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***No 3, February 1990***

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# Soviet Union KOMMUNIST

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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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## KOMMUNIST

No 3, February 1990

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### In the Beginning Was the Word

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[Text] For the past 2 years blood has been shedding in the Transcaucasus. The January tragedy in Azerbaijan shook up the entire country and alarmed the entire world. The people no longer only mourn the victims but also ask: Is the regime strong and are the ways of perestroika reliable? This is a dangerous time in the country's life.

We have as yet to find our way in the chaos of facts and seek answers to questions, many of which are already being asked. To what extent is there a national factor beyond the bitter events; where do we find a social factor, concealed in national clothing? Why, ignoring cadre changes, in two republics the party leadership and the state authorities remain hopelessly weak? To what extent are acts of violence the result of the blind rage of the crowd or the planned actions of provocateurs? Who benefits from such actions? What forces stand behind them? It will be not easy to provide answers and many new questions will arise until we manage to understand everything. One unquestionable lesson, however, should be learned by all of us.

Whatever dramas may have occurred in various parts of the country in recent years, in the beginning was the word. "The word did not predict storms. It was fiery from the start," reminds us Bulat Okudzhava in the poetry with which he reacted to the new trouble. How can we determine the limit beyond which any verbal thunder is replaced by the thunder of fire arms?

Let us recall some links in the chain of events, already repeatedly stained by blood.

First we had the criticism of the many years of violation the national rights of Armenians in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]. There was the demand to separate the NKAO from Azerbaijan and the slaughter in Sumgait. There was a lengthy increase in tension in the NKAO and around it: strikes, blockades, threats and acts of violence. Neither side achieved its objectives and none of the initial problems were resolved. The struggle, nonetheless, triggered new problems one of the most difficult and long-term among which, perhaps, is that of hundreds of thousands of refugees running out of both republics. Then we new links were added to the chain: the actions taken by the Azerbaijani authorities against NKAO autonomy, the resolution passed by the Armenian Supreme Soviet on incorporating the NKAO, the pogroms in Baku and the

introduction of troops. There were further casualties and more thousands of refugees and other steps not leading away from the bloody swamp but going even deeper into it.

How many events can be recalled from these 2 years: had we known when things began to happen and how they would end we would have acted differently or else kept quiet. No, let us not condemn the very first word of criticism. It had to be heard, for we could no longer live as in the past. We shall not call for tempering criticism today: there is no such thing as too much criticism if it is just. However, it is not in vain that Vladimir Dal gives three meanings for the word "critical." The first is, "related to criticism, a substantiated study; capable of good and accurate judgment and assessment." The second: "Tend to blame and to seek shortcomings." The third: "Difficult, dangerous (see crisis), leading to a turn, to a coup."

To what type of turn or coup is the course of events taking us?

A great deal of things to be eliminated in the course of perestroika have accumulated in our social life. The question is how to eliminate the unnecessary without damaging the necessary. How to eliminate the old without hindering the building of the new. Many people believe that committing violence against the old order promises freedom soon. Actually, it can only trigger a nationwide demand addressed to the authorities: to use force for the sake of maintaining order. What position should be taken by the authorities which are equally criticized for action in bringing order as well as for inaction? This suits quite well those who would like to wreck perestroika. Yes, the counterviolence exerted by the authorities was triggered by the violence of extremists. However, such events do not bring us in the least any closer to democracy. There are those who are impatient to bring down the wall of public order. Let us ask ourselves: What would happen if behind that wall there turns out to be not freedom but dictatorship?

Is it not time to think and have second thoughts and not only about the Transcaucasus? In frequent cases we have heard elsewhere in the country abusive criticism without analytical criticism, firing automatic thoughtless verbal double shots: "fascist"- "occupationist;" "stagnant"- "separatist," etc. Every day one can hear in Moscow and in any part of Russia a verbal exchange of fire such as "particrat"- "demagogue." Thoughtless and one-sided statements do not come only from "below." They are also sounded in the materials of the central mass information organs and also included sometimes in official documents.

Naturally, it is not merely a question of the form of such statements. The deafening manner, as though especially adapted to replace human thought with an animal shriek is by no means always mandatorily thoughtless. By no means is it being accidentally used when efforts are made to assert one's own rights by harming the rights of others.

The danger remains high. Even after the Baku tragedy, many are the people who, while mourning "their own" dead are unwilling to remember "the other." However, there also are gleams of hope. In the terrible January days the participants in social movements in Georgia broke up an initiated political demonstration in Tbilisi, realizing that this was not the time for it. The initial talks were held between the opposite sides and movements in Armenia and Azerbaijan and initial, albeit partial, agreements were reached. The word of reason was heard coming out of Moscow as well and out of many other parts of the country. So far, however, this has been too little. We shall be able to relax only when every citizen learns to distinguish a false note in the criticism and abuse instead of a criticism-analysis and when everyone, hearing a hysterical intonation in the speech of a speaker would not hasten to support him but harshly ask: "Why is he shouting all this? Let us think."

Words have been very important in politics at all times. In our tempestuous time it is particularly important not only to block the path of open speculations on emotional statements but also to avoid a thoughtless attitude toward the word. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## THE CPSU BEFORE THE CONGRESS

### Society, Classes, Party

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[Text] As we approach the 28th Congress, the debate on the new image of the CPSU, and the democratization of its internal party life increasingly sharpen the basic problems of the party's structure and activities. In their letters, the writers ask: What is the party's place in our present society, on what social strata or classes is it based? Some question the stipulation of the statutes concerning the class and, at the same time, the nationwide nature of the CPSU. How accurate is this double nature?

We believe that no one has ready answers to such questions. They must be sought collectively, selecting the strongest, most rational and most constructive among the abundance of currently existing viewpoints, testing in the course of debates the reliability of arguments. Two polarized views on the role and place of the party in society are expressed in the present selection by I. Linkov, doctor of historical sciences, and V. Vilchek, candidate of art studies. It opens with a letter by A. Petrovskiy, member of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, clearly proving that no simple answers can be given to even seemingly simple questions.

### A Simple Question

My 17-year old grandson loves to ask me difficult questions on problems of current policy. This time, however, the question was extremely simple. That is what he apparently thought and, initially, that is what it

seemed to me as well. "Grandpa," he asked, "what is a worker? What is a scientific definition of a worker?" Wisened by nearly 30 years of experience in writing articles for a great variety of encyclopedias and dictionaries, without any whatsoever apprehension I began to compile a definition: "A worker is a participant in the process of the division of labor, who..." I went no further and I, to the amazement of my daring interlocutor, began to mumble something and, in the final account, capitulated, saying that I must think about it....

Naturally, first of all I consulted references. Since the question was not about workers living under capitalism, "forced to sell their manpower to private owners" (my interlocutor had already read about it in textbooks and could provide quite accurate quotations), I was interested in the definition of the concept of "worker" or "workers" under socialism. With some amazement I discovered that the term was to be found in any dictionary or encyclopedia available to me. Everywhere there were articles about the "working class." However, to understand from such articles who specifically, under our circumstances, could be classified as member of this class, turned out to be impossible. The only thing that one could learn from such articles was that it was a "class of working people in nationally owned socialist enterprises, owners of the means of production, and constituting the most progressive and organized force of society."

Let us set aside the current energetically discussed question of whether enterprises are owned by the state or by the nation and let us concentrate on interpreting the concept of "working people in socialist enterprises." Let us imagine for a minute a big book-publishing house. Hardly anyone would start denying that it employs working people (excluding inveterate loafers). Let us begin with the finished product. The truck driver delivers it to the book centers. The packer wraps the books for shipment. Other working people print, assemble and put the covers on. Are all of them workers? Naturally, they are. Furthermore, from morning until evening typists type, proofreaders scrupulously go over the texts until their eyes hurt, typesetters and editors sweat over them, then there are the illustrators.... Furthermore, the author does not stand aside almost from the beginning to the final stage of the creation of a specific consumer product—a book—which is a subject of spiritual and material culture, the value of which is set in monetary terms. Are all of them workers? Are they not? If so, why not? What is the criterion on the basis of which one could separate a typesetter from a typist, a typist from a proof reader, a proof reader from a technical editor, etc.? I realize that such a formulation of the question may seem strange. In fact, who does not know what is a worker?

I, like everyone else, know that a miner in a mine, a steel smelter by a Martin furnace, a weaver, are workers.... However, all of this is known "on the level of the first signaling system," i.e., when we deal with emotionally colored images. At this point I and, obviously, anyone



else finds everything clear. However, if we were asked to provide a scientific definition, the clear images and different concepts become inevitable: we need precise criteria which could set some working people in state enterprises apart from other, being unable to identify in a socialist society its progressive and organized force exclusively on the basis of so-called ordinary awareness.

So, what are we to do? Obviously, it would be expedient to seek some basis for singling out workers among the other working people, having failed to find such a definition in authoritative encyclopedic publications.

Let us apply the following system: let us formulate hypotheses which may help us to determine the necessary criteria and let us try to prove or disprove them.

To begin with, obviously, we cannot apply the concept we cited of ownership of the means of production as a criterion for such differentiation. As a worker, does a milling machine operator own more (or will even own, something we hope for, under the conditions of perestroika) means of production compared to a plant director or shop chief, who are not considered workers?

The second hypothesis is the simplest possible: a worker is a person who produces the end labor product which is to become an object of consumption. It is precisely such people that tighten the final bolt on a motor vehicle moving along the conveyer belt. I am afraid that this hypothesis would not work. In order to justify it we should ignore the entire lengthy production process of the creation of an automobile, which involves the participation of die press operators, fitters, engineers, personnel of the technical control department, designers and many other working people. What specifically does a driver who sits behind the steering wheel of an automobile which has come off the assembly-line produce?

Here is the third hypothesis: a working person who does physical labor or, in any case, combines physical with mental labor. Here as well we would fail. What if not physical labor is being performed by a sculptor who makes a statue out of a block of marble, i.e., who produces a finished material product of cultural value. Is there more physical labor applied by the engineer of an electric locomotive engine (a worker!), compared to the captain of an airplane or an instructor (who is not a worker!)? Eye microsurgery at S. Fedorov's clinic is a complex conveyer-type process, as a result of which an artificial lens is implanted in the patient, requiring tremendous physical stress, micron-level precision of movements, the most skillful hands of the surgeon, the use of a variety of instruments and utmost skill. What is the essential difference between this surgeon and an assembly-line worker or tuner of precision parts of instruments and motors? The physician who performs plastic surgery on a human face creates beauty. The barber does the same thing with the customer's hair. On the level of professional-production personnel I see no

difference. This, however, is not the case in terms of their social status. Some are workers while others are not. Why?

Let us cite yet another assumption: workers do not shun "dirty" work. Actually, however, it is precisely this fact, as it became clear, that was the initial premise for the question which led me into an impasse. It seemed that my grandson, who is attending medical school, argued with someone who claimed that in the course of his work the worker is not reluctant to dirty his hands, unlike intellectuals, including physicians. The young medical worker stood up for the people of his profession, saying that a laboratory technician in a hospital, who spends his entire day analyzing urine, feces and phlegm, is engaged in no less "dirty" work than a fitter or a bedpan washer. He also mentioned physicians such as urologists, pathologists and proctologists. I do not know about others, but to me these arguments sounded convincing.

I am afraid that the fifth hypothesis may seem simply insulting to a working person. I am quoting it simply for the sake of rejecting it from the start. The worker is a working person who allegedly has no creative approach to his work. He is a simple follower of instructions, he does what has been ordered by superiors. He is given a blueprint which he must follow. How is he distinguished from a teacher who also performs assignments related to training in accordance with curriculums, instructions and method guides? Are there innovative teachers? There also are, and to an even greater extent, workers who are rationalizers and inventors. The creative principle would not bother a worker providing that he is not hampered. It would be just as stupid to state that a worker is a person whose skills are lower than those of his superiors in the hierarchical ladder of his enterprise. Let us compare a sixth-grade turner with the bookkeeper of the plant administration. Who is more skilled? Who in this case would dare to assert an opinion? Incidentally, could we compare that same turner with an auxiliary worker or a sales clerk in a vegetable store? All that unites these working people is a line in the table of organization.

Here is another hypothesis. A worker is a person with insufficient education. He does not have higher training. However, I know many workers who are VUZ graduates. Should we introduce in the definition we seek the formulation "lack of higher training?" We are, nonetheless, living in the age of the scientific and technical revolution and computerization, when the line separating physical from mental labor truly vanishes. Is it a question of a diploma! Let me recall a few things. By the end of the 1970s I was heading a chair at Moscow University. Occasionally we were visited by a very old man, a mechanic working at the physics department. According to the personnel department documents, he was a worker. This enabled him to earn a pension although being employed. Yet he dealt with the same problems as many scientific associates. How amazed I was when I accidentally learned that this worker was Lev Termen, a legendary inventor, whose name was famous

in the 1920s. He was considered Marconi's equal. He had lived a long time in the United States and then, in the 1930s, returning home, found himself far from Moscow. Termen had invented a then considered fantastic electric musical instrument named "Termenvoks" and, during his visit to Soviet Russia, successfully taught V.I. Lenin to play the instrument. This was the same worker Lev Termen who, last year, aged 93, became candidate CPSU member.... No, I believe that no one would dare require a general education or any other "general cultural" qualification for awarding the title "worker."

Let me now try to structure the seventh, a strictly psychological, hypothesis. Could it be that the demarcation line between workers and nonworkers is in the awareness of the people? We make frequent mention of the class self-awareness of the working person. What can be said on this account? Could it be that it does exist but if it is a question of the society in which we live I, as a psychologist, am unfamiliar with any kind of study which would justify any mention of such distinctions (for example, a worker at the technical control department in a cannery, who rejects cans of apple jam which move in front of her down the conveyer belt, and the proof reader in a printing press, who looks for misprints in the text). It is true that in 1927-1928 the main topic of the State Institute of Psychology, Pedology and Psychotechnology (GIPPP) was the "Study of the Characteristics of the Native Moscow Proletariat, Through the Method of Determining the Speed and Power of Reaction, Extent of Memory, and So On." To the best of my knowledge, however, as was to be expected, nothing came out of such studies. Naturally, this does not mean that there are no basic psychological differences in the mentality of the working person as opposed to the loafer or the thief who, as we know, has sworn never to work. This, however, is a different question and a different topic.

No more than seven hypotheses were formulated here, offering possible criteria which could be used to provide us with the necessary definition. Not one of them could be proved. This analytical method is nothing other than a variant of the "trial and error" method. Someone may be able to suggest other more productive hypotheses which could shed some light on this scientific problem. This problem is quite important, considering that in solving numerous political, legal, social and economic problems we use the self-evident, one would think, concept of "worker."

One thing about which I am totally convinced is that these are no idle thoughts. I have the highest possible respect for the working person, for all working people and, like everyone else, I scorn loafers and all parasites. The more difficult the work of a person is, the more useful he is to society, the greater the respect he deserves. However, when no one has actually defined a concept used for purposes of social stratification and for solving the problem of power, at this point some serious thinking becomes necessary.

At the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies, one of the speeches included the following statement: "I represent here his majesty the working class." I would not argue against this statement. However, the question arises about the subjects of his majesty within the corps of deputies. Who are they? Are they engineers, jurists, professors, officers? At the second Congress of Deputies, a member of the trade unions expressed his concern about the fact that the peoples deputies included less workers and kolkhoz members by a factor of 2.5 compared to their representation in the Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation. He spoke of someone's (incidentally, whose?) aspiration to "remove workers and peasants from the political arena." Throughout his entire speech he argued that one must "give priority to defending the interests of the working person," and that "we need a mechanism which would protect above all the majority of simple people, the working people," "the simple working people," the "labor majority," and so on. Let us point out that such statements are frequently made.

Generally speaking, I do not understand here what "simplicity" has to do with it? Are there more working people who are "simpler" than, for instance, that same chairman of the republic council of trade unions? It would be quite interesting to know whether he considers himself a "working person?" Why not? If not, what does he do?

It has always seemed to me that the category of "working person" includes absolutely anyone who works conscientiously and efficiently, who is useful to society, the person who works according to his capabilities although, it is true, not always receiving according to his labor. I do not see, in this sense, any difference between a docent and a switch man, an actor and a militiaman, and a blacksmith and a diplomat. All of them work and who will deny this?! I too dedicate my entire priority to defending the interests of the working people. However, it would be interesting to know who is not part of this "labor majority," who is a member of the minority? Is it a question of prison inmates and criminals? Should we go to war over this topic? What about bureaucrats? It would be stupid to depict the entire administrative apparatus as an army of bureaucrats. How about members of cooperatives? Whatever accusations may be leveled against them, lack of industriousness would not be one. As we know, there are workers, peasants, employees, students and pensioners who live below the poverty line. Who among them should be considered a "simple working person," and who should be deprived of this title? To whom would the people's deputy give priority and to whom among them is he ready to deny this title?

In these notes I do not claim to provide authoritative views, for I do not consider myself a specialist in this area. I presume that a serious discussion of this matter should be within the competence of social scientists—sociologists, historians, political economists, jurists, and political experts. Let them decide and point out errors in my thoughts, if such indeed exist. Let them set the

scientific criteria which guided the USSR State Committee for Labor, Gosstandart and other authoritative institutions in drafting the All-Union Classification of Professions of Workers and Positions of Employees and Their Wage Rates, and classifying as either (worker or employee) thousands of professions and positions, ranging from minister to diver. Let us not forget that the position in the various parts of the classifier determines a great deal of things related to the material and legal status of the working person.

It was precisely such considerations that I shared with an acquaintance of mine, who is a "worker" by social origin and engineer by training, and doctor of sciences who, in his laboratory, developed several interesting technical appliances and participated in their practical application in industry. He heard me out attentively and said: "Here is what we do! As long as your colleagues social scientists have not agreed on all of these criteria and definitions, please consider me a worker!"

#### **I. Linkov: 'Class Approach Puts Everything in its Place'**

The formula "renovation of the party" is no more than an appeal which expresses the need to reform the CPSU. This formula covers the entire range of social concepts concerning the scale, depth and nature of renovation. Naturally, in the course of the discussion all of them have the right to be represented. However, if we wish to restore the Leninist type of party, the Leninist concept of party structure and activities should be the basis for renovation. In that case, the search will take place not in an empty area and not through abstract theorizing but on the basis of methodology, theory and, which is particularly important, the historical experience of the CPSU.

The party was created by V.I. Lenin as a party of the working class. It was on this basis that its outlook and revolutionary theory were shaped and a strategy, tactics, principles and standards of party life were formulated. Subsequently, something else was added to the "party of the working class" concept: "The party of the whole people." This double feature was codified in the official documents—the CPSU Program and Statutes. The first time that such an "enrichment" of the Leninist doctrine of the party showed up was in the documents of the 22nd Congress, together with the adoption of the third party program, the program for building a communist society. It included the following statement: "The Communist Party of the working class has become the vanguard of the Soviet people and the party of the whole people...."

I remember that this formulation put the social scientists in an impasse: How to interpret it? Was it a rejection of the class nature of the party in favor of the national nature? At that time social science publications provided no answer; nor was there a scientific development of this formula either on the eve of or after the congress. The result was that it was so inconsistent with reality that even despite the active promotion at that time of the so-called theory of "developed socialism," the 25th CPSU Congress was forced to amend it: "Under the

conditions of a developed socialist society, when the Communist Party has become the party of the entire people, it by no means loses its class nature. In terms of its nature the CPSU was and remains the party of the working class."

The comparison alone between these formulations proves that the question of the "party of the whole people" remains, to this day, theoretically undeveloped. Under the conditions of the period of stagnation neither objective nor subjective prerequisites to this effect existed. Today, when we are turning away from ideological dreams to reality and faced with the need to develop a new program and bylaws for the CPSU, a clear answer must be provided to the question: Is the very concept of "party of the whole people" legitimate?

Is it possible for an individual political party to express the interests of the entire people, i.e., the interests of all classes and social groups within Soviet society? My belief is that, for the time being, it cannot. This would mean that social consciousness has become shaped according to party ideology, something which, naturally, is not possible. Suffice it to point out that the interests of the working class clash with those of the declassed elements, the dealers in the shady economy. Nor do the interests of the different social groups of working people coincide with each other. The multiple economic systems, the way to which is being opened by the new laws on the land, leasing, ownership, and so on, increases such differences of interests. At best, their combination is a thing of the future, the distant future at that. If such is the case, the formula "party of the whole people" has no real basis, at least at the present historical stage. One may think that this puts an end to the problem. However, it is also important to determine the consequences of this unsuitable supplement to the Leninist definition of the party's class nature. In my view, this was predetermined by the entire course of the country's post-October development.

The CPSU was established and started functioning in a multiparty environment, when the interests of even single classes and social groups, including the working class, were simultaneously represented by several parties. The situation at that time demanded tactical flexibility and instant readiness to change organizational ways and means of work. Hence the constant concentration on the search of ways and means with which to express, in the fullest possible way, the interests of the working class and other toiling strata. The result was the October victory.

The ruling party assumed full responsibility for the fate of the revolution and the life of the working people. Difficulties in building the new society and the civil war drastically changed the circumstances and conditions under which the party operated. As was pointed out at the 11th RKP(b) Congress, "in order to consolidate the victory of the proletariat and to maintain, in the midst of a raging civil war, the dictatorship of the proletarian vanguard, it became necessary to deprive of the freedom of organization all political groups hostile to the Soviet

system. This was an exceptional, a forced decision. For that reason alone, as the situation stabilized, it should have been nullified. However, Stalinism asserted the one-party system as the standard of party and social life.

A monopoly status, along with the consolidation of the party's leading and guiding role, created conditions for activities which were unnatural in the case of a political organization. The Stalinist dictatorship made it the dominant link in the command-administrative system. Party and state functions became intertwined and largely identical; the illusion developed that the party can express the totality of interests of all social strata. As further successes were achieved in the building of socialism, this illusion strengthened even further, ignoring any critical interpretation of the ways through which it was achieved and at what price. The lack of political opponents led us to forget concepts such as "tactics," "accord," and "alliance." Theory became dogmatized and the organizational structure became ossified. Methods of political leadership were replaced by methods of direct management of society. Intolerance of dissidence reached its peak and became the standard. "Enemies of the people" could be found in each class and social group.

In civilized and democratic countries, it is the state that is entrusted with serving the interests of the entire nation. In our country this function should be assumed by the soviets. Recently a newspaper described the Supreme Soviet as the social mirror of society. Let this mirror reflect the totality of interests of the Soviet people; let us render God what is God's and Caesar what is Caesar's. The interests of the people should be served by the soviets and the interests of the working class, by the party.

I can anticipate the question: Would this lead to a rejection of the formula that "the CPSU is the party of the whole people," and pit the working class and its party against all other social strata and, above all, the intelligentsia? Would restoration of the class nature of the CPSU conflict with the present aspiration on the part of the leading political parties in the world to win over on their side the highest possible percentage of the population on the basis of nationwide and universal human values? I believe that it would not, and it does not contradict it if we proceed not from the vulgar and far-fetched but the true Marxist-Leninist understanding of the nature of the party of the working class as being a party of the whole nation. This means the ability to express the interests not of the entire people but of all working people. The difference between these approaches is clear. By expressing the interests of the working class the party also expresses the interests of the absolute majority of the members of socialist society, not only because the working class today accounts for the numerical majority of the employed population and plays, as the basic production force in society, a leading role in its life, but also because the interests of the remaining working people coincide with those of the

working class, not with all of them, naturally, but with the basic, the main interests.

Since the CPSU can express only the basic, the determining interests of the working people, the other political forces could be objectively represented by organizations, movements and parties created by the different social groups within society. Under the conditions of democratization they have already appeared; they will continue to appear in the future and, incidentally, also wither away. Therefore, does this mean that a conversion to a multiparty system at the present stage in our social life is becoming reality? By no means does everyone agree with such an interpretation of the question. Many are those who believe that it is necessary to preserve the one-party system which would make it possible to consolidate society and to concentrate all its healthy forces on solving the problems of perestroika. Accelerating the process of creating a multiparty system and the aspiration to deprive the CPSU of its status as a ruling party, as some extremist elements would have it today, when they call for "soviets without communists," or else who see the solution in the adoption of capitalism by our society is, in my view, antisocial. The CPSU is not only the initiator of perestroika but also the guarantor of the country's socialist path of development.

Nonetheless, we must realize that the process of establishing a multiparty system, which is already gathering strength, cannot be stopped through administrative prohibitions. That is why we must concern ourselves with strengthening the consolidating role played by the CPSU among all social strata and groups within Soviet society. How to attain this? On what basis? I believe that it could and should be based on the essential coincidence of the interests of all working people. It is precisely the ability of the CPSU to express the fundamental interests of all social groups of working people that will help it find a common language with the other political forces within society, forces which share its views on the objectives and tasks of perestroika.

It is on this basis that the approaches to relations between the party and the political organizations and politicized independent movements, and structures, which hold ideological and political positions different from those of the CPSU, become clearer. The only acceptable path for the party in this case is the historically tested experience of the approach adopted by our own and other parties: a serious dialogue, a comparison among arguments and the ideological-political struggle.

The adoption of such an open position by the party would make it possible, on the one hand, to surmount the comprehensive currently observed sluggishness in the way the party organizations react to the activities of informal organizations, to seek points of contact among the different interests, and jointly to work on solving a specific range of problems. On the other, this would make possible efficiently to counter the blunt attacks of



antisocialist and antiperestroyka forces. Changing relations with other social movements would, unquestionably, revive and develop the lost skill of convincing and shaping public opinion.

There is a natural aspiration not only to express more completely the interests of the working class but also to win over the other toiling strata. This also predetermines changes in cadre policy, such as abandoning the formal-nomenclatural approach, and supporting and assisting on an equal footing the promotion to leading positions of both party and nonparty members in the governmental and economic areas of Soviet society, people who are honest, decent and able, people who live with the interests of the working man.

Dropping the claim of expressing the interests of the whole people would eliminate the declarative and contradictory nature of Article 6 of the current USSR Constitution, which conflicts with Lenin's theory. Any party should remain ruling as long as the people trust it. Of late, it has been repeatedly noted that the right to party leadership must be earned on a daily basis, through practical activities, and that the struggle for such a right must also be daily. The trust of the people in the CPSU must be earned by enhancing the party's authority among the working people, maintaining unbreakable ties with them and doing everything possible to express their interests through political decisions and practical actions.

Today a great deal is being said and written about "communists" and "party members," and about the color of party cards. What are the criteria on the basis of which the political views of various perestroyka supporters are being assessed? Think: they all root for the people yet occasionally the views they hold are the complete opposite of those held by others. Class and national concepts, in their Marxist-Leninist interpretation, immediately put everything in its place. A communist, who shares the outlook of the working class and its class viewpoint will not, shall we say, support private ownership which would directly lead to the appearance within our society of a social stratum of coupon clippers, who would live an easy life at the expense of the added value created by the working class, by the working people. He would not forget that in the new model of socialism as well the fundamental principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work" must remain inviolable.

The class nature of the party is secured also by the structure of party ranks. Abandoning the double formula clears the grounds for the revival of the Leninist theory of party membership. As we know, V.I. Lenin paid exceptionally great attention to the theoretical development and practical implementation of the principle of the socioclass approach in structuring the party ranks and securing the decisive predominance in the party's social structure of the best members of the working class. In this case problems of the growth and control of the party structure were considered as inseparably related to

the state and development of its social base and the study of the objective status of classes and social groups within society at each specific historical stage. The economic status of classes and social groups within society and their world outlook, interests and objectives were determining factors in assessing the social base. Lenin proceeded from the fact that, from the very start, the working class is social base of the Communist Party. It is in the working class that the party found "a fully determined and strictly class-oriented base...." (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 14, p 80). It is precisely the working class that shapes, that singles out and nurtures the party (see op. cit., vol 24, p 34).

These Leninist ideas must be reinterpreted and taken into consideration in structuring the party. Their methodological significance is permanent. Their consideration is also important because, as it has become clear to us now, we are much closer to building socialism than we were when this statement was made, compared to building a communist society. The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, having deemed necessary to put an end to "apportionment," did not provide the answer as to what should it be replaced with. Many scientists and practical workers began to believe that the decisions made at all party congresses, starting with the 22nd, concerning the leading place of the working class in the social structure of the party, had lost their validity and that all social strata had thus gained the right to be equally represented within the CPSU. Yet, according to Lenin, the members of the other classes and social strata were accepted by the party only as they converted to the positions of the working class. It is precisely this meaning and spirit that are expressed in the party's first and second programs.

The clear orientation toward the working class within the CPSU under the conditions of the renovation of society and political pluralism is extremely necessary, for it is not excluded that, as was the case during previous historical stages, workers-communists will frequently have the final word in ensuring unity within party ranks and in the practical implementation of party policies. The support of party policy and resolutions by the working class was, is and will remain within the foreseeable future the foundation of the party's strength. Both under Lenin and now, under the conditions of perestroyka, the industrial enterprises are the main party strongholds. Forgetting and abandoning this principle has never led to anything good. Is this not confirmed by the sharp aggravation of tension in many parts of the country?

In directing the party toward strengthening the worker nucleus, V.I. Lenin taught us to see the disparate nature of the working class and to distinguish among its individual strata. He cautioned against including in the party's ranks people who have been workers for a short time only and have not gone through serious training in industry (see op. cit., vol 45, pp 17-18). In defining the concept of "worker," he thus suggested that "this concept include only those who in fact, based on their status

in life, should adopt a proletarian mentality" (ibid., p 20). This Leninist concept, which he expressed in the final period of his life, should become one of the criteria in accepting workers in the party. Violations of this criterion during the post-Leninist period were more the rule than the exception.

In formulating specific steps, it is also important to take into consideration that in Lenin's time, in accepting someone as party member, the party organizations proceeded from the acknowledgment of the fact that even at industrial enterprises the structure of the working class was not homogeneous. They concentrated their attention above all on the leading skills—metallurgical workers, machine builders, miners, and many others, related to the latest equipment and technology of that time, and to cadre workers who had spent long periods of time working in large-scale machine output. The use of this experience today seems not only possible but also expedient. One of the most acceptable options could be the formulation of different conditions governing the acceptance of cadre workers employed in the basic areas of industrial production and workers employed in other sectors and areas of the national economy, as was practiced in the 1920s. Naturally, it is not a question of mechanically applying past experience to present conditions. Today the very concept of "category" as such becomes unacceptable. However, strengthening the worker nucleus within the party has not lost its significance.

Nor have measures applied in the past, such as appealing to workers in industry to join the party. This was carried out in the form of party weeks and direct appeals. Based on historical experience, it would be expedient to consider at the 28th CPSU Congress, along with steps to purge the party from passive and unworthy ways of strengthening its ranks, summoning to the CPSU cadre workers, describing this, shall we say, as the "perestroika call." Reality itself leads us to recruit, in the present difficult stage, a new detachment of the most active supporters of perestroika within the CPSU, and to strengthen the party's influence in labor production collectives which are at the cutting edge of our reorganizations. This would also be consistent with the approach taken by Lenin to strengthening the party ranks. Lenin frequently emphasized that during the most difficult times for the country the party turns to the working class, for it is precisely in the working class that it sees its most reliable source of strength.

Without a return to the class and whole-nation approach, as understood by Lenin, in my view, the CPSU could have neither a present nor a future. If it indeed wishes to become the leading force of the renovated socialist society it should once again, as was the case under Lenin, blend with its class, and revive the ability to store and express to the fullest extent its interests and to remember that it is thus that it will also express the basic and vitally important interests of all other social groups of working people.

#### V. Vilchek: 'Revival of the Class Approach—What Lies Behind It?'

The most severe of all the crises which are tearing apart our society is the crisis within the CPSU; this is the Gordian knot within which all other problems have become entangled. Regardless of the notorious Article 6 of the Constitution, which merely codifies the real state of affairs, the party committees were and still are the bearing structure of the country's political system. Party ideology, even one reduced to a set of sacrosanct dogmas, functioned as a quasireligion, which ensured conformity within an internally heterogeneous society. Understandably, the crisis of such foundations led to the intensification of chaos in the minds and in the economy, the explosion of nationalism and irrationalism, etc.

This crisis came to a head a long time ago: the chronic ills and difficulties of society could no longer be explained by accusing domestic and foreign enemies of intrigues, or blamed on the errors of the latest "outstanding Marxist-Leninist." They led to a realization of the falseness of our social doctrine itself. Its destruction, accelerated by glasnost and the erosion of the "image of the enemy," the struggle against whom is the only possible way of survival of any obsolete ideology, questioned also the legitimacy, the justification of the command-administrative management system, which also included the party.

We can accurately identify the point at which the underlying, the smoldering crisis broke out: it was at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which passed a resolution according to which the party would abandon functions which were alien to it as a political and ideological organization and would restore full power to the soviets. This was a decision the significance of which would be difficult to overestimate. Its logic was obvious. A "state-party" is bound to be totalitarian. The essence of totalitarianism is not a repressive regime. It is not an administrative system but a blend, a lack of differentiation among the various components of social life: ideological, political and economic. Totalitarianism is equally obvious in the cult of Stalin and the possibility of giving a "class evaluation" to genetics or judging a farmer-based economy not from the viewpoint of its economic efficiency but from an "ideological" viewpoint.

During the period of stagnation our society had stopped being totalitarian. It had lost its fanatical quasireligiousness which had degenerated into hypocrisy and cynicism and had led to bureaucratization and corruption. The administrative system—a semi-decayed totalitarianism—was still firmly and eagerly holding society in its clutches. Getting rid of it and releasing perestroika—a transition from an unnatural condition into a condition normal in terms of a contemporary industrial civilization—meant destroying the archaic symbiosis embodied in the "state-party" concept.



Theoretically, there was yet another way toward achieving a society of parliamentary democracy: faster democratization within the party itself, converting it into a free alliance among all healthy socially active forces, united in their unconditional acknowledgment of constitutional norms of an internationalist state and principles of democratic socialism and the priority of universal human values, the subject of which is not the nation, not the people but the individual. With such a variant in its development, radically changed, the party clearly could oppose nationalistic and other centrifugal trends and assimilate, albeit as separate trends and factions, the majority of progressive social forces; the democratically elected party committees would have essentially converted into a political chamber of soviets, controlled by a chamber of representatives of all nonpolitical communities.

However, life has its own peculiar logic: the idea which prevailed was that of the "separation of functions," with a compromise consisting of a "double mandate." According to this concept, the power would go to the soviets, while the party, having become the political vanguard of the people, would concentrate on problems of ideology, on the formulation of the theory and strategy of social development. Possibly, there was no other means of freeing perestroika, of changing the country's political system, freeing the hands of reformers within the party's leadership and leading society out of its state of apathy. However, this choice as well proved dangerous.

The CPSU had been established as a power-wielding organization. Losing the power, essentially the party organizations become outsiders, increasingly realizing that the functions left to them are nothing but fiction. Who would deal with the formulation of theory and strategy? Would it be the raykom apparat? Would it be the primary party organization in a soap-making factory? Why not let scientists and the strategists of social development deal with theory—the Supreme Soviet, ideologues and educators, writers, journalists and teachers? What does being the political vanguard mean? A vanguard role means universally acknowledged leadership.

Therefore, what gave us the right to lay a claim to leadership? Was it that the party hierarchy put at the top a man who had the courage to start telling the truth and thus accelerating the inevitable denouement of the 70-year old tragedy? Yes, this was a spiritual exploit which was performed, alas, not by the party but by reformers in its leadership although they too, as one could easily guess (and today guessing is not even necessary, for this has been publicly acknowledged), did not even think that they would release from the bottle the genie of a capricious history. The initiated transformation process unquestionably established differences within the society, but by no means on the basis of the party principle: the distance between CPSU members N. Andreyeva and S. Andreyev is much greater than the one

separating the latter from nonparty member Ye. Yevtushenko, socialist F. Mitterrand, republican George Bush and conservative Margaret Thatcher.

Yes, we condemned the errors and crimes of the past and thus performed the ceremony of ritual sacrifice and the overthrow of the false idols. However, even if we had truly repented for what had been done not by "them" (Stalin's satraps and Brezhnev's bureaucracy) but by us, through our silence and on our behalf—this would hardly have had any effect: responding to a summons may be difficult but is no cause for ovations.

Such is the reality, and it would be unreasonable to ignore it. Naturally, "one can see better from a distance." However, today a sufficient distance has already appeared: it is in the countries of Eastern Europe. However, the topic of the party crisis remained and still is taboo. This vow of silence was partially voluntary and conscious; it was dictated by ideas shared by many and in this case I am not alone. All radical reconstructions in history which, to a certain extent, are similar to ours, have needed an authoritarian guarantor. Why should we not link our hopes to the "authoritarianism of traditions," the traditions of party leadership which would act precisely as a political guarantor of social stability and would make it possible to ensure the crisis-free development, to a greater or lesser extent, of the democratic process, until a market has been developed along with parliamentarianism, a new federalism, political forces which could engage in a constructive dialogue, etc.

However, many apparatchiks, who swore that the party has no interests other than those of the people, were unwilling to nurture the cuckoos of democracy, vigilantly seeing to it that only their look-alikes would remain in their nests. Instead of promoting the democratic process and becoming a kind of umpire in the rivalry among healthy social forces, some party committees initiated a struggle against the public. Others fell into a state of anabiosis, observing not without malice, it seems to me, the development of chaos in a power vacuum. Others decided to secure for themselves the role of leaders by supporting nationalistic and other similar movements or the corporate egotism of enterprises and individual regions. Others again were in a hurry to become spokesmen for the discontent of the masses with the economic crisis and with the shady and semi-shady economy, the concerns presented on the television screens and in the newspapers, i.e., the consequences of the long command-administrative rule.

In my view, the reanimation of the "class" party theory became the ideological reflection of the confusion and fear of the future. It is simple: as the dogma we memorized since childhood stipulates, the working class is the leading force of society. Were we not reminded of this by the strikes which shook up the country? (Some scientific research institutes as well were not reluctant to go on strike for a week or so although no one noticed it.) Consequently, in order to preserve its leading role in

society, the CPSU must remember that it is the party of the working class and the spokesman for its interests.

Naturally, it can be said that, for some reason, it was precisely the members of the working class that were the least eager to rush into party membership. For many long years Candidate of Scientific Sciences Petrov had to wait before joining the front ranks because somewhere else fitter Sidorov had not "matured enough" to join, thereby disrupting the theoretically necessary social bal-  
last. However, such an objection can be blocked immediately: it is claimed that the party lost its attractiveness to the workers precisely because it forgot its class nature and replaced a strictly defined social base with a very amorphous one; having abandoned the slogan of the hegemony of the working class and yielding to the temptation of being the party of the whole people, it became the converging point for a variety of interests.

In short, nothing can be achieved with debates on the empirical level. Let us try to understand whether at one point the party had been, and could the party become, a political organization of the working class? What does the term working class mean and what do social classes mean in general? What are relations among them? What social forces are vanguard in society and, consequently, could secure for the party its leading role?

According to Engels, the division of society into social classes is based on the law of the division of labor. In principle, this idea is accurate if we apply it not to sectorial division, which triggers the questionable concept of the dual class nature of Soviet society ("workers and peasants"), and not the division of labor into physical and mental. Both "physical" and "mental" are the activities of any worker and it is quite idiotic to consider the "worker engaged in physical labor" as the bearer of progress, which leads precisely to the reduction of that same "physical" labor. Unfortunately, such a concept of the division of labor has played an extremely negative role in history, our history in particular, nurturing anti-intellectual prejudices and an obscurantist demagogy.

To repeat myself, in principle the idea of the division of labor as the foundation of the class stratification of society is unquestionably accurate if the only thing we bear in mind is a functional division which can be clearly seen in Lenin's definition of a class. In any society someone must deal with the production and reproduction of culture and knowledge; someone materializes such knowledge while someone else performs the functions of administration, power, and preservation of social stability. The differentiation of society in terms of these three functions is what leads to the creation of social classes, which are quite different and specific to individual societies.

In the so-called feudal society said differentiation does not go into the area of material production but runs along the line of separation of three public production systems: material, political and spiritual, thus triggering

closed classes-strata: peasants and artisans, military-feudal rulers, and clergy. In a contemporary society, functional differentiation penetrates material production itself, as a result of which from strata-class based, society becomes a strictly class society, consisting of the working class (industrial and agricultural), a managerial class (political and economic, who could be both owners and "capitalists," as well as hired employees and managers), and the class of the intelligentsia (scientific and technical and humanitarian).

Class is a theoretical concept which characterizes the status of a person within a system of production relations. The real person does not fit the "class" box. To begin with, he could belong to two classes (farmer, scientist-administrator, etc.), and, situationally, even to three classes, simultaneously. Second, man is the "sum total of all social relations:" national, demographic, confessional, ideological, interrelated with class, but not reduced to them and not stemming from them.

This leads to a number of conclusions which, in my view, are of practical significance:

By definition the division of labor means cooperation. Therefore, a standard of relations among classes is cooperation rather than struggle and interaction rather than suppression of one class by another;

Class interests and relations cannot be generalized. Depending on the specific historical situation, other could be dominant here: group, regional and national;

Neither theoretically nor practically, under contemporary conditions, could classes be classified into leading and led. All three functions in social production are identically and absolutely necessary and the leading role could belong not to one class or another but to various groups within each class, interrelated through a basic commonality of interests and opposing other groups of all classes, including their own.

It is obvious that from the empirical viewpoint the system suggested to the reader has been accurately dogmatized as "Marxist." Marx observed not a mature working class but a proletariat which was, again according to Marx, the product of a breakdown of estates, nations and other similar traditional communities. Still according to Marx, the proletariat has not only no possession but no fatherland, religion or family; it was on this that Marx based his faith in the radical revolutionism of the proletariat and its ability to develop a universal unity, the fact that this no one, becoming everyone, will no longer reproduce states, classes, religions and nations, having established a stateless, classless international social system—communism.

The time when this thought was expressed should be taken into consideration. It is more important, however, to pay attention to something else. Similar communist ideas, although dressed in unrecognizably different garb—mystical or religious—have invariably appeared during periods of profound crises, in the course of the

conversion of society from one civilization (or formative) status to another. It was in such marginal historical zones that a declassed mass appeared, dropping out of cultural traditions, tending to accept messianic ideas and becoming the foundations for an equalizing-communist so-called millenarist movements. Such movements, as explained by W. Turner, the noted cultural expert, include communes and communities created by masses which have been uprooted and are in a state of despair, who live on the margin of society or wherever the former patriarchal societies fall in the power of the industrial societies. As a rule, the British scientist notes, at the very early stages of religious or political movements of an equalizing type initial communism is replaced with "despotism, superbureaucratization or other types of structural rigidity.... People who live in a community sooner or later begin to demand of something or someone absolute power—whether a religious dogma, a God-inspired leader or a dictator." Actually, long before Turner, it was A. Hertzén who, with Babeuf in mind, proved the inevitable dialectics of equalizing-communist movements: "He died and on his grave an increasingly omnivorous monster known as **Centralization** grew."

No, I am not diverging from my topic. Quite meaningful to prerevolutionary Russia was the model suggested by Turner of a patriarchal society interacting with an industrial one. That is precisely why Russia, rather than Europe, which developed more organically, was able to withstand relatively easily the "infant diseases" of millenarism and proved to be so receptive to utopian equalization-communist "proletarian" ideas in Marxism, presented in a variety of forms. The social base of bolshevism was not the working class but the proletariat and the other marginal population strata which identified themselves with it. I believe that another major role in the victory of bolshevism was played by the fact that some of the ideas of Marx's doctrine triggered the subconscious reaction of the "Russian idea" with its antibourgeois, parochial and messianic nature.

Earlier than his supporters, Lenin realized that an attempt to make a breakthrough into the future could end in failure, into a collapse back to the totalitarian past of mankind. The dictatorship of the proletariat transformed with frightening speed into despotism, superbureaucratization and the cult of leaders. However, Lenin's efforts to take the country out of the reach of the "monster of Centralization" and quasireligious dogma, which proclaimed a radical "change of all concepts of ours on socialism," and the need for "self-Thermidorization," the rehabilitation of a class society, the conversion to a market economy and the NEP, yielded only short-term results. What won were the ideas and style shaped by Stalinist totalitarian socialism: an industrial society deprived of its organically inherent economic regulatory factors, which dissolved economics within ideology and politics.

This kind of society is painfully conflicting. Being totalitarian and unnatural in terms of contemporary industrial civilization, it is forced constantly to recreate its

own social base: a declassed mass is not a "demos" but an "okhlos," as it was known to the ancient Greeks. This was a proletarian worker who had poorly mastered his skill, who was living in semi-poverty and deprived of rights but who was, nonetheless, socially protected by low labor productivity and a noneconomic system which excluded unemployment. It was a declassed manager, deprived of his own administrative rights and functions other than fiscal and bureaucratic; a declassed intellectual, who did not know the meaning of intellectual freedom, a semibureaucrat-semispecialist, the creation of an unnatural system of selection of mediocrity and sifting out or eliminating individuality and talent.

At the same time our society-industrial and not unique in the world—was forced to tolerate and reproduce its specific class figures: the so-called worker, managerial and creative (scientific and technical) elite. They unquestionably were and are the country's backbone, but also equally unconditionally opponents of the authoritarian regime, and a potential base of an entirely different, not a totalitarian but a civil society. A worker who knows the value of his skill is the antagonist of the proletariat; a manager who is an independent and an initiative-minded administrator is the antagonist of the bureaucrat; an intellectual is the antagonist of diplomaed mediocrity, of the conformist—"educated person."

Conflicts and contradictions which, nonetheless, yield to resolution and compromise, for their basic social interests are identical, may exist among workers, intellectuals and administrators (managers or owners, which is one and the same, for the owner of stock could be equally an intellectual and a worker). In precisely the same way bureaucracy, its corrupt "hegemon" and diplomaed mediocrity are equally necessary to each other, although on the level of daily life what characterizes their interrelationship is not mutual respect but mutual dislike, suspicion, scorn and envy. A compromise is impossible between the former and the latter. The former are the bulwark of democracy, pluralism and a market economy. The latter are government despotism, intolerance and a noneconomic economy.

Therefore, authors who claim that the party cannot be an organization for the entire nation, for it cannot represent interests which are heterogeneous in their essence, are right. The point, however, is that the invisible gap runs not between classes but between the marginal and the vanguard groups of all three classes.

The party's future is entirely determined by the segment of society which will become its social base. So far the danger is very great that the conservatives, who are losing their power, will be looking for support among the marginal strata. This is a real threat, for in circumstances of deep crisis, which appears to some as doomsday, it is easy to integrate quite diverging forces: the dogmatist-ideologue who is experiencing a collapse, the embittered outsider, the chauvinist who believes great power to be the equivalent of internationalism, the black marketer,

who is interested in an inefficient governmental bureaucratic economic system, the literary worker who fades in the light of glasnost and the bureaucrat, frightened by the prospect of not only losing his privileges but also his job, along with a mass of other characters who are aware of their lack of competitiveness and their groundlessness under conditions of freedom and democracy. Would such a combination result in a color which will not be red at all?

The CPSU can become the vanguard of society only by integrating the progressive forces within the society with a program and a corresponding form of party organization which would be consistent with their world outlook and vital interests. A program which could rally the vanguard should be, above all, scientific and free from mystical, irrational and quasireligious motifs, which were previously considered attractive to the dark awareness of the masses but were alien to a rationally thinking person. This applies above all to the concepts which prevail in our country about communism. Communism, viewed as a society of boundless abundance, inhabited by highly moral working people infinitely loyal to the cause, is a utopia the abandonment of which does not require any break with Marxism whatsoever. Conversely, only thus can we return to Marx's theoretically accurate ideas. For some reason we forgot that it was precisely Marx and Engels who were the first to conceive of communism as a postindustrial society in the full meaning of the term, as a realistically possible historical system which appears when a sufficiently high level of automation of material production has been reached.

Today it has already become clear that such a society is by no means destined to experience bliss, abundance or freedom, for each age has its own misfortunes and fortunes, wealth and poverty, freedom and dependence, and good and evil. In any case, however, the building of communism cannot be today the objective of a political party; we have all too many very difficult and real problems to allow ourselves to sidetrack society through the formulation of guidelines which could be considered "marginal" in our time.

The democratic socialism of a modern industrial society could be the sole objective of the vanguard party. The nature of contemporary socialism (as opposed not to capitalism but to the early capitalist, the bourgeois society, in which we face the terrible danger of falling) was quite well explained at the first Congress of USSR People's Deputies by Ch. Aytmatov. Possibly, he provided an explanation even without being aware of the fact that his text on real socialism, which shocked the majority of those present, merely illustrated Lenin's assertion that "...socialism is nothing other than state-capitalist monopoly, aimed at the benefit of the entire people..." (op. cit., vol 34, p 192). It is a question not of state-administrative monopoly but of a market-oriented society, i.e., a capitalist economy, not uncontrolled but highly organized, democratically controlled by the state, acting as a guarantor for the justice and social protection of the citizens.

The various vanguard groups in society can substantially vary in terms of their views on many important problems which, in the future, can be separated and structured within different parties. They are different from each other no less but also no more than are, for example, republicans from democrats in the United States. However, today they are united in the main thing: our society must be radically reorganized on the basis of the principles of humanism, controlled market economy, democracy and ecological safety. The division and weakening of vanguard forces could, in my view, be the result not of specific objectives but of concepts of the ways and means of attaining them.

Unfortunately, time is working against us: the crisis within society is deepening; in the absence of real progress, liberalism leads to a particularly dangerous type of bogging down, providing a nutritive environment for irrationalism, licentiousness, adventurism and reaction. The party's Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet and the government are concerned with laying the juridical and economic foundations for radical reform in the same way that a physician tries to maintain the condition of the patient and to rebuild his strength prior to surgery. I believe, however, that if in the past as well the economic mechanism could not be made to function with reasonable efficiency with the help of centralized planning and the administrative apparatus, what are the guarantees that this could happen today, when the system is drifting? Actually, if the concept of "improvement" succeeds thanks to the tactical skill and the "therapeutic" talent of the government, this could turn into an even greater difficulty. One must know oneself: a patient who comes out of a stage of acute crisis will not be in a hurry to submit to surgery.

Any objections? Any other ideas? They must be discussed. The necessary decisions must be made. Means must be found for their implementation. These are matters which are of essential importance to the party and to its further existence and role in society. Who should discuss such ideas? The primary party organization in the enterprise? That is unsuitable. It would be an unsuitable place for dealing with problems which have swept over a political party in a period of perestroika.

Let me illustrate this with a simple example. I work in one of those blessed institutes, one of the most typical offspring of the epoch of stagnation. According to its plan, the institute should generate ten times more scientific output than it could possibly publish, again according to its plan, even in minute editions. It would be useless and senseless to invent masterpieces. That is possibly why—in order not to torture ourselves—we do not create masterpieces all that frequently, having developed the durable loss of habit to do quality work altogether.

Nonetheless, both the institute and even the institute's party bureau employ noted supporters of perestroika,

famous throughout the country. They realize that perestroika is incompatible with the existence of our "breadwinner" as is the case with many other similar scientific, administrative and industrial "charitable" institutions. However, it is one thing to discuss such problems within the party as we formulate political programs, and something entirely different to discuss them in a labor collective in which common problems are insoluble and ideas which sound humane and constructive on the scale of the entire society turn into their opposites. The link between the party organization and production activities triggers a painful split. In order to eliminate it, thinking of its self-preservation, the party organization begins intensively to imitate perestroika and to create an updated and more refined stagnation.

In other words, the party's organizational structure (not on the microlevel exclusively) conflicts with the task of the renovation of society. In that case perestroika will work against the party, while the party will be blocking the very changes it is demanding, having become a clearly conservative force representing the interests of strata and groups which are by no means in the vanguard.

In order to free perestroika and to create organizational forms consistent with democratic objectives, the party must become not an organization of fellow-employees but an organization of like-minded people, who have joined forces to discuss a variety of political or ideological and not at all production-administrative problems, and carry out a variety of political campaigns and actions. In order to enhance the chances for its cleansing and assuming a vanguard role, it is necessary maximally to democratize the party structure, eliminating party membership as a career factor. We must break the intrinsically archaic and totalitarian party-production symbiosis. We must become accustomed to the fact that at work I am a working person and nothing else; in the country I am a citizen; in a store I am a customer, and in the party I am a politician and ideologue. As long as our civic-mindedness or official position is of interest in the stores, our party affiliation is of interest in our work and the party is interested in our labor successes, we shall be living in the old society, somewhat curtailed but not transformed by perestroika.

#### From the Editors

We believe that these articles demand a clarification. Let us immediately say that the editors do not fully share the views of either author. The effort to single out any given class within our society and put it above the other, based on the alleged greatest loyalty to the ideas of perestroika, conscientiousness and organization, appears quite questionable. Supporters of the changes which are occurring in our country may be found in all social strata and no one, we believe, would undertake to substantiate the place where their "concentration" could be higher; people who hesitate, who doubt and who are dissatisfied may be found among workers, intellectuals and villagers.

We do not find convincing Linkov's reference to the fact that today we are closer to the initial period of building socialism than communism, for which reason we should borrow some of the features of that period, such as making it easy for the workers to become members of the CPSU and the system of party appeals. The bitter experience of mass "recruitment" for the party, based on the sole criterion of "social origin" already exists in our country. Should we repeat this stage? Furthermore, society, although it is far from being communist, shows little resemblance to its post-October "predecessor." Would a new dictatorship of the proletariat hasten the building of a democratic law-governed state? Finally, what should one answer one's 17-year old grandson: Who should be considered a member of the working class and who should not? What are the criteria?

It is equally difficult to agree with many views expressed in Vilchek's article. It has been universally acknowledged that the 70-year old history of the Soviet system has not been smooth. It has included hopes and disappointments, discoveries and errors. Naturally, a great deal of it was also tragic. Could this entire experience be reduced to that characteristic and, furthermore, is it possible to proclaim perestroika as the whole upshot of a 70-year old tragedy?"

In our view, another questionable statement is the claim that the social base of bolshevism was not the working class but the proletariat and the declassed elements which identified themselves with the proletariat. The following idea may be perceived behind this claim: the bolsheviks were able to lead only those who were ready to exclusively bring down, destroy and expropriate, unable to create anything themselves. It is known, however, that the positions of the RSDWP(b) were the strongest precisely at the big machine production facilities, which had the most advanced technology for its time in Russia and which produced technically complex items (in some cases the best according to world standards, as was the case, for instance, of the Tula arms plant). Furthermore, did a substantial segment of the peasantry and the intelligentsia not support the revolution?

It seems to us that the author interprets quite arbitrarily the statements of the Marxist-Leninist classics. Thus, in the Leninist definition of classes he "interprets" the thought of the division of labor as being the foundation for the class stratification of society. Apparently, it is a question of the definition which V.I. Lenin provided in his work "The Great Initiative." Let us quote it in full: "Classes are large groups of people distinguished by their place within a historically defined social production system, their attitude (most of it codified in laws) toward means of production, and their role in the social organization of labor and, consequently, the ways of obtaining and the size of the share of the public wealth at their disposal. Classes are groups of people, one of which could appropriate the labor of another thanks to the differences in their position within a specific social system" (op. cit., vol 39, p 15). Obviously, the basic



difference among classes, according to Lenin, rests in the ways of obtaining a share of the social wealth and the attitude toward the means of production which, precisely, determine their role in the social organization of labor.

Nonetheless, we believe that these viewpoints should be represented in a debate on the place of the party in society. To begin with, this is because they are quite widespread and reflect existing social moods which cannot be ignored or not taken into consideration. Second, because it is difficult to disagree with many assessments concerning the current state of our society and our party. The legacy of authoritarianism, which turned the CPSU into an organization of unlimited power, is weighing on it like a chain, preventing it from mastering its new functions. It proved to be simpler to give a class interpretation to genetics than to define the tasks of the primary party organization and to understand what being a political vanguard means.

In sharing the objective of perestroika, which is the building of a democratic law-governed state, the authors of the present discussion offer their own ways for attaining it, and their own vision of the role of the CPSU in this process. We believe that in this case there is something to argue about. However, we have not tried to review Linkov's and Vilchek's articles but, for now, merely to single out some of their conceptual views. The editors suggest to the readers to assess their statements and to share their own thoughts on the place of the party in the life of our society and on its social base. COPY-RIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### **Toward New Values; The Theory of the Democratization of the CPSU**

905B0017C Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Feb 90 (signed to press 2 Feb 90) pp 18-21

[Text] The material which follows indicates the depth of today's social concern for the destinies of the party and how clear is the understanding of its role in the creation of a democratic and law-governed state. Only quite recently the scientific intelligentsia in its majority—this is common knowledge—was not all that interested in internal party life. The exception, perhaps, was the case of the social scientists who dealt with such problems by virtue of their jobs. That is why the Conference of Party Organizations of Institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences, at which the significance of the party to the destinies of our society and the ways to its renovation were discussed, became a noteworthy phenomenon not only for the Academy of Sciences.

Time passed and polemic passions subsided. The time has now come to interpret statements and to clarify positions. In a concise way Doctor of Economic Sciences L. Vartazarova, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences V. Rozanov, and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences O. Tumanova presented ideas which were been reflected in the draft statutes formulated by the scientists and the

theses for the CPSU platform. They were supported by 280 conference delegates (80 percent of its participants deal with natural and scientific and technical topics), representing 12 parts of the country. Some of these proposals have already been raised in the course of the debate on the renovation of the party in our journal. Nonetheless, we believe that it would be expedient to repeat them, along with some other, for such an approach makes it possible to gain a sufficiently complete idea on the views of the participants in the conference.

What drew the scientists to the conference was the aspiration to determine the present nature of our country and party, where are we going and what actions are necessary today. Having initiated perestroika and assumed responsibility for the entire history of the country's postrevolutionary development, the CPSU became the target of criticism, blame and attacks. The very choice of the socialist development of the country is being questioned and the viability and constructive nature of socialist ideas are being denied. Under such circumstances, a serious and weighed analysis is needed (as well as, largely, a revision) of the views concerning the contemporary socialist society, taking into consideration the entire wealth of experience acquired by mankind in the field of political movements, both positive and negative.

While participants in the conference referred to the fact that in our country it was merely the very initial foundations of socialism that had been laid, subsequently subjected to profound deformations and violations of a barracks-bureaucratic nature, which affected the CPSU as well and which became part of the administrative-command system. The rejection of such deformations, the revolutionary renovation of society and changing the view on the role of the party constitute the essence of the transitional period in which we find ourselves today and the fundamental content of perestroika.

Within the party itself forces with different political orientations exist and function, including anti-democratic ones, which manipulate the discontent of the people and the hard living conditions and which are channeling such moods against economic innovations and now also against the progressive forces in the party's leadership. An offensive has been mounted on some of the most unquestionable achievements of perestroika—glasnost and the democratization of political life. For that reason, involving on its side people who can accept the new CPSU platform, based on the humanistic priorities and values of social development, the search for allies and the rejection of claims to monopoly become fundamental principles in all of our party's activities. The CPSU Statutes should also change in accordance with these realities.

Thus, in the section on "The Party and the State. The Party and the Social Organizations" the following should be included: acting within the framework of the USSR Constitution, the CPSU pursues its policy within the



state and public organizations through the party members who work within these organizations. The only acceptable mechanism in the struggle for power is positioning one's candidates in leading positions, after they have been elected democratically, controlling their activities and, if necessary, recalling them from such positions.

In the opinion of the participants in the conference, the section dealing with the primary party organizations should be given an essentially new content. Such organizations could be created both on the basis of the industrial and the territorial principles and be united directly within regional party organizations without any intermediary levels. Party members may be accepted by any organization regardless of the place where they live or work. No primary party organizations should be created within central and regional party authorities.

As the foundations of the party, they must assist in the implementation of the programmatic objectives of the CPSU and participate in the formulation of its policy, in holding party elections and in elections for state power bodies. It is suggested that primary party organizations be set up on the initiative of party members and that at the first organizational meeting a secretary be elected and the structure of the organization be defined; such an organization must have a minimum of 10 CPSU members. The primary party organization must be registered with the regional or republic party committee.

The primary organization must have the exclusive right to accept new members. Its decision must be final and not subject to ratification by any other party authorities.

As is the stipulation in the current statutes, the question of expelling someone from the party should be decided at a party meeting of the primary organization, stipulating in this case that the party member who does not agree with the decision that he be expelled has the right to appeal to superior party authorities.

Should the primary party organization disagree with any decision made by the superior party authority, it should have the right to appeal it to a higher party authority, including the CPSU Congress.

The organizational autonomy of the primary party organization is backed by its financial autonomy. In order to implement this principle in practice, it should keep no less than one-half of the membership dues collected by the organization and the same portion of the income generated by its enterprises. The CPSU Statutes should include the stipulation that the primary party organizations have the full right to handle their monetary and material resources which they can channel to any party agency, organization and party member, invest funds in party enterprises or transfer funds to other public organizations.

Relations within the party should be structured on the principles of internal party democracy. In addition to the mandatory nature of the resolutions passed by the

leading party authorities (the general assembly, conference, congress) in the case of the executive authorities and the party organizations this principle includes electiveness, reciprocal independence among executive, controlling and information agencies, the accessibility to education and political work within associations by party members, based on platforms, within the framework of the program and the statutes. Other suggestions formulated at the conference were as follows: taking this concept to its logical end and allowing for the possibility of voting on the basis of platforms (such as, for example, in electing delegates to a congress).

The party members, rallied on the basis of a platform, have the right to engage in publishing activities, to submit motions to party and soviet authorities, and to initiate party referendums. Nonetheless, we should note the contradiction within the idea of drafting platforms and establishing associations only within the framework of the program and the statutes. What would be the case, let us say, of party members who decide to join efforts to amend any given stipulation included in the program or the statutes? This is not a unique situation: at the present time such problems, which trigger disparate opinions, which could become the foundations of a political platform, include the procedure for the election of delegates to conferences and congresses, particularly the forthcoming one.

In the view of the Academy of Sciences scientists, the CPSU could and should act in our society as a real political force which would consolidate progressive democratic strata and groups. The search for real ways of changing and renovating the party is unanimously related by the party members to the forthcoming congress, which will determine the nature of the platform and the statutes of the CPSU at the crucial stage of perestroika. Consequently, the question of the composition of the congress assumes a political nature.

The scientific workers spoke out in favor of direct, secret and multiple-candidate elections for the congress and the party organizations on all levels, based on territorial party districts. Such elections would ensure the possibly most democratic representation of the party members at CPSU congresses and conferences and will truly take into consideration the views of the party members.

In characterizing as a whole the draft CPSU Statutes, as suggested at the Conference of Scientific Workers, the following key aspects could be noted: changing the principles governing the organizational structure and relations within the party; accepting the admissibility of forming groups based on platforms; autonomy and financial independence of primary party organizations; and enhancing the role of the elective authorities and the answerability of the apparat. Unlike the current statutes, the draft suggested by the conference proceeds from a rejection of the stipulation of the exclusive role of the CPSU and does not include a definition of the party as the vanguard of Soviet society. Relations between the

party and the state must be structured on the basis of the deletion of Article 6 from the USSR Constitution or of revising its text.

In the view of the participants in the conference, the party platform which is to be adopted at the 28th CPSU Congress should include a reinterpretation of concepts such as communism, socialism and party. It is necessary soberly to analyze the role and place of socialism in the global social system, to consider the positive and negative aspects of other social systems, and to avoid groundless motions and utopias. In other words, it is necessary clearly to formulate answers to a number of questions, such as:

What are the highest values and ideals in the history of the development of mankind?

What is the correlation between such ideals and the communist ideals?

What type of sociopolitical structure consistent with such ideals should there be?

What should economic relations which do not conflict with the principle of social justice be?

What should be the criterion in assessing the ways and means of attaining set objectives and ideals?

Fitting the extremely short presentation, the answers of the scientists to these questions were as follows: man is the highest value of the world community; we have the right to consider ensuring equal and inalienable rights for man, the modern understanding of which is codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as the objectives on the highest hierarchical level; therefore, it is a question of humanistic or universal human ideals.

The proper implementation of such ideals in the social system of life requires building a society of consistent humanism, i.e., the type of association of free working people to whom said values are converted from ideals into ways of activities of individual and social groups. Consequently, not only the proclaimed ideals but also the ways and means of their implementation must be humanistic.

From this viewpoint communism represents the embodiment of the idea of consistent humanism, which must include the best achievements of the human mind and their implementation in various aspects of social life. The gravest contradiction between communist objectives and the experience in their implementation in the socialist countries, objectives which were created by the administrative-command system, have led today, in the opinion expressed by many people, to discrediting the very idea of communism. In weighing these circumstances and acknowledging the need for the CPSU to assume responsibility for the entire 70-year history of our country, the majority of delegates at the conference also spoke out in favor of retaining the communist trend in party strategy and, consequently, its name.

The results of the development of the society in recent decades raised, however, new problems in this area. They include, above all, the interrelationship between man and nature. In the course of its development civilization has attained the possibility of self-destruction. It is understandable, therefore, that the program of any humanistic party, including the CPSU, should be oriented toward preserving life on earth in all of its forms. Consequently, in addition to the rights and freedoms of the individual, the party platform should include also the right of society to ecological safety, survival and progress of civilization and the availability of its results to all nations and countries.

The methodological foundation for the draft of such a document, as suggested by the participants in the conference, is Marxist theory, enriched with all the achievements of contemporary social thinking. The draft stipulates that Marxist theory is broader and deeper than the simple notice of said rights and freedoms. It contains the identification of the basic trends of social development, consistent with humanistic ideals and ways of achieving them.

The draft calls as a primary task of the party the implementation of a radical economic reform paralleled by a radical economic change and the resolution of national, social and ecological problems, the comprehensive legal support for such processes and the creation of a democratic state.

In this connection, it is noted that the party's economic policy must be aimed at maximally easing the objective difficulties of a transition to a qualitatively new stage of development of the national economy. This must be one of the main distinctions of the socialist management of the economy based on the criteria of humanism and social justice.

Prime importance is ascribed to the development and defense of the social standard and science as its structural component.

Compared with the existing documents, the party's class foundation was subjected to major review. At the present stage, it has been suggested to proclaim the party as belonging to the whole nation, reflecting the interests and objective aspirations of all strata of Soviet society (working class, peasantry, intelligentsia and employees).

In noting the need to retain the political leadership of the CPSU at the contemporary stage, the Academy of Sciences scientists deem necessary to take into consideration in programmatic documents the possibility of party activities under multiple-party conditions. In the course of the sociological survey, 66 percent of the surveyed delegates at the conference supported this suggestion. As many respondents deemed expedient to single out various platforms (factions) within the CPSU.

It is worth noting that while debates on the need for retaining Article 6 of the USSR Constitution are taking place among USSR People's Deputies and within the

party, within society processes are taking place (the establishment of people's fronts and associations, the separation of the Lithuanian Communist Party, etc.) which confirm preparations for conversion to a multiparty system, in which the CPSU must act as equal political partner and, within a democratic situation, prove its right to play a vanguard role.

However, the acknowledgment of a multiparty system could hardly be considered a panacea for all ills. This is confirmed, for example, by the experience of a number of socialist countries where the existence of several parties within society did not hinder the administrative-command system from taking root. In countries such as Britain and the United States, the parties which alternate in holding the power are essentially distinguished by the tactics they choose and the economic instruments they apply but not in the least by their strategy.

Before the real mechanisms for the development and change in the political system may be developed in our society, related to a multiparty (two-party) system or the predominance of a given platform within the CPSU, we must become "exposed" to multiparty possibilities. The lighter forms of this "affliction" depend on the properly selected CPSU strategy and tactics and, in particular, on acknowledging the right of different social movements and associations to participate in the exercise of political power.

The debate on the topic of "party and society" proved that under the conditions of a democratic society and a law-governed state, the party can hope for a long life and political success providing that a number of conditions are met. Above all this applies to the scientific formulation of a long-term strategic program for social development and change, formulating the distant and immediate objectives of this development, seeking and trying ways of achieving them and taking into consideration the interests of our various social strata. This also includes borrowing all that is best and most progressive from our opponents, making use of the practical experience of social democratic parties, acknowledging the priority of universal human values and interests over other group, including class, interests.

The discussion at the conference singled out a number of key problems the attitude toward which directly influences the possibility of the CPSU to be a political leader. The survey of the delegates indicated that the scientific intelligentsia does not see in the working class, the people's fronts and associations and in the party and state leadership of the republics the force which should guide our society (less than 10 percent of those surveyed favored them: for the sake of fairness let us note that the scientists themselves rate the role of the scientific intelligentsia as being quite low—no more than 7.4 percent favored it). The majority believe that the leading role should be played by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies—47 percent; the will of the people, expressed through referendums, 25 percent; the USSR Supreme Soviet, 21 percent; and the CPSU, 18 percent. Here, we

believe, one can see a clear underestimating of potential allies—the working class, the people's fronts and associations, and the party and state leaderships. On the other hand, we see absolutizing the decisions of the supreme authority—the congress of people's deputies—and referendums, as well as underestimating the need for daily work in large social groups and one's primary party organizations for their practical implementation.

Therefore, the existence of various political forces in our society, and the need for the CPSU, under the changing circumstances, to defend its role as political leader, forces us to define our attitude toward Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution and to comment on the conference's resolution. In the survey of the delegates, 83.5 percent spoke out in favor of deleting it and deleting any other stipulations which codify within the Constitution or the statutes the monopoly status of the CPSU in the political structure.

The participants in the conference noted that under circumstances in which conservative and left-wing radical forces are relying on the populist moods which truly exist among the people, and with some of them favoring the need for a "strong hand," eliminating Article 6 of the Constitution in its current draft would only strengthen the party's authority among the people and prove its further readiness to be the leader of perestroika. The changes which are taking place today in the parties in Eastern Europe and the decisions to exclude the corresponding items from the constitutions of these countries indicate the timely and expedient nature of this step.

Delegates at the conference said that one cannot consider as definitely settled the question of the status of the RSFSR Communist Party. Scientific workers of the USSR Academy of Sciences spoke out in favor of a referendum among the party members of the Russian Federation on this most important element of perestroika within the CPSU. Under circumstances in which Union republics are seeking ways of self-determination, the lack of a communist party in the RSFSR could be considered a reflection of the weakness of the republic and its unpreparedness to defend its interests. Yet another reason in favor of the establishment of an RSFSR Communist Party is related to the fact that the RSFSR is identified with the "center" which is "monopolizing the power." The establishment of a Russian Communist Party would help to destroy the existing stereotype.

We cannot fail to see that this problem is very complex and is one of general party and Union nature. Establishing a communist party of the RSFSR would contribute to federalizing the CPSU, while Russia objectively has been and will remain the consolidating base for the entire USSR. The adopted decision of establishing a Russian bureau within the CPSU Central Committee could be considered an initial step in the formation of new party structures within the republic. We believe, however, that the opinion of the Russian communists, as expressed in referendums and other

forms, should be known and taken into consideration. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE

### Return Credibility to Statistics

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[Article by Vadim Nikitovich Kirichenko, doctor of economic sciences, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Statistics]

[Text] Increasing social activeness and the persistent efforts to find a solution to adverse critical situations are manifested, among others, in the increased interest shown in statistical information and the growing volume of criticism of it. Under those circumstances the most unwise thing which people professionally involved with the governmental statistical service could do would be to try to save the "honor of the uniform" by proving that despite isolated shortcomings, which are being surmounted, generally speaking the situation is not bad. Nonetheless, society will not trust such claims, not without a reason, for they would be inconsistent with reality.

For decades the dominant concept was one of displaying successes and advantages and concealing difficulties and negative phenomena in the development of the country and its various regions. Statistics, like theory, was asked to perform a twisted ideological function: shaping illusions of well-being and infallibility in the activities of the command-bureaucratic system. Such a "glossed" approach was reflected in the very methodology for formulating indicators (rate of social output, price dynamics, level of consumption of goods, efficiency, and losses) and tendentious reviews of the methods used to formulate data, which were concealed from society. Comparisons with standards, indicators, and methods for setting them, used in the statistical practices of developed countries and of international economic organizations, were not provided. Distorted data on the pace, standards, and ratios of the country's socioeconomic development did not provide a reliable foundation for the making of most important socioeconomic decisions.

Naturally, many shortcomings in statistical information have to do with figure-padding and obvious whitewashing. The struggle against them demands tireless attention. Nonetheless, the main harm caused to the accuracy of statistical data was the imperfection (or tendentiousness) of the methodology of computations and the tendency to make them fit current political tasks. Following are some examples.

Quite recently, already during the period of perestroika, in the course of the computation and publication of GNP data for 1985-1987, the gross social product, the

national income, and the real population income, corrections were made which eliminated the impact of the reduced production and sales of alcoholic beverages on the dynamics of such indicators. Consequently, the growth rates of the national income for 1985 and 1986 were roughly doubled. Actually, the 1985 GNP had increased not by 3.5 but by 1.6 percent only; and that of 1986 by 2.3 rather than 4.1 percent. One can easily understand the uselessness of such data in analyzing the situation and making substantiated decisions. The USSR State Committee for Statistics has now eliminated such shortcomings. The next step was taken in assessing the 1989 results, which were already based on computations of consolidated indicators not in so-called fixed 1983 prices but in current prices, thus excluding the influence of the actual price increases. Last year the generated national income increased by 2.4 percent and the GNP by 3 percent.

Retail trade should reflect the volume of sales of goods to the population in exchange for its cash. However, according to the existing methodology, it also includes the volume of sales of durable goods to organizations, establishments, enterprises, and kolkhozes, meeting their current economic needs, and food products to organizations in the sociocultural area (petty wholesale). This includes all earnings from the marketing of durable goods on a commission basis, although it would be justified to consider only part of the sales of commission stores, related to cash turnover. There are elements of a double accounting, above all in computing the volume of paid services. They include services provided not only to the population but to enterprises and organizations as well. The overall volume of double accounting and cashless operations amounts to some 20 percent of the growth of retail trade and trade services. In the latest publications of the State Committee for Statistics, increases from sales of alcoholic beverages, increased average group prices, and the growth of petty wholesale trade are excluded in assessing the growth of trade. In 1989, for example, compared with the preceding year, the physical volume of food and products and durable goods for sale to the population increased by 4.5 percent, while the overall increase in trade was 10.2 percent.

The aspiration to embellish the actual situation was dictated by the unjustified adding lard and by-products to the population's meat consumption. Having abandoned such a computation method, let us note that the indicator of per capita meat consumption in 1988 dropped by 8 kg. The amount of grain resources was also exaggerated (annually by 12-15 million tons). It was computed by adding the water and unused admixtures. In the future, the type of data universally accepted in world practices of the full volume after processing, will be provided (i.e., not with the actual but with the admissible moisture and litter).

It is relatively easy to put an end to such obvious absurdities and tendentious methods. It is much more difficult to surmount the disparity between these methods and worldwide statistical standards, a disparity

which developed over several decades, and to make the information system consistent with approaches and standards adopted in international practices.

The high road leading to the solution of this problem is clear. We must learn how to use in our macroeconomic computations the most important elements of the system of national accountability and integrate them with the system of the national economic balance. However, this is much easier said than done, for it will require a substantial restructuring of the entire bookkeeping system at enterprises. However difficult the problem may be, it will have to be resolved, for this approach is consistent with a developed system of commodity-monetary relations and financial-credit instruments, i.e., relations and institutions toward which we too are advancing as we develop the radical economic reform.

The first step in this direction was the use in Soviet statistical practices of the GNP indicator, the formulation of which is based on the principles governing the system of national accountability as practiced by the United Nations. It characterizes the overall volume of economic activities in the country, applicable to the combination of material production, and public and private services, and all varieties of income and amortization. A system of tables has already been formulated, which makes conversion from a national economic balance to indicators of the national accountability system possible. We do not consider in any way disgraceful the use of foreign experts, who are specialists in the area of national bookkeeping. It is precisely the possibility of relying on rich international experience that enables us more successfully to solve the most difficult problems of a perestroika in statistics.

Naturally, an essentially different approach must be adopted also concerning the methodology of international comparisons among the most important indicators of economic development. This is being practiced by the UN Statistical Service, in the interest of the entire international community. The initial step leading to the full inclusion of the USSR in this process will be a bilateral comparison with the FRG and Austria. This will enable us to formulate a methodology and to lay an internationally accepted foundation for comparisons with other countries as well.

Accountability, periodic in particular, terribly overburdened with daily technical production data. The question of substantially reducing it remains pressing. Information is not a gift of nature but a product, the making of which involves labor and materials. Thus, merely processing the annual accountability for capital construction by the computer centers of the organizations of the State Committee for Statistics costs about 1 million rubles; the simultaneous selective survey of the income of worker, employee, and kolkhoz families costs several hundred thousand rubles.

Coordinating requests for information with financial and labor possibilities and computer capacity is as

necessary as it is in ordinary types of production activities, the more so since such capacities are limited. For example, the annual budget allocations for the entire system of state statistics, including the cost of departmental science and cadre retraining, total about 200 million rubles. In 1989, the United States appropriated some \$2 billion for the biggest statistical programs alone. Such direct comparisons, naturally, cannot be a guideline in budget planning. However, they must be taken into consideration as we think about the means and amounts of financial support of information and, specifically, statistical activities in the country.

The end result of statistical work is characterized not only and even not strictly by specific "figures" but by an analytical conclusion which can be derived from the obtained data. The study enables us to identify the reasons for phenomena, the influence of and interaction among different factors, to assess the efficiency of managerial decision-making and the possible economic and social consequences of the developing situation. Unfortunately, it is precisely the complex, the multifactorial analysis that remains a weak point in domestic statistics.

Naturally, there also is the influence of the prevalent concepts concerning the establishing an indicator as such, the disparate nature of statistical data, and the lack of coordination among the methodologies used in computing related parameters. Nonetheless, in my view the main reason is the gap in the natural ties linking statistics with the science of economics. Based on my experience in scientific work, I am perfectly aware of the way, over several decades, economists were supplied with very partial information.

Thus, what kind of serious financial analysis could there be a question of if the economic public was unfamiliar with the actual state of the national budget and the size of the national debt? Official publications invariably reported a surplus of state revenue over expenditures. Meanwhile, financial disproportions were growing and becoming increasingly dangerous. The most important types of revenue were declining.

In 1987-1988, payments made by state enterprises and organizations based on their profit (income) declined by 10 billion rubles, while the profits left at the disposal of enterprises and organizations increased by nearly 50 million. Compared to 1985, income from foreign economic activities declined by 8.5 billion rubles. With every passing year expenditures increased substantially (by 33.7 billion rubles for the national economy, 25.7 billion for sociocultural projects, and another 11 billion for financing foreign economic activities). Budget subsidies also increased to compensate for price differentials for individual commodities (by 20 billion rubles), and the share of such budget expenditures reached 19 percent (9.5 percent in 1970). This was due essentially to increases in the purchase prices of agricultural commodities and supplements to prices. The gap between income and expenditures was filled by transferring to the budget general state loan funds. In 1989 alone the USSR State



Committee for Statistics published figures which showed the growth of such borrowing during the 12th 5-year period: from 18 billion rubles in 1985, borrowing rose to 90 billion in 1988. Finally, the public was informed that the share of the funds borrowed from the state's lending fund to cover budget expenditures had risen to nearly 20 percent, compared to 2 percent in 1970 and 5 percent in 1985, as well as the fact that many topical problems, including social ones, were being resolved by borrowing on future revenue, which significantly increased the national debt and the country's foreign indebtedness.

Naturally, we can now blame the economists for failing immediately to notice the difficulty and for sounding the alarm belatedly. However, it would seem odd strange to demand of a physician an accurate diagnosis and efficient treatment while refusing to inform him of the condition of the patient.

Today the personnel in statistics themselves need the active involvement of science in the practical solution of problems of improving methodology and intensifying analytical work. Studies must be made of many problems which remain "blank spots," without scientific solutions, and which have not studied by our statistical service.

It was thus that in both scientific and practical matters we realized the inadequacy of the traditional value methods for determining the dynamics of economic growth under the conditions of profound quality changes and structural shifts in production, the appearance of essentially new types of goods and services, and the unparalleled increase in the role of intellectual forms of activities. Still prevalent in the theory of balancing the economic growth are its natural-physical aspects, which deal with the flow of output and production factors. Yet today we need studies in terms of market balance or imbalance, which would enable us to determine the purchasing power of the population and the enterprises, price dynamics, supply of commodities and services, and interaction between price and demand. It is only on this basis that we can obtain a uniform assessment of material-physical and financial-value aspects of the reproduction process. We need a theoretical and an analytical foundation for the formulation of methods and indicators of statistical observation of inflationary processes. The list of insufficiently developed theoretical problems could be extended. One thing is clear: cooperation between statistical authorities and scientists can become tangible and effective. A major prerequisite to this effect is a radical increase in glasnost in statistical information and the methodology used to obtain it.

Of late we have been able to expand the scope of statistical publications and to reduce the list of information considered classified. In solving this problem, occasionally we come across objections of striking originality. For example, it is being said that the publication of detailed information on foreign economic relations, the amount of the debt, and the cost of servicing it could adversely affect relations with foreign banks. But then, is

it not clear that it is precisely such information that is fully accessible to them? Meanwhile, the lack of clarity concerning our reserves in foreign exchange and gold is what the creditors dislike the most. As a whole, in order to make the level of openness of our statistical information consistent with universally accepted international standards, extensive and difficult work lies ahead.

By itself, a statistical indicator proves little if the method by which it was obtained remains concealed. In reviewing the methods, a process which is being quite intensively conducted currently, the State Committee for Statistics intends to make them public. This will also create favorable conditions for making alternate computations of indicators by researchers and organizations unrelated to governmental statistics.

As we know, the practice of alternate computations presumes the observance of certain conditions which guarantee the interests and protect the rights both of governmental statistics as well as of those who undertake to make alternate computations. Above all, this involves a uniform initial statistical base, openness and accuracy of the computation methodology, and the required competence of those who are making alternate evaluations. Unfortunately, against the background of a justified mistrust in official information, the importance of such obvious restrictions is frequently ignored. Truly fantastic figures are put in circulation.

Thus, a popular weekly cited "alternate" computations of the share of wages in the national income, as provided by one of its readers and checked by the editors. In this case, forgetting that the year has 12 months, they divided the **monthly wage fund** by the **annual volume** of the national income, reaching the conclusion that the share of wages in our country is ten times lower than it is abroad. Hence they claimed an insane level of exploitation. The mathematical error was by no means a harmless misinformation. Actually, the share of the wages of workers engaged in material production, in terms of the national income they generated (in actual prices), was 46.9 percent in 1985 and 48.3 percent in 1988. Considering the end use of the national income (as a result of redistribution processes) the share of the population's income increased within that period from 61.4 to 62.4 percent, while the cost of the nonproduction area and accumulations within it, from 23.8 to 24.7 percent. In both cases there was a trend toward an increased share of the population and the nonproduction area. Another typical comment was found in the journal concerning the volume of social consumption funds (175 billion rubles in 1988): allegedly, "100 percent of such funds benefit our elite." However, one should be familiar at least with the structure of the social funds. Such funds are spent on free services for education, health care and physical culture, on the maintenance of housing (81.5 billion rubles), and cash payments (about 94 billion rubles). The latter include pensions, temporary disability aid, aid to families with many children and single mothers, aid to children in low-income families, and the cost of annual paid leave taken by the working people. Furthermore, it



is not exclusively the so-called elite that can be sick, take paid leave or be a single mother, and send its children to nurseries and kindergartens and Pioneer camps. The share of income from the social consumption funds in the overall family income with an average per capita earnings of no more than 75 rubles is 29 percent; it is 21.8 percent for an income ranging from 75 to 100 rubles. In families with an income in excess of 200 rubles this share is lower by a factor of nearly 2-3 (10.6 percent).

It is both possible and necessary to discuss the amount of the social funds and each one of their individual elements, and to criticize the specific mechanism for their distribution and choice of priorities. But why distort obvious facts? For even a lie used not for purposes of glorification but in rebuttal, nonetheless remains a lie.

Today the computation of price indexes is the main link in the entire chain of problems of accuracy of socioeconomic information and a foundation for a realistic assessment of the dynamics of the most important general economic indicators. Particularly great attention is being paid to price changes in the consumer market. For many years the statistical services claimed that the prices in the consumer market remained virtually stable. Through personal experience, millions of people were aware of the opposite. Given this situation, society is ready to believe virtually any figure characterizing the rate of price increases as long as it is sufficiently high. Unfortunately, an accurate computation of price indexes and the cost of living is a difficult and very labor intensive statistical operation. In the United States, for example, approximately \$65 million is annually allocated for this purpose. That is precisely why I would be somewhat mistrustful of specialists who smoothly make their own assessments of the rate of inflation without any detailed discussion concerning the sources of their data and the methods they use in working with them.

Based on the computations made in 1989 by the USSR State Committee for Statistics for the 1971-1988 period, the average price index, including the kolkhoz market, rose by more than 40 percent. Between 1986 and 1988 the increase in average purchase prices of goods sold by the state trade system, the consumer cooperatives, and the kolkhoz market (excluding changes in prices of goods produced by cooperatives and as a result of individual labor activity) was 7.2 percent, including 11.7 percent for food products and 3.2 percent for durable goods. Price changes were uneven. Their increase was quite noticeable for some groups of goods, something which was sharply felt by the population. The most substantial increases in average prices were those of processed meat products (18.5 percent), canned meat goods (13.9), potatoes (22.8), vegetables (11.6), bread and bakery goods (22.3), and alcoholic beverages (46.5 percent). In the area of durable goods, the fastest price increases were those of clothing and linens (13.8 percent), refrigerators and freezers (10), television sets (7.8), woolen fabrics (8.7), and automobiles (7.2 percent).

In 1988 the share of goods in which there was an increase in average prices within the overall volume of trade was, in terms of actual prices, 54.4 percent. The influence of this group of commodities on the average price index is diminished through the dynamics of prices of other commodities.

The share of goods whose prices remained virtually stable in 1986-1988 (the price indexes ranged between 99.5 and 100.5 percent) was 25.3 percent of the overall volume of goods sold in 1988. Such goods included, in particular, fish, animal and vegetal oil, margarine, dairy products, cheese, eggs, sugar, washing machines, electric floor polishers, and synthetic detergents.

During the same period, the level of average prices of confectionery goods, herring, canned fish, cotton, silk, and linen fabrics, knitted goods, leather and rubber shoes, carpet and carpeting goods, tape recorders, photographic cameras, etc., dropped. The share of goods the prices of which dropped was 19.4 percent of overall trade.

Such price changes had different and more adverse effect on low-income families: in families whose average per capita income was under 75 rubles, the share of goods the prices of which had increased accounted for nearly two-thirds of their purchases.

One can easily see that the list of goods the prices of which increased consisted mostly of items in daily demand, the reaction to which was particularly painful. It is hardly necessary to prove that higher prices for bread and potatoes cannot be compensated with lower prices of still cameras.

Determining the price index will enable us to characterize inflation (the process of depreciation of the currency). At this point, however, at least two questions arise: is it accurate to take as a base in computing data on average prices goods purchased and, in our circumstances, are price increases an accurate reflection of inflation?

The current price index which dominated our statistics for many long years, takes exclusively into consideration legislatively mandated price changes. It does not reflect the higher prices of new goods and the influence of many other forms of hidden price increases. Nonetheless, we should acknowledge that the average price index, the dynamics of which we discussed, is influenced by the natural process of changes in technical and economic parameters and the quality of output. Price changes consistent with changes in the quality of goods, as we know, are not an inflationary factor.

In order to determine more objectively the real price increase, which characterizes increased or lowered costs to the consumer per unit of consumer value, in 1989 the USSR State Committee for Statistics organized a registration of prices based on a set of representative goods. A

total of 650 representative goods sold in state commercial stores in all 150 oblast, kray, and republic centers were selected.

This method enables us to take into consideration the dynamics of current prices of comparable goods, the appearance of new commodities, and the influence of contractual and temporary prices. It reflects changes in consumer expenditures per unit of the consumer value of low-quality goods and excludes the influence of varietal and structural changes. The consolidated price index of recorded representative goods takes into consideration the influence of prices on sales volumes in the state trade system, the consumer cooperatives, and the kolkhoz market, as well as in cooperatives and individual labor activities. It is precisely these advantages that explain its extensive use in global practices in computing inflation in the consumer's market.

If a significant portion of prices is mandatory, in addition to the visible inflation another specific inflationary form—suppressed inflation—appears. The mechanism of its formation consists of the faster growth of income compared to the increased volume of commodity resources. This has become particularly noticeable in recent years. Thus, in 1989 income rose by 12.9 percent, while population expenditures for goods and services, by 9.1 percent. The result is an accumulation of unsatisfied solvent demand (increased surplus accumulations in the Savings Bank and on hand by the population). With a free price setting, consumer prices could rise to match the size of unsatisfied solvent demand.

Based on the studies which were conducted (recording the prices of goods and service fees), in 1989 consumer prices rose by 2 percent. This is the price component of inflation. The concealed part, based on increases in postponed solvent demand, reached 5.5 percent. Therefore, the overall scale of increased inflation in the consumer sector was, according to initial assessments, 7.5 percent. This means, in particular, that price increases were the reason for approximately one-quarter and the aggravation of shortages, for three-quarters of the overall scale of inflationary processes.

According to the estimates of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, the aggregate unsatisfied population demand for goods and services reached 165 billion rubles. If we were to attempt to eliminate it through free price setting, based on market laws, the prices of consumer goods should rise immediately by a minimum of 40 percent. This would lead to extremely undesirable and grave social consequences. Incidentally, given the present situation, this would be the least price we would have to pay for suggestions calling for a "radical" and immediate conversion to free market relations on the consumer market.

The statistical study of the structure of inflation highlights the main trends in the struggle against it. Above all, we must concentrate on surmounting suppressed inflation, for it is particularly destructive economically

as well as socially. It is a question of the need to increase the production of goods and services, to broaden the range of goods to be sold on the market, to expand paid services, and to introduce truly commercial principles in the organization of trade. A strict tax regulation of income would be required as well. Income could and should grow but only to the extent to which the end production results increase. Otherwise the increased monetary income of the population becomes meaningless from the viewpoint of any real improvement in the material situation of the people, and of maintaining social justice in our society. Steps must be taken to freeze monetary savings of population and enterprises. The necessary mechanisms for implementing such a policy do not have to be invented, they are known. They include loans, setting mandatory financial reserves by enterprises, and practicing a flexible interest policy, which would stimulate long-term forms of investment of available funds. The successful implementation of the set of anti-inflationary measures creates natural prerequisites for holding back price increases, for in a balanced market and with competition among producers it is easy to dispose of one's income, while earning it becomes difficult.

Efforts to deal with inflation by freezing prices, despite the entire seemingly radical nature of the method, essentially merely changes the correlation among forms of inflationary processes. Life does not become any better if the full power of such processes is manifested in the further aggravation of shortages and a growing breakdown of the market. Inflation, as a category of commodity-monetary relations, must be suppressed through market methods as well, with the help of financial and monetary controls.

Computing the price index and rates for services would enable us to adopt a new approach to the study of the dynamics of the population's living standard by social and income group and to formulate steps to strengthen social protection. Particular attention should be paid to the study of the living standard of low-income population strata.

This applies, above all, to the quantitative characteristics of the problem. Although in recent years the size of the low-income population has been reduced, it nonetheless remains quite significant (in 1980 there were 68.6 million people whose gross income was 75 rubles, or 25.8 percent; there were 36 million people or 12.6 percent of the total in 1988).

In low-income families, more than one-half of the income is spent on food (the average for the population at large is one-third). Such expenditures per family member account for nearly one-half and, for the purchase of durable goods, for one-third of the average for all families.

One-half of the low-income people belong to families with several children. According to data of a selective survey of the income of 310,000 families, conducted in

March 1989, the per capita total income for all families was 124 rubles, compared with 108 for families with two children, and 66 rubles for families with three or more children (71 for workers and employees and 53 for kolkhoz members). Twenty percent of the low-income population consist of pensioners; single mothers account for approximately the same percentage.

More than one-half of people with a per capita income of under 75 rubles monthly live in the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan; 26 percent live in the RSFSR, 12 percent in the Ukraine, 4 percent in Georgia and Armenia, 3 percent in Belorussia and Moldavia, and 1 percent in the Baltic republics.

In frequent cases the situation of the low-income families is worsened by difficult housing conditions. Of the urban families of workers and employees with a per capita combined income of up to 75 rubles, 22 percent averaged less than 5 square meters of housing area per family member.

In order to eliminate such low income, we must pursue an active policy backed by allocating substantial financial and material resources. This can be successful if the thus pursued policy is based on a profound statistical study of the nature and structure of the problem. Only this would enable us to formulate steps which would take into consideration the demographic nature of low-income families and regional specifics.

Any major socioeconomic decision affects an entire array of interrelated processes. Without identifying them and without contemplating compensating measures we cannot solve the problem. For example, the fact that the minimal pensions were raised on 1 October 1989 will result in a significant reduction (although not the total disappearance) of the low-income group of retirees. Their number will be reduced by one-half. The increased income of the pensioners will lead to an increase of demand for food, inexpensive clothing and shoes, and medicines. By 1990 the higher cash income as a result of increased minimum pensions will be approximately 6.5 billion rubles. According to USSR State Committee for Statistics specialists, about 45 percent of this amount will be spent on food; 20 percent on durable goods, and approximately 10 percent on services. Aware of the consumption structure of low-income groups of pensioners, we may assume that in order to satisfy such new demand, we shall have additionally to produce approximately 470,000 tons of meat products, 2.2 million tons of dairy goods, 2 billion eggs, and 1.4 million tons of potatoes, vegetables, and melon crops. Unless we ensure an increase in resources and establish a corresponding structure of consumer demand, any increase in monetary income will fail to yield the desired social results.

In order to make the steps aimed at surmounting low income efficient, such measures should, in as much as it is possible, have a clear target. They must "work" for the satisfaction of the specific needs of specific population groups. This would mean, for example, lowering the cost

of medicines, communal services, and use of public transport for the elderly and the disabled. This should also apply to food supplements for pregnant women, nursing mothers, minor children of low-income families, and subsidized purchases of children's clothing and shoes.

Usually, low income is related to the need for increased social assistance by the state or the enterprise. However, there is yet another important and as yet unused reserve: increasing the share of the working population in republics with a high percentage of low-income families.

The 1989 census indicated the existence of a substantial number of people of working age, who are not involved in public production or going to school—about 6 million people (excluding those farming their private plots). The highest share of unemployed population is in Azerbaijan and the republics of Central Asia.

Unfortunately, for the time being, the information we need for a detailed study of the reasons for unemployment and its share in the involuntary component (unemployment, in the strict meaning of the term) is clearly insufficient. In order to gather the data necessary in pursuing a policy of efficient full employment, we shall have to resolve a number of difficult methodological and organizational problems.

Of late, problems of economic relations among republics have become particularly pressing. Considering the complexity and the economic and political significance of such problems, particular attention should be paid to perfecting the statistical methods used in their study: interregional intersectorial balances and procurement statistics.

Nearly 25 percent of the gross social product is involved in the trade among Union republics. As a rule, the smaller the republic, the higher becomes its share of exports of its output and its consumption imports. The highest share of consumption imports (27-29 percent) is characteristic of the Georgian, Moldavian, Kirghiz, Tadzhik, and Armenian SSRs and the Baltic republics. In 1988 a positive balance in the interrepublic trade (surplus of exports over imports) was found in five republics (RSFSR, Belorussia, Azerbaijan, the Ukraine, and the Georgian SSR).

A study of foreign economic relations of republics (their exports and imports) indicated that in terms of foreign exchange rubles the volume of exports exceeds that of imports in only three republics (RSFSR, Uzbek SSR, and Tadzhik SSR). In all other republics foreign exchange income from exports was insufficient to cover their imports. For example, in terms of intra-Union prices, Moldavia's actual imports for 1987 exceeded possible imports (based exclusively on foreign exchange income from republic exports) by a factor of 3.8; the respective figures were 4.3 for Turkmenia and 14 for Armenia. It is true that the absolute volumes of imports were small. All in all, for the Baltic republics, this excess was slightly over 100 percent.

Let us note that such disproportions reflect the consequences of the division of labor which developed in the national economy in the course of several decades, independent of the will of the republics themselves. Furthermore, the existing economic mechanism does not link at all the individual income of working people in republics to the economic efficiency of production facilities located on their territory. Finally, the income of enterprises located on the territory of a given republic (mostly owned by Union departments) is by no means the same as income earned by the republic and local budgets, which is used to the benefit of the local population. Therefore, the cited figures, however impressive they may sound, should not be used to substantiate the "unfairness" of interrepublic trade. It is even less admissible, on this basis, to accuse the population of any republic of living at the expense of another. Such computations are necessary and useful in scientific and practical matters for the study of the efficiency of the all-Union division of labor. However, they cannot be used as unquestionable arguments in support of direct political conclusions.

The economic results of the trade among republics are influenced by the imperfect correlation between prices of raw material resources and finished goods, the inefficient mechanism of the use of the turnover tax, and subsidies for meat, dairy, and other goods. Many such imperfections would be eliminated with the price reform. However, we can use them as estimates, if commodity trade is assessed in world prices. A great deal is being said and argued about as to who would benefit and who would lose in that case, most frequently citing random and unreliable data.

The USSR State Committee for Statistics has studied interregional flows in terms of world prices. As was to be expected, this improved the situation (the balance of imports and exports) of republics which export fuel and worsened it in cases in which light industry goods account for a significant share of exports. For that reason, in all Union republics (other than the RSFSR and the Ukrainian and Turkmenian SSRs) the general balance of imports and exports in terms of world prices is worse compared to domestic prices. Based on the conditions prevailing in 1988, a worsening of this balance in terms of world prices, compared with domestic prices in the case of the Baltic republics, Moldavia, and the Georgian SSR, equaled the loss of approximately 10 percent of the national income.

Thus, should we use world prices, the Moldavian SSR would have to pay more for importing petroleum products, metal, machines, and equipment. It would earn from exporting food products a lesser amount by a factor of 2.7, for global prices of wine products are lower by a factor of 1.9; of fruits and vegetables, 4.2; of tobacco, 4; and meat and meat products, 3.1. The Republic would benefit from imports of chemicals and light industry goods. However, this would not compensate for losses in other import and export items.

Naturally, however, the main task in improving regional statistics is by no means that of assessing who "owes" what to whom. Without a normally operating domestic market this problem cannot be solved. Computations in terms of world market prices are not a useless analytical method. However, their significance should in no case be exaggerated. As long as domestic prices are unrelated to them, we must apply a large number of conventional assumptions. It is much more important, rather than engaging in sterile arguments about the redistribution of the public pie, to organize a balanced statistics on the regional level, which would include drawing up a balance of the public product, capital assets, the largest segments of the consolidated financial balance, and all most important consolidated indicators of socioeconomic development, such as national income, net output by enterprises in material production, gross national product, overall volume of consumption of material goods and services, and summed indicators of public production efficiency. Only thus can we lay a strong information base for the development of regional self-management and self-financing.

The domestic statistical service, the development of which was most closely related to the zemstvos, enjoyed deserved prestige for its honesty and professionalism until the end of the 1920s. The zemstvo statistical data were used both by Bolsheviks and Cadets in their efforts to substantiate essentially different views. However, all in all, their accuracy could be relied upon. It is only in such a situation that a normal social debate on economic and political problems and the healthy development of economic theory are possible.

The politicizing of statistics and its conversion into the servant of the power structures dealt a heavy blow at its reputation. I believe that today the most important task of the statistical authorities is to ensure the accuracy of the data and, on this basis, restore the trust in such data on the part of the Soviet and international public. The country can no longer afford to seek the right way with the help of trick mirrors. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### **Which Side is Left and Which is Right? A Historian Reflects on Contemporary Political Debates**

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[Article by Vladimir Viktorovich Sogrin, doctor of historical sciences, professor, editor-in-chief of the journal OSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI]

[Text] Everything has changed in our native home. The "ideological-political unity" of society has vanished; tempers are boiling and endless disputes are taking place about who we are, where do we come from and where are we going? Political pluralism which, only recently, was a swear word, has now become living reality and the variety of our ideological and political trends could

astound even foreign observers. Three among them become apparent, which are main in world practical experience and, one could say, classic: right, also described as conservative; left, also described as radical; and those of the center.

Is such a separation advantageous or disadvantageous? This question excites many people today. In this connection, without, naturally, claiming in the least to provide any exhaustive, not to mention definitive, answers, I would like to share my views; this could trigger a discussion on the entire set of related problems.

Let me begin with a reference to global experience: contemporary civilized societies which allow pluralism do not reject a single one of these three trends and have long acknowledged the usefulness of each. Such trends reciprocally supplement and balance each other, while also ensuring the fullest possible expression of a variety of social interests. Radicalism is particularly active in initiating social reforms; conservatism, in maintaining and defending the basic values into which, in the course of time, many reforms convert; the center is a balancing force which does not allow passions to overflow and which ensures public consensus and encourages compromise among various strata and groups.

This, so to say, is the optimal model, established in the developed democracy. Alas, our society is a long way away from it. In our social life the three main trends frequently show political intolerance and waste an excessive amount of time in determining their attitude toward the other, which worsens even further the situation with deadlines, in which the process of real social perestroika constantly finds itself. The profoundly critical situation demands of the three trends, while preserving their own vision of the future of society, also to develop political consolidation around the common strategic objective of humanization, democratization, and a radical turn in economics, social relations and the political system of global and domestic socialism.

Naturally, the political ability and will to establish a perestroika coalition and structure it on the basis of the broadest possible social foundation should be demonstrated, above all, by the center. However, also interested in forming such a coalition are those forces which support it from the various sides and which have declared their support of the common principles of perestroika. The founding of such a coalition and the consolidation of perestroika forces and trends would turn out to be quite difficult and even impossible unless they are able to rise above extremist moods and make it possible freely to eliminate various extremes and the destructive credo within their positions, according to which "the worse it is, the better."

The appearance and activeness of extreme left- and right-wing forces<sup>1</sup> became particularly noticeable in the spring and summer of 1989. At the first Congress of People's Deputies one of the speakers, adopting a rigid confrontational style, vilified the "aggressive-obedient

majority," and labeled the elected Supreme Soviet as "Stalinist-Brezhnevist." This was followed by efforts at organizationally shaping left-wing radical groups and their associations. In turn, the right began to make active use of various "direct democracy" methods, including holding meetings with a view to submitting ultimatums to the center. The right wing developed its leaders who, in an effort to catch up with the left-wing radicals, undertook the creation of their own associations.

Despite the entire antagonism existing between the extreme left and extreme right in terms of their views, tactics and even platforms—extremes meet!—a great deal in common can be detected between them. It is precisely this similarity that made them particularly threatening to perestroika. Characteristic of both the left and the right radicals are maximalism, the division of society based on the principle of "we" and "they," and a confrontational-aggressive approach to "them." Those who are not with us are "enemies of perestroika!" They are intolerant of dissidence and their slogans and demands sound like ultimatums.

We do not like social compromise and social consolidation to be the fundamental principle of perestroika (yet it is this principle alone that makes possible the nonviolent way and means of revolutionary change!). They categorically demand of the government, of the head of state and, as a whole, of the perestroika coalition to stop "sitting on two chairs" and firmly settle on one, i.e., the radical right or left. The rejection of such an ultimatum (which, naturally, is bound to be the case), is followed by accusations of lack of principle-mindedness.

Here is the way this demand was presented by one of the left-wing radical leaders last autumn: "The high power echelons, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium above all, have mounted a mass offensive on democratic perestroika forces.... The CPSU has no authority whatsoever. For the past 70 years, under its leadership, the country has gone nowhere. The prospect of throwing the Soviet, above all, the Baltic republics into a bottomless pit, which is what the Soviet Union is, is terrible. The CPSU should close down PRAVDA which is disinforming Soviet society."

Paradoxical though this might seem, ultimatums from the right are not different from ultimatums of the left radicals. Let us listen to their voices at the 22 November 1989 Leningrad meeting: "In its present structure the Central Committee has lost all authority within the party and the people. It is unable to head perestroika!" "In my view, the slogan 'the Politburo must be answerable!' should be formulated differently: 'The Politburo must be held liable!'" "The newspapers and television have become instruments of information terror.... The mass information media must be put under worker control!"

Naturally, both left and right radicals demand "of the party to be answerable" for different reasons. The former are dissatisfied with the fact that the party is not making a "big leap," and is not separating itself, once and for all,



from the "dogmas" of Marx and Lenin and is not coming out in favor of replacing public with private ownership. The latter do not like the fact that the CPSU Central Committee is accepting pluralism and asserting a variety of forms of ownership and intends firmly to surmount equalization and barracks socialism. They are united in many of their militant aspirations toward a kind of monopoly on perestroika: to the former it means the assertion of market and political freedom, Western style; to the latter, a repair, albeit capital, but nonetheless only a repair of the administrative system.

Usually, our extremists not only do not acknowledge but sometimes even fail to notice the perestroika strategy suggested by the party. To them it simply does not exist! Is this unanimity with which they proclaim that "the CPSU Central Committee has no program for perestroika!" not striking? The purpose of this incantation in the rhetoric of extremists, which is one of the main incantations, is to me clear: to question the accuracy of the line taken by the party and state leadership, and to draw the masses over on their side. Is this consistent with reality?

Today, when perestroika is approaching its fifth anniversary, we can consider most thoroughly the question of strategy. Let us follow the situation through party documents, starting with April 1985, particularly singling out as landmarks the materials of the 27th Party Congress, the 19th Party Conference and the CPSU Central Committee plenums. We are bound to notice that the perestroika program did not appear with waving a magic wand. It did not fall down on us like manna from heaven. It matured gradually and each one of its new theoretical and strategic concepts was the result of a sharp and sometimes painful and merciless interpretation of our past and present, the fate of world socialism and all civilization and the struggle against conservative forces within the party and society. A huge distance separates the resolutions of the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the conceptual summing-up article by M.S. Gorbachev "Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika," which was published at the end of last year. Yes, in April 1985 the party did not have even a tenth of the perestroika ideas, not to mention specific draft bills, which existed at the start of 1990. Here again we find the main feature of the perestroika program which, to many of us, is quite unusual, for it led not to ideological and theoretical decrees or splendid dreams about a "communist paradise" for the "present generation of Soviet people" by the year 2000, let us say, but to an interpretation of the ways and means of revolutionary renovation on the basis of a look at the live, varied and, as it eventually became clear, sharply conflicting social, national, spiritual and political interests. It developed as a result of interaction and, not always without a conflict or painlessly, blending of "revolution from above" with "revolution from below." Yes, based on our traditional yardsticks, such a development of theory and program for perestroika is quite unusual. Could it have been different?

Foreign and even Soviet analysts and politicians frequently compare our perestroika to Roosevelt's radical "New Deal" of the 1930s in the United States. As a historian I am convinced that although perestroika and the "New Deal" took place under different social systems, comparing them is not only legitimate but also instructive. In my view both perestroika and the "New Deal" could be classified as internal formative revolutions; the former is aimed at the fundamental renovation of socialism; the second pursued the same task pertaining to capitalism. Both perestroika and the "New Deal," from the very beginning, resorted to nonviolent democratic ways of social change and, again from the very beginning, chose economic, social and political experimentation as their main tool.

I recall what Roosevelt said when he became president: "The development of mankind follows mystical cycles. A great deal is given to some generations and a great deal is asked of other. The present generation of Americans have a date with destiny." Yes, this was indeed a date with destiny: the President had not a single ready theory or idea which could save a sick society. For a number of years he, together with his "braintrust," suggested a variety of sometimes different social experiments (naturally, however, there was not even a question of replacing capitalism with socialism). American society shifted to a new quality basis before the full theoretical interpretation of the course of the "New Deal" could take shape. The "New Deal" was carried out by this great experimenter who was relying, let us particularly point this out, on the recommendations of science.

Like the "New Deal," perestroika is trying to follow (for the time being not all that energetically) the path of experimentation rather than dogma, and like the "New Deal" it sets as its objective to prove the viability of the social system within which it appeared. Filling the ideals of socialism with a new and previously unknown content, and considering naive and unpromising the mechanical application of the economic, social and political concepts developed by Marx and Lenin in a world which, in the course of a century, had experienced repeated revolutionary and radical changes, nonetheless perestroika demands the restoration of the creative, the dialectical essence of Marxism-Leninism, cleansing it from Stalinist sectarianism and using the authentic Marxist-Leninist methodology as its foundation. Here as well once again it encounters the opposition of the extreme right and extreme left, who reject the idea of the Marxist-Leninist axis of perestroika.

At this point the readers may ask themselves the following: As to the left-wing radicals, there is no doubt that many of them do not even conceal their wish to separate themselves from or even to reject Marx and Lenin. Conversely, the conservatives describe themselves as orthodox Marxist-Leninists. If such is the case, it is high time to criticize nothing other than the myth, stemming from conservative moods, of "orthodox Marxism-Leninism." This myth was created in the age of



Stalinism and was based on identifying Stalinist sectarian dogmas with the classical model of Marxism-Leninism. This myth was not surmounted during the time of Khrushchev and was even strengthened during that of Brezhnev. To this day it imbues the foundations of our social sciences and as far as the mass awareness is concerned, this myth is even stronger within it. Perestroika is constantly encountering the ideological and psychological reefs, placed by Stalinism: its firm attempts to cleanse socialism from Stalinist distortions, and restore to it the ideals of Marx and Lenin, its heart and soul taken away by Stalinism, are perceived as an attempt against the "purity of Marxism-Leninism." Possibly, future historians will describe this phenomenon as the greatest paradox of the age of perestroika.

Actually, on the right flank, precisely among the extremists, we also find those who will not accept any Marxism whatsoever, neither cleansed nor distorted. This applies to the nationalistic wing, to those, in particular, who are linked to the notorious "Memory." Speculating on the deformations of socialism, they call for removing all "foreigners," including Marx, from the Russian "high road," surrounded, as it becomes clear when looked at closely, by the iconostasis of the House of Romanovs. Having done away with Marx, they went after Lenin: it was precisely among the right that quotation mongers appeared, who tried to depict the leader of the revolution as an "enemy of the people," who was thirsting for blood and laying a path for Stalin.

Once again extremes meet. Actually, what specifically distinguishes the criticism of Marx and Engels by "Memory" ideologues from the criticism of left-wing radicals? In the majority of cases, we have the same stream of tears after the "innocently murdered" ruler, the same rejection of the materialistic theory of historical progress and the same extremely arbitrary and ideologized misrepresentation of the classics.

The social scientists use the fundamental methodological concept of "historicism." This means that any phenomenon, fact or idea could be given a proper scientific evaluation only if it has been analyzed within the context of its historical age or theoretical system. Taken out of such a context, and even less so when placed in a different age or system, they lose their significance and their meaning becomes distorted. In that case, any scientist has the right to pass the verdict that "nothing can be more stupid than a fact."

So, the left radical critics constantly violate the principle of historicism as applied to Marxism, bringing it closer to Stalinism and occasionally resorting to the open simplification of the classics. They apply Marx's theory, which linked the elimination of commodity production not only to social ownership but also to the highest level of development of production forces, to Stalinism, which promoted the noncommodity barracks socialism in Russia when that country had just left behind a patriarchal feudal-capitalist condition, and triumphantly exclaimed: "Eureka! The doctrinal sources of Stalinism

have been identified!" From a truly scientific viewpoint, however, this conclusion confirms for the thousandth time the sterility of antihistoricism.

Among the recent left-wing radical attacks on Marx and Lenin I was particularly stricken by the biting statement: "Marxism-Leninism was not capable of self-development even in its own virginally pure form." I was amazed by a number of things: the blatantly violated truths concerning Marxism (for it is well-known that the Marxist doctrine was formed and developed on the basis of the mastery of the most progressive theories of its time—Hegel, Adam Smith, Saint-Simon, Fourier and others), and the arrogant denigrating attitude toward the classics, who have always been ranked among the spiritual leaders of mankind, not only in the socialist but also the nonsocialist world, as well as the aspiration, in a single speech delivered at a meeting, to correct their "faults" and "groundlessness." What struck me most of all was that this phrase triggered great applause and that it intoxicated some informal publications. Probably the best explanation for such great popularity of that statement could be explained by the psycholinguists. Allow me, however, to express some personal remarks.

In terms of nature and form, this sentence is typical of left-wing and right-wing radical rhetoric: it is a phrase-incantation which presumes not a rational mastery but acceptance on faith. It is one of those phrases-incantations which a specific audience or readers of a given publication are most ready and willing to hear. The essence of such phrases lies not in their profundity and the aspiration to reach the truth, but in a militant antiorthodoxy. Such phrases appeal to the feelings. Their purpose is to shock, to electrify the audience. The phenomena and trends which their authors express, together with their audiences and followers, are described in world political science with one word—populism.

If we look at the latest domestic dictionaries of the social sciences, this concept will not be found in many of them. Populism caught us unawares as did, actually, many other phenomena of the tempestuous transitional age currently experienced by our society. Yes, its appearance was unexpected to our society, which had been dulled by decades of a fictitious "ideological-political unity." Essentially, however, it is quite legitimate: populism is actively rushing into the arena, always and whenever a difficult, conflicting and sharply critical situation develops. Based on the ordinary, the direct perception of the surrounding world and its problems, and on simplistic concepts of the cause-and-effect relations and ties in social life, populism offers respectively easier and frequently rebellious ways of solving difficult situations, reducing them to two or three panaceas. Populism promises purification from dirt with the blink of an eye. That is why it is frequently followed by the masses who are tired of waiting for their situation to improve.

World history is familiar with many attempts at starting populist movements and rebellions. The attitude toward

them on the part of Western social scientists is most frequently negative, which is fully explainable. Yes, particularly at the initial stages, the populists formulate also progressive democratic demands. Nonetheless, dominant in populism are irrationalism, a superficiality in explaining the reasons for social frictions and the economic difficulties of the people (the Masonic movement, criminal conspiracy at the top, etc.). Populist ideas and means have been adopted also by honestly misled people, sincerely dedicated to the interests of the nation, but much more frequently by unprincipled politicians and demagogues, whose purpose was to gain broad popular support at all cost.

Western experience is familiar with dangerous and, occasionally, even tragic examples of the results of a number of populist movements and mutinies. If we consider the experience of the 20th century alone, in the 1930s most active in the populist flank in the United States was Governor Huey Long, who tried to rally the people around slogans, such as "share the wealth" and "every man is king." These incantations attracted no less than 7 million farmers, petit bourgeois and workers. After Long's assassination in 1935, extensive connections between this populist and the "moneybags" were discovered. Populism also played a sinister role in Hitler's advent to power. The fascists promised the despairing people everything, instantly; they promised fast and easy ways of settling the crisis. They flattered the philistines with tremendous radical slogans and statements: share the wealth, anti-aristocracy, social justice, and special mission. They extracted full political benefits from playing on nationalistic feelings. We remember Hitler as a political usurper and architect of totalitarianism. However, he came to power democratically, thanks to the mass support he garnered at the 1932 elections. The bitter lesson to the labor parties was that many of his supporters were workers who had previously voted for communists and social democrats.

In my view, as we study and dissect populism, it would be an unforgivable error to limit ourselves to arrogantly scourging it. While comprehensively and principledly criticizing the ideas which exploit the backward features of the common mind of different social strata, but which claim to hold theoretical truths, the communists must, at the same time, most thoroughly study and take into consideration this ordinary mind and the liking it has for social justice, and include such social feelings within a rational program.

Today it is already obvious that populism appeared in our country as a result of the profound crisis within the society, including within social awareness. Two of the crisis phenomena in social awareness are directly related to the appearance of populism: a sharp disappointment in the socialist values, experienced by a certain social segment, on the one hand, and a rejection of the radical renovation of the concept and aspect of socialism by another segment of people, on the other. Their tendency to accept populist ideas is largely explained by the underdeveloped nature of the political standard of

society, without which a civilized democracy is impossible. Naturally, this political standard could not take shape in 2 or 3 years: in countries with developed democratic traditions, it took decades and centuries to develop; they required the passing of entire historical ages before a variety of political groups and parties learned how to compete in civilized ways, mastered the mechanisms of checks and balances, compromise and consensus, which prevent differences and antagonisms from growing into destructive civil wars. The combination of our young democracy with political standards is today the most topical task which must be solved within the shortest possible time. Until such a combination takes place democratic development will be in danger. One major reason for this danger will be the result of a populism which is gathering strength.

Once again extremes merge within populism. Naturally, the left and right wings of populism are not the same. Left-wing populists try to destroy "to the ground" the existing social structures and to erect, in their stead, a system of "absolute freedom" which, in practice, depending on their political sympathies, fluctuates from anarchy to Western liberalism. The right wing would like to dismantle all perestroyka structures and to restore a Stalinist-type "firm order." The right wing includes monarchists as well. Left-wing populism is more "intellectual" than the right: it has a "thicker" stratum of students and intellectual workers. However, the two populist trends share a great deal in common. Both imagine conspiracies (depending on their political sympathies) within the party leadership, the party apparatus, the upper, middle and lower levels of state power, and the Masons. They lump together all strata and groups—the mafia, the state, the underground economy and the party—and, on this basis, create their images of the "enemy." The right wing most frequently structure the image of the "enemy" as made out of members of cooperatives, lessees, intellectuals, scientists in particular, and the perestroyka generation of the party and state leadership. Many members of the left love to paint the image of the "enemy" from the idols of the past, making no distinction between the so-called "uppers" and "lowers" (Stalin and Stakhanov, Kaganovich and Pavlik Morozov are all the same to them). These different images of the "enemy" could entirely blend with each other while populism, rallied under the same roof, thus becomes particularly dangerous. For example, many people were worried by the criticism of our young parliament, voiced by the extreme right and extreme left. Something common could be heard in this criticism: "Enough blabbering! Faster, faster, faster!"

What is particularly worrisome is that populist impulses "from below" occasionally meet with a response among those who, by virtue of their social purpose and professional vocation and status, should be promoting what is sensible, good and eternal. Some members of the intelligentsia take up the populist slogans in an effort to earn mass support. But how dangerous this principle of "the means justify the end" is! Populism, even in its intellectual aspect, is not something good but something evil

which does not bring closer but delays true perestroyka and popular rule. It is my deep conviction that the task of the conscientious scientist, journalist and writer, the task of the true intellectual is to seek the various reasons for difficulties and ways to surmount them, and to formulate rational and comprehensively substantiated and considered options for coming out of the impasse rather than hurling thoughtless slogans. We must educate rather than divide the people and rally all people interested in promoting the establishment of a humane and democratic socialism.

It seems as though both right and left claim precisely to play the role of educators. I recently read a kind of credo by one of the spokesmen for "enlightened conservatism:" "Enlightened conservatism is an inalienable and a necessary part of any democracy. For some reason this political axiom cannot be understood by our radicals. What does conservatism mean? Literally translated, it means protection, defense. If the protection of Lake Baykal and of our northern rivers, the protection of historical monuments and the preservation of the spiritual and eternally living traditions of the Russian classics and the moral traditions of the people are conservative, then we become 'conservatives' and will be even proud of this." This may sound elegant and convincing. I believe that hardly anyone would object if the perestroyka coalition would incorporate this credo in its platform.

However, the point is that a strange and striking gap, to say the least, exists between this credo, expressed on behalf of a noted literary journal, and the articles which this journal publishes. Is this not the journal which is instilling the idea of the responsibility of a certain "small nation" for all past and present difficulties experienced by our homeland? Is it not this journal which, with striking refinement, charges the representatives of this "small nation" with the responsibility for Stalin's crimes? Is it not that same journal that cultivates in the readers something which in our literature was only recently described as "ordinary life chauvinism?" Such a view has nothing in common with true Russian patriotism. It has always been inherent in true Russian literature to seek not national but social types of suppressors of the freedom of the people, that such characters have never been identified with any ethnic group.

What are the "enlightened left-wing radicals" offering society? Total deideologization of social relations. With other "nonclass" categories, they have frequently started to promote universal private ownership, inflation and unemployment. Some extreme radicals suggest that these be used as a means of shock therapy concerning the economy. They agree that a shock economic therapy would trigger negative social consequences, such as the bankruptcy and closing down of losing enterprises and kolkhozes, drastic price increases, layoffs as a result of the elimination of harmful "hidden unemployment" of a tremendous number of workers and employees and the appearance of a healthy "real unemployment." It is suggested that society pay this price for the sake of

achieving an economic "breakthrough," for revolution would not lead to anything other than total breakdown after a few years, whereas "shock therapy" would heal us in 6 months. Among others, the following miraculous prescription is suggested: to divide all state ownership among 280 million citizens (including, consequently, children of nursery, prekindergarten and primary school age). Those who wish will invest their share in barber shops, stores or plants and those who, for some reason, do not wish to be entrepreneurs, would sell their share or "could simply drink it" (!) and hire themselves out to the new rich. The subsequent advent of "universal prosperity," they claim, becomes a "matter of technology." The nature of such "technology" is not explained at all, allegedly being a trifle, a petty matter. The main thing is to point the public in the direction of such "healing."

Common sense prompts us to ask questions of the extreme radicals: Where are the actual computations of the consequences of shock therapy? Where is the expanded study of the Yugoslav, Hungarian and Polish experiments in the area of a market-oriented economy, allowing inflation and unemployment and, in general, where are any kind of scientific works related to one idea or another? Alas, we have not come across any such work. My professional knowledge of foreign history convinces me that all of this means a return to the antediluvian market variant, abandoned by even the most backward capitalist countries. As to the developed Western countries, such a market competition was discarded more than a century ago. Conversely, the purposeful and skillful planning of the economy, competition among industrial and agricultural giants and social engineering have already renovated them on several occasions, becoming, in many respects, a model for emulation by the socialist states. Unemployment as well has lost its classical purpose: in the progressive Western countries priority has been given to a variety of ways of fighting it. There also exist various and quite efficient means of struggle against inflation.

Mastering Western experience in a civilized way does not mean "duplicating" it. Let us point out that even the Western supporters of the theory of convergence have, in their majority, adopted a skeptical attitude toward the model of a universal industrial society which would ignore national and specific historical patterns of different countries and nations. Furthermore, a return, in the literal sense, "to 1917" would mean, in our case, abandoning the social concepts and mechanisms which have assumed a universal civilizing nature and are not the property of socialism alone. Indeed, today many of our scientists, including the radicals among them, acknowledge that the process of socialization in the West, which developed as a reaction to the challenge of the October Revolution, sunk durable roots, rescued classical capitalism, and essentially gave it a new life. The viewpoint has even been expressed, precisely by radicals, that the Western countries include in their system more socialism than we do, and that it is precisely they that should be described as socialist. If we assume

that such is the case, does it make any sense, consistent with the theory of historical progress, to include the demand of destroying "to the ground" the socioeconomic structure of our society and replace it with what has been substantially reorganized and humanized in the West thanks to the process of socialization?

Neither the extreme left nor the extreme right dominate contemporary radicalism and conservatism, although they are quite noticeable thanks to their increased activity, "noise and fierceness." Ignoring them and belittling their centrifugal influence on the perestroika coalition would be an obvious error. The protracted sociopolitical crisis objectively contributes to the growth of extremes and they could develop into a real threat to perestroika. Imposing prohibitions in the struggle against their influence is unacceptable. However, a principled political stance toward them should be assumed. It should be implemented in the course of a thorough debate with the extreme groups and, naturally, in the course of the extensive enlightenment of the people concerning the real possibilities for socialism to come out of the crisis.

I have faith in the principle of the great minds of the past, of the giants of the Enlightenment: democracy can successfully develop only if it is an enlightened democracy, for otherwise it degenerates into tyranny. It is only an enlightened people that can oppose false prophets and protect its freedoms. Under the conditions of perestroika, such functions of enlightening the people and developing their political standards could be performed, above all, by the intelligentsia and the mass information media. They must be fulfilled honestly: bearing in mind the good of the people and not their own political ambitions and aspiring to reach the truth and not to increase at all cost the size of readerships, audiences, and publications. In that case the number of political shamans would diminish and the danger of populism eliminated. In such a case we could hope to undergo the revolutionary transitional period under conditions of democracy, without resorting to a "firm hand," and making our own political choice through means worthy of a civilized nation.

#### Footnote

1. In global political publications extreme left also includes left-wing radicals and extreme radicals, while the extreme right includes ultraconservative and right-wing radicals. It is considered that left-wing radicals are those who, regardless of the type of society within which they function, favor a radical dismantling of the existing system, while the ultraconservatives are those who aggressively defend traditions which have already exhausted their possibilities. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### The Universities of Perestroika

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[Interview with Yuriy Roderikhovich Zakis, USSR people's deputy, rector of the Latvian University imeni P. Stuchka, conducted by O. Dolzhenko]

[Text] **Dolzhenko:** Restructuring the life of an educational institution such as a university is a complex and difficult matter. However, of all its aspects the changes which are dictated above all by the processes occurring within society, within the immediate social environment, are of particular interest. Today opinions as to what is taking place in the Baltic republics range from rejection to total support and approval. In particular, occasional calls are heard to consider the course of perestroika in this republic, in a certain sense, as setting a standard. What do you think about this, Yuriy Roderikhovich?

**Zakis:** It seems erroneous to me to claim leadership for our republics in the perestroika process. If we were to accept any whatsoever leaders, whose example should be followed, this would automatically take us back in the old preperestroika tracks. Each area has its own specific nature. Each one of them has its own situation which somehow "impresses" a line of behavior. We cannot ignore this. In our republics, in Latvia for example, it is precisely such specifics that determined a number of steps which were taken.

The second reason for which I do not like this assessment is the following: in my republic perestroika is developing, to say the least, not much better than in other parts of the country. In some areas there have been obvious changes; there have been no changes in other and, here and there, some backsliding has even been noticed.

If we look at other places, we could see that in some of them changes have occurred precisely in areas of which we, Letts, cannot boast. Therefore, I do not like statements such as "frontrankers" and "laggards." In perestroika such standards simply cannot exist if we truly wish to renovate our life. Everywhere one must seek his own approaches. Everywhere the people must creatively resolve the problems raised by reality.

**Dolzhenko:** However one cannot fail to see common features in the perestroika processes. For example, all of us wish to get rid of the command-administrative system which has become an obstacle to social development. However, we frequently forget that some of its aspects are absolutely innocent. It turns out that such a system appears also when we adopt as a standard for our development the example of another country or society. This is described as catching-up development. What does this mean in practical terms? Above all, it means accepting as an objective not of the tasks based on the realities of our life, and existing culture, but those introduced from the outside. In order to attain them we

must create an army of "enlightened" officials who live with our interests. The standard accepted as a social plan already contains answers to all possible questions. If all answers are known, the need for intellectual activities, if it appears at all, appears in a distorted form. A state developing on the basis of such a program does not need people who would question the answers accepted as the charismatic truth. The need to develop the intellectual and humanistic potential vanishes. What becomes important is the task of eliminating the bearers of opposite ideas.

This topic could be pursued further. I believe, however, its meaning is clear: if we wish to convert to a democratic system, we must try to develop ourselves and not organize the endless pursuit of that which we would like to resemble.

If we now turn to the picture reflecting the characteristic features of life of individual areas, we would see that they are specific. Therefore, perestroika tactics as well should be different. What should be common is the aim to make changes for the good of man.

How do you assess the course of events in Latvia?

**Zakis:** I would define the processes taking place in our republic as normal. I did not expect anything else. Gradually, the people are regaining their lost feeling of responsibility for their own affairs. In the past they did what they were ordered to do by the center. Today the situation is changing. This means that the individual increasingly begins to ask questions concerning the accuracy of his actions. Hence the arising variety of opinions, not only on the individual but also on the group level, and all of them dealing with one and the same question. Furthermore, different views are found among the members of the various ethnic groups. There is nothing amazing in this. Caused by some occasionally invisible principles, inherent in each one of them, they are distinct from each other. What would have been amazing would have been the exact opposite, had such differences been lacking. Therefore, I see nothing bad in the variety itself of opinions and assessments.

**Dolzhenko:** Variety presumes the existence of mechanisms for the coordination of assessments and perhaps even the interests of different groups. What is the situation in this area?

**Zakis:** Naturally, each group and nationality has its own specific interests which, to a certain extent, conflict with those of other. We must look for mutually acceptable solutions. This is a difficult path, so far unfamiliar to us. Patience and respect are needed. It is precisely in this area that difficulties appear. From my viewpoint, we have started to lose mutual trust all too fast. Somehow surreptitiously but increasingly the following idea appears: if my neighbor is doing something, he is not doing it without a purpose, he is planning something against me. When my neighbor tells me that there is absolutely nothing of the kind in his thoughts, I still do not believe him. Please notice that such a mistrust is

reciprocal both between Letts and Russians and Russians and Letts. I did not accidentally equate here Letts with Russians. Latvia is a multinational republic but in terms of other ethnic groups, as a rule, no problems arise, such as, for example, in relations with the Jewish population. Our republic has opened one of the first Jewish schools. There are Polish schools. I do not mention the Russian schools because we have always had them.

Therefore, when we start thinking about the reasons for the appearance of difficulties, we reach the conclusion that they are based on a certain asymmetry. We frequently say that we have equality in our country, that all people are equal, and so on. However, we only say this. In fact, I repeat, the members of the different ethnic groups cannot be totally identical, which is what determines their different frames of mind in the different parts of the country.

Here is an example: a friend of mine lives in Leningrad and works there in a VUZ. Although, as he told me, everything related to his job is in proper order (he holds a rather high position), he has the constant feeling that he is being steadily checked and that his trustworthiness is in question. (What if he all of a sudden would go back to Latvia without even saying good-bye?) I shall not undertake to judge what is the matter in reality. However, that is the way he feels. Probably something similar is being felt by the Russians living in our country.

**Dolzhenko:** Where do we begin our the search for mutually acceptable solutions?

**Zakis:** Above all, we should restore the validity of the concept of the "people of Latvia," not the Latvian people but, precisely, the people of Latvia. It should be interpreted as an independent territorial, political and economic unit. This people must have its own regime. It should own the land, the subsoil and the means of production. In this respect there should be total equality among all the people living on the republic's territory. I consider wrong also any discrimination in terms of languages. We cannot say that one language is better and another worse although there may be reasons to accept that in a given area a given language would be basic, naturally assuming that the people agree to such a classification.

Letts live not only in Latvia but in other parts of the country as well. In this connection, the question arises of establishing relations with those who live beyond the borders of their republic.

Letts living outside the republic receive minimal support. The situation with the Russians is somewhat different. Note the view held by the central press. It seems to me that journalists of the central newspapers are more interested in the problems of the Russian-speaking population. From the human viewpoint this is understandable. However, the information which they handle originates not only from the people of the native nationalities.



Our republic has newspapers; the television informs the population of the results of numerous surveys. Here is what is striking: people surveyed on the street (including Russians) say that they have never had anything against others. Meanwhile, the central mass information media are reporting that in the Baltic republics the friendship among the people is breaking down. Let me point out that this friendship has not broken down and it never will. Never have members of strictly one nation lived in any country. Multinationality in a country is a natural condition. However, the structuring of a state is a process which should assume a specific aspect in a given area. In this case as well a uniform approach cannot exist.

Note the paradoxical nature of the situation. In the past the most common language spoken in Latvia was Russian and the Letts asked how could this be? Now most people speak Latvian and the other side is asking the same question.

Nonetheless, I believe that mutually acceptable solutions could be found, based on the high standards of international communications. Such standards must be developed. We ascribe excessive importance to the laws. For example, we pass a law that you must love me, and so kindly start loving me. However, it is not a law that creates a feeling of mutual respect. Mutual respect is based on the standards of relations which develop naturally. I have never greatly relied on the passing of laws. If a law is passed it also works against someone. Against whom? Could it be against my neighbor, so that he could feel my increased power? I do not need this.

**Dolzhenko:** What changes are taking place in your university life?

**Zakis:** There are numerous changes but let me single out a few which are of relative interest. I would include among them abandoning the traditional practice of enrolling university students in the Russian and Latvian departments. What kind of practice was this? An applicant would like to study physics. The first question they would ask him was in what language he had trained. Each department had its own competitive examinations. This was an absurdity! If a person wants to be a physicist it is precisely this that matters and not the language in which he was trained. Therefore, there should be only one competition for students applying to the physics department.

Furthermore, we are abandoning the practice according to which the student must submit an enrollment petition. We would like to convert to a system of contractual relations in the course of which we determine the obligations and rights of the student and the university. We could stipulate everything, from the specific subjects which the student should study to with his military training. As a result of this all subsequent discussions as to why I have to study one thing and not another vanish naturally. In precisely the same way the following question is raised: Why is it that in a university there should

be that many Letts and that many non-Letts and what is the ratio in terms of ethnic composition? Our ratio is quite delicate: whereas in Riga Letts account for 50 percent of the population, in the university, last year, 70 percent of the entire student contingent was studying in the Latvian language.

**Dolzhenko:** How do you explain this?

**Zakis:** To begin with, we have some departments, such as Latvian language and literature, in which primarily Lett students are enrolled. Second, there is no linguistic barrier for the Russian-language population: such people frequently go to study elsewhere in the country. There is yet another nuance which became particularly noticeable after the Law on the State Language was passed. It is no secret that in mixed marriages, as a rule, children are fluent in both Russian and Latvian. Now they are being trained in Latvian. We should point out that in the past it was more advantageous to attend a Russian-language school. For example, it took 10 years to graduate from a Russian school and 11 from a Latvian. Therefore, a young person who graduated from a Russian school had 1 year additional before being drafted. The situation now is different: there is only one type of school in the republic. The training language becomes a matter of personal choice.

Let me also point out that, nonetheless, the purpose of perestroika is not to switch from one rigid system to another equally rigid: whereas previously Moscow ruled rigidly today Riga should rule just as rigidly. I like neither option. I am in favor of a system which offers the individual the possibility of making a free choice and freely to exercise his civil rights.

**Dolzhenko:** One such right in our country is that a free education is guaranteed to every person. What is your attitude, Yuriy Roderikhovich, toward free education, as it exists in our country?

**Zakis:** Above all, if we look at our constitution—today, unlike the situation in the recent past, when no one paid attention to it, we read it quite closely and not only read it but try to interpret, to determine the precise meaning of what it reads—if we look at the section on rights we find out that every citizen in our country and in the republic has the right to education.

This means very little. Clearly, I also have the right to sleep and eat. There is no need to mention this. However, the text further stipulates that this right to education is guaranteed by providing education free of charge. My question is this: Why should free education be guaranteed? It is simply a form, a way of obtaining an education! The guarantees are in the fact that, enrolling in a university, I could say the following: I am a citizen of this country, for which reason I have the right to attend a university. The only criterion on the basis of which the question of my enrollment could be decided is the level of my training.

**Dolzenko:** Yes. Yet today we have competitions. If you are ranked first or second, you will study; if you are not, you will not. In this case your civil right is ignored. This may sound rather drastic but it would be no great exaggeration to say that in our country the right to education is not secured. In frequent cases secondary school graduates are unfamiliar with subjects which are stipulated in the curriculum, most frequently due to lack of teachers. Inequality in educational chances as well has become substantial: for example, the very fact that a child is born in the family of a forester substantially diminishes his chances of obtaining higher education compared to the offspring of an engineer or a higher school official.

The right to education means that anyone who wishes to learn and has the necessary level of training should have the opportunity to do so. In our country, however, this right is also hindered by the competitive selection system.

**Zakis:** That is why I believe that the constitutional right to education should be interpreted as follows: our country allocates funds for the support of VUZs. Unfortunately, they are insufficient to provide training to anyone who wishes it. Our university as well is allocated some such funds. I assess the cost of training per student and I determine that the state budget allows me to train a certain number of people. Naturally, the available openings will be based on a competitive system. What else can we do? What matters is that students who are thus enrolled establish some contractual relations with the university, which would stipulate all the requirements concerning the student's training, set by the state which pays for the training. If these requirements are violated, automatically the relationship between student and university is broken. This system already exists. I am merely emphasizing the process of the establishment of the relationship.

At the present time other applicants whose level of training would entitle them to enroll in a university are left out. In our country, however, a variety of forms of activities are developing. For example, there are cooperatives, a system of leasing relations is beginning to be organized in the countryside, and many enterprises have become quite independent and wealthy. Therefore, let me say to those who have not qualified in the competition: find a company which would pay for the cost of your training and learn as much as you wish. It would make absolutely no difference to me whether you are learning well or poorly. I will not expel a student as long as he pays.

Finally, another possible form of enrolling in a university is the purely individual one. The student himself pays for the cost of his education. This may shock some people: aha, you are selling diplomas! Nothing of the sort, I answer. Bribery may exist elsewhere but not in our case. To begin with, we enroll people who have the necessary preliminary training. A diploma will be issued only if all the requirements concerning the level of

training of the graduate have been fulfilled. However, a person could learn as much as he wishes as long as he pays his university tuition.

The result will be an additional enrollment of students.

**Dolzenko:** How will such revenue be used?

**Zakis:** Salaries to the teachers, increasing the number of teachers, building new school buildings and dormitories, purchasing equipment.... Please note that with such an approach we solve yet another important problem which is more of a moral than a material order. If in the past those who did not qualify on the basis of the competition remained outside the universities (if they could find a job that was good and well but many of them simply were supported by their parents), now such people would be attending a VUZ and would be investing in it their own and, most frequently, their parents' savings. Incidentally, there is hardly a more beneficial area in which one could invest savings than education. That is why I think that the old view, according to which I was not concerned with someone who had not qualified in the examinations, was wrong. No, this too is my affair. I must know what will happen to the person. I must help him find a sponsor. For example, I could ring up an enterprise and say: "Here I have a good boy but he is short of tuition funds and I personally have no money. You would not regret paying his tuition!"

This year, for the first time our university enrolled students on the basis of such rules. In one of the departments there was an entire group of students sponsored by companies which were paying their tuition. Few people pay for their tuition privately. Thus, in the philosophy department only two students have paid for their own tuition....

**Dolzenko:** What was the reaction to your innovation?

**Zakis:** It varied. There were those who said: "How can you charge money for education? This is immoral." That is a strange logic: it is moral to charge money for vodka or a car but immoral for knowledge.

The greatest of our values is the intellectual potential of the people. It is expressed in real skills, abilities and knowledge.... Look at how long it takes to obtain a driver's permit! Yet, such waiting should simply not exist. Anyone who would like to learn how to drive a car should have easy access to such training. Consider the following situation: a driver is needed, but he is unavailable or, at least, he is not always handy. It would be an entirely different matter if everyone had learned how to drive a motor vehicle. This is perhaps not the best example, but examples of this kind could be cited as much as one wishes. Therefore, I am convinced that some of the money which is today funneled through the cooperatives should go into education so that such funds could contribute to increasing the skills and knowledge of the people.

I consider the overall cultural standard of our individuals, of our society as being the greatest cultural value. A skillful and knowledgeable person will always find a way to apply his knowledge. In our country, however, a person may not be admitted here or there, or not qualify in the competition.... I, nonetheless, say that if the situation has developed in such a way that a person has not been accepted on the basis of the competition, he should pay for the cost of his learning and learn.

Today in our republic, in general, we proceed from the fact that all the funds which could go into education should go there. Essentially, this approach is not new. Look at practices abroad, where the process of transferring funds to the educational system is encouraged in all possible ways. Companies simply aspire to donate funds to schools, for this is their best possible advertising. It would be proper for our companies as well to adopt this tradition and consider it a moral foundation for their activities.

I recently visited the United States, where the rector of a private university described to me the material situation of his school as follows: the cost of education there had reached almost \$20,000 annually. It is true that this amount includes room and board. Therefore, having paid this money the student then eats as though free of charge. However, this \$20,000 covers only 60 to 65 percent of the cost of tuition. In order to obtain the remaining 35-40 percent, the rector said, every year he travels around the country and even goes abroad, meets with alumni and asks for contributions. In America alumni remember their university. For the rest of their lives they feel that they are part of a single university family.

**Dolzhenko:** Unfortunately, this tradition was stopped in Russia although it did exist in the past. Remember who built the dormitory of the MVTU on 2 Baumanskaya Street. It was a former graduate, a talented engineer who became very successful. This was not an isolated example. On the other hand, however, before the revolution the engineer's income was somewhat different. He had something funds to spare. Today he can assist only through favoritism, finding a way to use the money of the enterprise rather than his own.... The difficult material situation of our educational system, our higher schools in particular, did not develop by itself. I believe that what influenced it above all was the fact that throughout its existence, the higher school developed within the framework of the state which professed, starting with Peter the Great, the concept of catching up. At first the higher school met the requirements of the state. It was shaped within the framework of the administrative-bureaucratic system. By its very purpose it was a higher school engaged in solving strictly functional problems related to the development of the state. Society had adopted a rather distant attitude toward it. There was a weak link between the interests of the higher school and those of social development. That is precisely why opposition to a progressive faculty and various student

activities was always topical in the Russian and, subsequently, the Soviet higher schools: in general, in terms of the administrating state, the educational system is another administrative system, but twice as strong. The only bright spot in our history was that of the public schools which operated in Russia at the turn of the 20th century. It was precisely they that, albeit for a short time, were given autonomy. Approximately one-half of the higher educational institutions at that time had been created through public efforts. It became honorable to invest funds in education and thus to contribute to its development. Let us recall, in this connection, the Shanyavskiy University, Shelaputin's Pedagogical Institute and the Bestuzhev courses....

Incidentally, how is university policy influenced by the fact that now its activities will be financed out of republic funds? I do not ask this question randomly. Worldwide practical experience indicates that the method of financing of school also quite clearly determines the type of students it could train. In Switzerland, for example, most university financing comes out of city funds (I am not speaking here of technical universities). The city quite clearly determines who could attend and who could not attend a university. For example, it is precisely the city authorities which set a strict quota for foreigners. They are guided by the clear stipulations that a good education is expensive and that the task of the university is to meet the educational requirements of its own citizens; no waste of funds should be allowed and or teach one and all. At this point perhaps something further should be specified, but the logic of the thinking is roughly the one I described.

**Zakis:** Under present circumstances, since financing now will come from the republic budget, the following question seems reasonable: Who do we train? If the student is a citizen of our republic, everything is clear: he pays taxes, he makes his contribution to the cost of education and has the right to learn. If it is a student from another republic, he must be given the same rights on a certain specified basis.

However, this is only a first although an important approximation to the answer.

Let us go on. I could conclude contracts with VUZs in other republics interested in such relations. Naturally, students who could pay for their own tuition should have the right to enroll. If any given republic is directly interested in training specialists precisely in our republic, I believe that it will always find the possibility to pay the tuition. Naturally, we too will pay for training specialists for our own republic. Therefore, I believe that grounds for discussions which take an unpleasant political shading will disappear: the Baltic republics are earning a great deal of money but all the money goes to Central Asia (or else, as the miners recently claimed, they earn substantial funds but all the money goes to the Baltic republics, for which reason the people there live

well). No grounds should be provided for such talk. Let us compute and consider. We shall live according to our earnings.

In the final account, if anyone petitions us to provide learning facilities to a group of youngsters we, naturally, shall respond. It is simply pleasant to feel that we are able to take real steps and help someone who needs our assistance. Believe me, as a result the friendly relations between republics and nations will not only not weaken but become even stronger.

We are also thinking of developing in the future a special fund for those who will come to study in our republic. This will be good publicity for our leading scientific schools. For example, physics is quite well developed in our republic. In principle, we could set aside for other republics (specific quotas for each one separately) a few tuition-free openings for physics students. I believe that the result will be the development of relations among different VUZs which will interact. Such relations will be on the human level.

Incidentally, it is precisely because of the lack of such relations that I do not like the so-called noncompetitive target enrollment. How is this practiced? The starting point is the obvious fact that a republic cannot train students in all areas it needs. We receive from enterprises and organizations requests for such specialists and send them to Moscow. There such requests are considered and we are being told: we can allocate for you two places at a university in Kaliningrad, so many in the Far Eastern University, etc.

**Dolzenko:** What is it that you do not like about this system?

**Zakis:** To begin with, there is no personal contact with the rector of the VUZ attended by my students. I cannot go and determine what is their situation and the way they live.... Incidentally, I have five students currently studying in America. I went there and was able to familiarize myself with their learning and living conditions and the level of their training. Unfortunately, such contacts exist with America but what about within the Union? There is yet another negative aspect. For example, we may be granted one seat in a Ukrainian VUZ. The Letts will think long and hard about whether to go or not: it is far away and they are unwilling to leave home. Meanwhile, a Ukrainian living in Latvia would, as a rule, accept immediately, for in his case this is no problem: he is going back to his own republic and even entering an institute without competition! He goes and, most frequently, does not return. As a result, the entire purpose of such enrollment is lost.

**Dolzenko:** I am interested in the steps you have taken to join the Association of Soviet Universities. Participation in the work of such an organization indicates the wish to combine efforts and work jointly with the universities of other republics. My question is the following: What do you expect as a result of joining this association, and what do you hope to gain from it?

**Zakis:** To me the most important thing now is to be in touch with my neighbor. In our university life everything goes into the USSR State Education Administration and everything comes from it. It supplies us with curriculums, certification commissions and instructions of what to do and how to do it. What I would like, however, above all is to see what my neighbor is doing and how he is doing it. I think that it is precisely the Association that should author and initiate all instructions and rules and prescriptions and control the process. Whether we like it or not, although many officials of the State Education Administration may have VUZ experience, unquestionably their standard will not be that of the association. For that reason I believe that the "legislative" initiative concerning the higher schools should come precisely from the Association of Universities and should originate precisely there. I believe that the Association will become a major force in our country.

You have no idea how pleasant it is to communicate with colleagues. Strange though it may seem, such greatly necessary contacts are virtually absent in our country. That is why I think that all of us would benefit greatly from the creation of such an association. This is a real way to better mutual understanding, cultural growth and research.

What are we struggling for? We are struggling for economic and cultural independence. We would like to get out of the clutches of a rigid administrative-command system which, for many long years of its existence, proved its total groundlessness and inability to ensure the harmonious development of society. In principle, this system was opposed to man. To it man was merely a cog, a prerequisite for solving problems alien to man. With the help of our reforms we are trying to eliminate the alienation which developed between man and the results of his labor.

The steps taken in the course of perestroika are aimed at the democratization of society. They are a means of asserting the priority of universal human values compared to the values of the system. They are naturally paralleled by the broadened autonomy of enterprises, VUZs in particular. Already today our rights have become considerably greater. However, having obtained such rights we have come across a situation or, rather, a question of how to use them most efficiently. It turned out that alone one could do something but not much more. The natural aspiration developed in the VUZs to interact with each other: we are no longer cogs but autonomous organizations which are solving many of their own problems. Naturally, we began to show greater interest in what takes place outside our schools. We found ourselves in a very curious situation: the need to solve our problems is encouraging us to coordinate our efforts. It is thus that we have reached the level of seeking a modern model for controlling our development, university education for instance. The Association of Universities, in my view, is the prototype of such a future democratic form of managing the development of

our universities. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## SOCIAL PRIORITIES

### Defending the Defenders

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[Article by V. Dymarskiy and Ye. Shashkov, *KOMMUNIST* special correspondents]

[Text] We met Vyacheslav Sevastyanov, captain in the anti-aircraft defense forces, during a 3-day meeting of an independent social experts evaluation, which analyzed the state of the threat of war and the activities of the Soviet Armed Forces. The meeting was attended by party workers, representatives of the Ministries of Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, scientists, teachers, public personalities, and, naturally, members of the military. In the company of serious men, who discussed such serious problems of military building, the captain seemed somewhat confused, as he subsequently himself admitted, due to the fact that, shifting from one work group to another, he failed to find an audience willing to drop down from theoretical heights to our sinful earth with its daily problems. We recorded the emotional story of this officer. This became the initial information on which we asked USSR people's deputies, representing the Armed Forces in the supreme authority, to comment.

Thus, the opening statement is that of Capt V. Sevastyanov:

I am certain that the military is the socially least protected part of society. I speak this in knowledge of the matter. I am ashamed to admit to my wife and child that as a Soviet officer, as a man, I am unable to secure for them even basic living conditions. I simply fear for my family, for its future, and such fears are stronger than the fear of any possible punishment for disobedience and for an open protest against real Army reality. Judge for yourselves.

We live in a little plywood house made, 1960 model, without any amenities. One cannot even speak of hot water, and cold water is carried from the yard. It is true that there is steam heat but it is inadequate and each officer family has an additional two or three electric space heaters. We keep the children wrapped up, for otherwise they could freeze. There is nothing astonishing in the fact that they are always sick, while medical aid consists of one feldsher who not only cannot treat patients but cannot even examine them. In 7 years of service, for example, I have not been examined even once by a medical commission. It is a good thing that my mother has something to do with the medical profession and was able to arrange for me to see a doctor. It turned out that "all I had" was an ulcer. But what are others to do, when not even a polyclinic will accept them for lack of a physician's referral? What are our wives, deprived of

even basic gynecological consultations, to do? Before I was assigned to Karelia I served 6 years on an island in the White Sea. I totaled 17 emergency helicopter trips for urgent medical aid, for locally no one could do anything. How could one talk of any kind of high combat-readiness, when one's wife is lying on the operating table?...

I am ashamed to look at my family. We have no nursery or kindergarten. Our wives are forced to stay home. If a wife is lucky enough to find a job (assuming that she is not prevented by family obligations), in the majority of cases she must forget her previous profession. There also are food procurement difficulties. Naturally, somehow we try to deal with the situation. While stationed on the island, I would get the "Buran" ready, hitch a small enclosed trailer to it, and drive more than 50 km on the snow, in a snowstorm, to buy bread. Sometimes we lived without oil, sugar or bread for a whole month. No one cared. Occasionally a high level commission would come and there would be a polite conversation for a couple of minutes, after which someone would shout: You are a loafer, you are doing nothing! All recommendations are reduced to what color to paint the fence, whether green or gray, and whether to paint a yellow strip across it or not....

It is thus that we live in our Army "boondocks." Is it astonishing that the people would like to get out of it? But how to do it? The children are the salvation: the garrison has no school and the moment the child reaches school age, the father is transferred elsewhere, frequently with a demotion. Although many people do not move but send their children to boarding school, what is the guarantee that this would not turn out to be even worse? The most widespread method of organizing one's life is favoritism, the "cancerous tumor" of our Armed Forces. Competence and professionalism are qualities which, it would seem, are of no interest to anyone. The main thing is for the person to be "one of ours," and rise along with the high-ranking commander, or else be appointed closer to Moscow, where conditions are incomparably better compared to ours. At this point the deputy commander for political affairs interferes. He is needed by the Army, in my view, to prevent the principle of one-man command from turning into one-man rule and to help us in our life, regardless of rank and position. He is the anti-tank "hedgehog," whose job it is to block the careerist and to defend human fate. However, today the political organs themselves are controlled by commanders who are mandated by the regulations to assume responsibility for everything: combat-readiness, education, and training. They make use of such rights by "pushing" whenever necessary, the various buttons—the party organization, public opinion or the political officer. Naturally, most frequently commanders are put under circumstances which dictate a certain behavior on their part. However, no conditions can justify boorishness and ignorance. To allow an officer to go to the city for one reason or another, in winter to allow the pregnant wife of an officer to sit not in the back of the truck but in



one's own car, requires simply to be human and to realize that one is dealing with a person. But if a general can allow himself to proclaim loudly: "What intelligent statement could be expected of a senior lieutenant?!" what can one ask of other ranks?

All of us are well familiar with the resolution on reducing the Armed Forces by 500,000 men. However, there is no glasnost whatsoever on the development of this process, which leads to arbitrariness. An officer can be discharged from the Armed Forces on the basis of three articles. The first is incompatibility with the position held; the second is related to a reduction in personnel; the third is for discrediting the title of officer. Naturally, the most advantageous is to be discharged because of personnel reduction: the person receives for 1 year 150 rubles monthly in "unemployment assistance," and priority in acquiring housing and other advantages.... All of this, it turns out, is only for the senior officer ranks. A lieutenant, captain or major who would submit to his commander a request for resignation immediately finds himself classified as "incompatible with the position held," with all the consequences: at the age of 30 one goes back home with an empty suitcase and one tries to organize one's life as best one can. No one shows any interest as to why actually is the officer willing to leave the Army and no one thinks about his social problems!

I already named some of them. There are other as well. The same arbitrariness prevails in regulating the workday and payment for overtime. You may not believe this, but for combat duty under extreme hardship conditions and increased responsibility, the officer is paid an additional 42 kopeks daily. This is the entire compensation for the "peaceful sleep of the Soviet people." One cannot even dream of regular leave: at best, we could get an emergency pass, delayed by a couple of days, but even that is a rarity.

Or take the latest events in the Transcaucasus. Naturally, this is an emergency situation. However, it also affected thousands of members of officers' families who had to be evacuated from Baku and other areas, in some cases even without warm clothing, money or a place to stay. Once again, in the majority of cases, total indifference was displayed, this time on the part of the civilian authorities.

It is considered that the Army is part of society and that all of the difficulties experienced by our present society should affect the Army as well. Yes, this is so, but is it possible to forget our special responsibility which involves a risk to life?

That is why many officers are unwilling to continue with their Army service. Generally speaking, the question of discharge from the Armed Forces should be resolved in principle. Why, unlike other citizens, are we refused the right to change professions? We must make our choice at the age of 17, still as boys, whether under the influence of patriotic feelings, the seeming romanticism of military

service or else parental persuasion. Later comes experience, life interests are defined, and, frequently, there is disappointment....

We shall interrupt the captain's monologue to illustrate his thoughts with two letters recently received by the editors. "I served in the Armed Forces for 4 years," writes Senior Lt I. Vartsan. "During that time I realized that this was not the right place for me and that I would be unable to develop my full potential in the Army and use my entire stock of knowledge and, therefore, I could not be fully useful to society. As early as the fifth year of school, I began to realize all of this and submitted a request for resignation which, however, was denied.... The problem of resignation affects not only me personally but many other officers who, like me, made a wrong choice of profession or else people who, by virtue of other circumstances and reasons, can no longer continue their Army service. Today the people are trying to base their lives on the principles of democracy and glasnost and, understandably, many people feel that it is impossible to having their own views and opinions which differ from the ideas of their commander or the political department and the atmosphere of secrecy which, to this day, prevails on many levels of the Armed Forces. All this and many other factors have alienated me from the Army. What can one who finds himself in this situation do?"

"In order to be discharged, one must artificially claim that one is a truant, an abuser of alcohol or else an immoral person. This is the only way, as is bluntly said by all commanders and chiefs to those who are trying to resign. But how is it possible for a reasonably thinking person who respects himself to take this road? I find every single day spent in the Army a burden. I am simply forced into violating statutory regulations. Is it that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 40 of the USSR Constitution on the right to choose one's profession do not extend to military servicemen?"

This topic is followed in the letter by Lt S. Vostrikov: "I have been repeatedly told by the chief of the political department that I shall be able to resign my commission from the Armed Forces only as a nonparty person. I do not understand the connection between unwillingness to serve in the Armed Forces and CPSU membership. If I realize that I was not made to serve in the Army and have honestly stated this, why should I be expelled from the CPSU? Is it better deliberately to be in the wrong place in life, torturing not only myself but also the people around me? Party policy may stipulate this but I cannot understand it."

Let us note the statement that a resignation from the Armed Forces is linked to resigning from the CPSU. We shall return to this after we have heard the end of the story of Capt V. Sevastyanov. He goes on to say:

We are like the historical recruits who served 25 years. But what about the Constitution, which should be the same for all citizens? For all, apparently, but not for military servicemen. In such a case, let us have our own

constitution, such as the Law on Defense, and the Law on Universal Military Service. It is only on such a basis that Army problems can be solved, not by resolutions, even ones formulated by the CPSU Central Committee, but on the basis of a law, the violation of which entails specific penalties. Above all, social guarantees must be stipulated. The state must be concerned with its defenders. One cannot base everything on self-sacrifice and enthusiasm. We have plenty of that and also a feeling of duty. No one, however, has as yet rejected the use of social and material incentives. It is precisely incentives that are needed and not charity, as was the case with the latest raise of 50 rubles monthly, given equally to generals all the way down to lieutenants.

In general, in my view the relationship between the officer and the Armed Forces must be on a contractual basis. The contract should stipulate everything: the length of service, particularly in remote garrisons, salary, social insurance, the officer's right to a residence permit to live in his parental home, and anything else related to Army service....

The impression today is that we are needed by the state and the Armed Forces only as people who perform specific functions. However, every one of us is also a person, a citizen. In brief, I submitted a petition to resign from the CPSU. Do you know what was the final step which pushed me into doing it? It was a telemarathon sponsored by the Soviet Children's Fund! I watched it from beginning to end and crossed the line of doubt, illusions, and hopes. To begin with, I did not expect that the difference in children's welfare was so great between us and "them." However, that was not even the most important feature. The main feature was that had we reached a condition in which all that was left of us was to stand like beggars at a railroad stop. Did this apply also to the officers? I saw no solution. The circle was closed. How to break it? Who will help our children? If I leave the Army, so will other. We shall destroy the seeds of future crops. And what happens then?

Pause...

Army regulations forbid collective complaints, for it is simpler to deal with separate individuals. Let me repeat: I have nothing to lose, I have told you all this not only on my behalf but also as instructed by our officers' collective. Go, I was told, and tell them everything as it is: we want to serve but we are unwilling to live this way....

We do not know how typical these situations may be and what were the personal motivations for the actions taken by those three officers. You will agree, however, that one must not ignore anything of this kind, even an isolated case. For the sake of being more objective, let us listen to another side: to USSR people's deputies. Responding to our demand to comment on the officers' revelations were Maj V. Zolotukhin, a military journalist; Maj V. Lopatin, a political worker, and Col A. Tsalko, a military flyer.

V. Zolotukhin. Unfortunately, much of this is typical of our Armed Forces. Negative phenomena have been

manifested with particular clarity under the circumstances of the current reduction of the USSR Armed Forces. Initially, it was planned that this would include also voluntary resignation, i.e., those who were unwilling to serve could file a resignation request. However, there were so many applicants that the Ministry of Defense was forced urgently to delete this item from the regulations which were being drafted. So far, according to deputies who are in the military, there have been 27,000 requests for resignation from the USSR Armed Forces. The situation is truly critical. It is worsened by the lack of applicants for military schools. Unless the necessary radical measures are taken, including those involving social guarantees, in 5 or 6 years there will simply be no officers in the Armed Forces.

With the forthcoming adoption of the new Law on Defense and the new Regulation on Military Service, finally the officers will be given the right voluntary to resign their commissions. We, people's deputies representing the Armed Forces, will do everything possible to see to it that this item is mandatorily included. Today an officer is obligated to serve all of his 25 years and can leave the Armed Forces only for reasons of illness or for discrediting the title of officer. The moment the item of voluntary resignation appears, I fear that no one will be willing to serve in hardship garrisons under the present circumstances.

A. Tsalko. The problem of the socioeconomic protection of the officer is a derivative, an element of the overall situation. In other words, individual problems cannot be solved without solving the general ones. It is a question of the legal status of the Armed Forces in the state and the concept of the organization of defense. One must also assess the extent of the military threat and define in detail the components of our military doctrine. In short, we must clearly formulate the fundamental principles related to Armed Forces reform, for otherwise the situation cannot be corrected.

V. Lopatin. We reached these conclusions at the meeting of the Armed Forces Subcommittee of the Committee on Problems of Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which was held on 4 January 1990. We discussed the question of the struggle against nonstatutory relations within the Army. In the course of the discussion the participants in the meeting unanimously concluded that this problem cannot be solved, and nor could many other, without the formulation of general, basic concepts which would constitute the essence of the military reform. The second conclusion reached by the subcommittee was the following: to begin with, it is necessary to consider the concept and substantiate the model of restructuring of the Armed Forces and only then undertake its practical implementation instead of acting as we do now. The drafting of the defense bill must not be done in secrecy, without extensively seeking the opinion of the Army and Navy public. The situation with the draft new regulations is similar. Otherwise, in

drafting the military reform we shall constantly come across documents which were drafted on the basis of the old approaches.

**V. Zolotukhin.** Here is a single example of the equivocal nature of the draft Law on Defense, as written by the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Article 32, which deals with the status of military servicemen, first states that military servicemen summoned to training, enjoy all the rights and freedoms, fulfill the obligations, and bear responsibilities stipulated by the legislation for Soviet citizens. It also adds that there are additional rights and obligations and, let me emphasize, **necessary restrictions of general civil rights and freedoms**, stemming from the specific nature of military service, as stipulated by USSR laws on universal military duty and military service, the status of military servicemen, and general Army statutes of the USSR Armed Forces. In other words, the law stipulates that the rights and obligations of military servicemen can be substantially restricted through subsequent acts. This is a major deviation from the Constitution.

**A. Tsalko.** A group of military deputies and scientists developed the concept of the military reform, structured on the idea of having professional Armed Forces. Its implementation, in our view, would make it possible to solve socioeconomic, living, and other conditions. In other words, a person must be protected economically, legally, and morally. For example, if a professional who joins the services on the basis of a contract is sent to a garrison where the stipulated conditions for his service are lacking, he cannot be forced to remain there. Currently, our major postulate is "firmly to withstand all the hardships and privations of military service." Essentially, this is the foundation of military social policy.

**V. Zolotukhin.** It is a fact that unless all such problems are solved officers will have to be paid not their present salary but several hundred percent more in order to interest them in military service.

**V. Lopatin.** Without getting into detailed computations (which have been made), I can state with full responsibility that claims to the effect that a professional Army would be much more expensive than the present are totally unsupported. Consciously or subconsciously they mislead the Soviet public and the country's leadership. I, for example, was interested in the origin of the figure used in the expert evaluation made by specialists of the USSR General Staff Center for Operative-Strategic Research: funds needed for the upkeep of voluntary Armed Forces could, allegedly, be covered by no more than 30 percent while the rest must come from the state budget. It turned out that the logic which led to this conclusion was amazingly simple: the size of the Army is reduced by one-third and, respectively, so do expenditures. Furthermore, General Staff specialists lacked accurate figures even for the current Armed Forces. It is on the basis of such computations that all of their rejections of the suggestion to convert to a professional Army are based.

**A. Tsalko.** The way we see it, it is a question of a gradual conversion. It would be naïve to assume that one could go to bed with one army and, the next morning, wake up with another—a cadre army, regular, staffed on a professional and voluntary basis. Unquestionably, a gradual approach is needed. The first step, in my view, should be the introduction of a system of contracts which would include social guarantees. As a whole, our deputy-written draft concept of military reform, which calls for developing a professional Army, properly fits the concept of the future reduction of the Armed Forces, not with the destruction of lives, as is the case now, but on the basis of a solicitous attitude toward the officer corps.

What is the current social status of the Soviet officer? Let us call things by their proper names. We are people who have no control over our own lives: an order is issued, and you go into battle. If an officer is ready to do so voluntarily, on the basis of a contract, this means that one must clearly stipulate everything and grant the officer certain advantages. In the final account, there should be a social, a material compensation. If society equates me with the average statistical working person, in that case I am forced to say, forgive me but I shall be in control of my own life and destiny and shall not entrust them to anyone else. Yet the mission of any Army, whether professional or superprofessional is, on the basis of an order, to undertake the solution of a problem involving the use of force. Otherwise this will no longer be an Army but who knows what.

**V. Lopatin.** In order to fulfill this mission, the Armed Forces must be staffed by people who are trust the constitutional guarantees concerning their status in society. Let us consider the right to housing. Today, according to Army deputies, there are 165,000 "homeless" officers; the income per member of the family of a military serviceman is, on an average, 30 percent lower than that of a worker. Fifty percent of officers' wives are unemployed, not because they do not want to work but because there are no jobs. And all of this takes place against a background of statements to the effect that man is the main value of the Armed Forces. Whereas in most foreign armies the maintenance of the personnel accounts for one-half of all outlays, in our country it accounts for only one-third. Such is the real cost of the "human factor." Meanwhile, no money is spared for military ordnance, some of which is unnecessary or even mortally dangerous to operate. I am familiar, for example, with some Air Force subunits in which the officers intend to stick labels to vertical take-off airplanes "stay clear, life-threatening." In order for the flyers to accumulate flying time, standard MIG-21s have been assigned to these subunits. As to the "wonder aircraft," with vertical take-off, for which so many awards and state bonuses have been given, the safety of the flyers was forgotten.

In the large garrison in which I serve there are three kindergartens for no more than 320 children. There are 800 children waiting in line. This is a most urgent matter and it is not the first year that it has been raised. Each

time we are refused funds to build new children's institutions. I was told by the commander of the Northern Fleet, the commander in chief of the USSR Navy, and people's deputy Chernavin the following: "Comrade Lopatin, you voted for reducing military expenditures, now harvest the fruits. We are forced to eliminate the children's projects from the plans." How can one react to such a statement today, when we hear so much about the priority of social problems? If no funds are left for kindergartens, I asked the commander in chief, where does the money come from for the building of state dachas in the Moscow area for the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and for the General Staff? This fact was already reported in the press. Huge funds were invested in them! I have data showing that the cost of one such dacha was 627,000 rubles!

The Armed Forces today are being corroded by favoritism, nepotism, and incompetence. We, peoples' deputies, have received a large number of letters on this subject. Does this not confirm also the lack of legal protection of military personnel?

**V. Zolotukhin.** For example, the Fundamental Law stipulates that every citizen of the USSR has the right to annual paid leave. Term service military personnel may receive such leave only by decision of the commander, if the soldier distinguishes himself in his service. There seems to be some logic in this. But then what happens to the constitutionally guaranteed right? We already pointed out that an officer cannot change professions even if he feels that he has made the wrong choice. On the other hand, he is deprived of the right to appeal to the court if he is illegally discharged from the Army, for this decision is made by the superior commander. It is very difficult, virtually impossible, to determine which are the necessary and the sensible restrictions of rights. They are defined by the specific commanders. The regulations stipulate that an order issued by a commander is the law for his subordinates. The lack of legal foundations for military service provide real grounds for the blossoming of "Army willfulness." It is no accident that, according to data at my disposal, the military prosecutor's office countermands as much as 30 percent of orders issued by commanding officers on all levels. The view exists that in the local areas this can be countered by the political authorities. However, such is not the case, for as we already noted, their legal status as well has not been defined.

**V. Lopatin.** In the past the political authorities were developed as a social protection institution, to which one could turn for assistance. Today they account for some 100,000 men and, in my view, it is precisely such an inflation in their size that is the first reason for their inability efficiently to fulfill their functions. The number of political workers is not based on the party budget and their salaries are paid by the state. This is a vivid example of the way quantity converts into quality with a minus sign before it.

**V. Zolotukhin.** Furthermore, the Army political organs, as an instrument of party leadership, do not act in accordance with the CPSU statutes. For example, the principle of democratic centralism, which presumes elective status from top to bottom, does not extend to them. In the Armed Forces the party organizations are subordinate to the political authorities which they have not elected.

**V. Lopatin.** I can judge from my own experience about the attitude toward the political organs on the part of military servicemen, for I am a political worker myself. In the course of my career as an officer I have served in six garrisons as a result of promotions, and each time in the new place I met with open mistrust on the part of others, not as an individual but as a representative of the political authorities.

The situation in such garrisons reminds one of civil war. Many members of the middle level of the party apparatus, as we know, to maintain their positions at all costs, so that they do not have to change anything but leave everything as it was, for this suits them personally. We see the same thing in the Army political organs. The reasons for the obstruction of processes of party perestroika today are approximately the same throughout the CPSU, including the Armed Forces. Here, however, they have become even more emphatic because of the strict hierarchical system. Today our party includes communists of different breeds. I recall that after the Third Congress of People's Deputies V. Kuptsov, first secretary of the Vologda CPSU Obkom, said: "Yes, we hold the power in our hands and we are ready to surrender it. But who will take over?" But this "power in our hands" does not mean that it is in the hands of the party. I and my comrades are also party members but have no power.

Nonetheless, the fate of society, the fate of the Armed Forces is today in our hands. I would like for the officers who are encountering difficulties not to lose faith in themselves, not to separate themselves from participation in solving problems of the Armed Forces, the party or our entire society. If we, people interested in the radical, the positive solution of such problems, give up, it is people who do not wish to change anything in this life who will remain. Such is our answer to Captain Sevastyanov.

**Woe to that society which silently and indifferently looks at the problems of its Armed Forces: their ability to fulfill their constitutional difficult and responsible mission depends, not last, on the extent to which they will be able efficiently and promptly to eliminate the "painful spots" of Army service and to secure the social and other rights of people in military uniform. We realize that many of the views expressed here will trigger arguments and objections, will be accepted or rejected. In our view, however, the main thing has been voiced: the extreme concern for the status and living conditions of the military servicemen, with officers in this case.**

We did not comment on their statements. We did not round the "sharp angles," believing that this is merely the beginning of a discussion on the social protection of the military, a discussion which, we hope, will be continued by generals, officers, and privates, by anyone concerned with the present and the future of our Armed Forces and with the search for new and efficient approaches to the solution of accumulated problems. It is not for nothing that in our country the Army is referred to as a people's Army and the right to have its opinion about it belongs to every Soviet citizen.

Let us remember that the political situation in the country and in its various areas has developed in such a way that the Army has found itself in the center of public attention, seen and heard by everyone. Frequently, there are extreme opposite assessments of its activities; opinions clash on the need for or, conversely, the inexpediency of having a professional Army, the forms of legislative control over it, and its functions and ways of staffing under the conditions of the future renovated Soviet Federation.... The very fact that such a close look is being focused on the Armed Forces confirms, in addition to everything else, their special place and role in our society. Aware of this exclusive responsibility of the Army to the people, let us acknowledge also the legitimacy of the demand for a considerate attitude toward the people who serve in it. Naturally, it is not only the military who need efficient social protection today, as we well know. However, priorities must be set as well, the more so since in this case it is a question not of dividing the already lean public "pie," for tremendous reserves are contained within the Armed Forces themselves, in the redistribution of the funds appropriated for them, which should favor the "human factor." Its underestimating in the Army is having (or could have) much graver consequences than outside the Army. The defender must be defended.

The following accusation has been frequently made in the mail to the editors and in numerous meetings between editors and military units: KOMMUNIST essentially publishes articles by military leaders. Let those who are the backbone of the Armed Forces, the middle officer ranks, speak out as well. We have tried partially to meet this wish. Despite the controversial nature of the various views expressed by the officers, it is unquestionable that only with an honest and active stance in the search for the best possible variants for a profound restructuring of the Armed Forces that the honor, dignity, prestige, and social well-being of the person in military uniform could be asserted.

That is why we would like this postface to become the preface to a forthcoming debate. COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### Everything for the Sake of Man?

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[Discussion between Natalya Mikhaylovna Rimashevskaya, doctor of economic sciences, head of the USSR

Academy of Sciences and USSR State Committee for Labor Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of the Population, and Nikolay Nikolayevich Gritsenko, doctor of economic sciences, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission of the Council of the Union on Problems of Labor, Prices and Social Policy; prepared for publication by M. Krans]

[Text] For the sake of fairness let us point out that the slogan "everything for man" is heard today less frequently than in the past, for we are becoming accustomed to tell the truth and, for the time being, life is such that these words are virtually meaningless. However, at congresses of people's deputies and sessions of the new parliament, at assemblies and meetings and, particularly, during the recent strikes, the demands of the people who have become tired of waiting for the promised benefits, who have become tired of struggling for a better life and who would like to feel changes for the better already now and not in the distant future, are being heard ever more loudly and insistently. The same feelings are clearly traced in the editorial mail.

Also found in the letters is the currently typical wish to have a realistic analysis of the situation and to substantiate decisions: "Ever new demands are being formulated. Who can prove competently whether they are just or far-fetched? Who determines and weighs the sequence in which claims can be satisfied?"... "So far, it is only that wheel which squeaks the loudest that is being lubricated and the one which is closer to the ears of the central press and the Moscow officials."... "We do not have in our country a service which would provide an overall assessment of the living conditions of the Soviet people by region and issue recommendations to the central and local authorities, aimed at eliminating monstrous violations of such conditions, and which would inform of them the entire population in the country. Without it, the escalation of the growing and frequently unjustified requirements and claims will not be stopped."

We invited in our editorial premises two doctors of economic sciences who deal professionally with such problems: Natalya Mikhaylovna Rimashevskaya, as head of the USSR Academy of Sciences and USSR State Committee for Labor Institute of Socioeconomic Problems of the Population, which was established during perestroika; and Nikolay Nikolayevich Gritsenko, as chairman of the Council of the Union Commission on Problems of Labor, Prices and Social Policy of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We were interested in their views—the views of a scientist and a legislator—on the implementation of a policy which was considered most important at the very start of perestroika and was qualified as a strong social policy.

N. Rimashevskaya: For more than 70 years it was instilled in us that the state undertakes to "take care" of the people. This paternalistic ideology was established quite firmly and cannot be surmounted all that easily and quickly. This largely accounts for the escalation of demands....



**N. Gritsenko:** I would not condemn any one of these demands. In my view, all of them should be made public. As to who will satisfy them, when, and at whose expense, is a different matter. This becomes a question of priorities and of our possibilities.

Today the miners are the focal point of attention. In the past we presented them in the press and in motion pictures in romantic-heroic colors and few people knew the conditions under which they worked. It was believed that the miners were earning money by the shovelful. Somehow, we forgot that many of them never got to live long enough to retire. A human life is lost per million tons of coal mined, and in some mines the cost is even higher. Natalya Mikhaylovna, have you see the way those miners work?

**N. Rimashevskaya:** I have.

**N. Gritsenko:** I too visited a mine in Voroshilovgrad. The seam was 70 centimeters thick and the gradient was 30-40 degrees. It was dark and hot; the miner was crawling behind the combine; next to him the propping worker was putting up the props to hold up the "roof." The combine chief told me that the day before there had been a landslide which had buried three people. They were still giving a sign of life in the evening but not the next day. Can you imagine, he said, how hard it is to bury the victims?

Here is another recent impression. We went to Temirtau. The city was virtually invisible. The smoke from the Kazakhstan Magnitka was covering dozens of kilometers of steppe. Add to this the chemical plant with its terrible stench. Our driver said: "We, like drug addicts, have become accustomed to breathe this air. We cannot stand it for more than 2 weeks, after which the allergy takes over." In our country there are more than 100 cities in the same calamitous ecological condition.

I do not believe that making claims and demands to the center will last forever. At this time we, deputies, planning authorities and scientists, need this in order to determine what are our sensitive areas. Today we are in the stage of "taking inventory" of problems and I would not like for the voice of the people to be suppressed, for this is one of the forms of the people's participation in managing the economy and the state. For example, the labor collectives of metallurgical enterprises have formulated more than 2,700 demands. All of them have been recorded by the trade union central committee and the ministry. Their study has indicated the areas in which planning, economic and financial authorities and the collectives themselves must concentrate their efforts. The broader the range of suggestions that come to us the more completely we shall be able to take into consideration unsolved problems and legislatively protect the interests of man.

**N. Rimashevskaya:** The main task is to struggle not with the consequences but with the reasons for difficult situations. For quite some time we have needed new technologies for the extraction of that same coal, which

would free the miners from unbearably heavy toil; we need even more the use of energy-conserving industrial processes, as is being done in all developed countries. Otherwise what develops is, to say the least, a paradoxical situation: the state as the owner of the means of production allows the hardest possible work on mines such as those in Voroshilovgrad and then touchingly sympathizes with the miners....

Recently the congress of people's deputies discussed the concept of the 13th 5-Year Plan. Are you sure that the right social priorities have been earmarked and that the problems will be solved in the necessary sequence and precisely in accordance with the wishes of the people?

For example, it is believed that more than 40 million people in our country live below the poverty line. If the 5-year plan would stipulate that by 1996 the number of low-income people will drop to, let us say, 30 million, the people would truly see how one of the most important problems is being solved. Or else, what does the fact that in the next 5 years housing will be increased by nearly 40 percent? It does not prove anything! Would it not be better to establish the extent to which the percentage of families which today live below any health standard would decline?

**N. Gritsenko:** The deputies themselves are dissatisfied when told that the living standard will improve by so many percentage points. We would like to know specifically how this will reflect on the living conditions of veterans, mothers, children and the disabled.... However, in order to include in the plan such differentiated indicators, we must have a good idea of the real situation. We, however, are familiar with the needs of the different social strata and groups only in their general aspects.

Let me say frankly that we feel some concern when we vote for a plan or a budget, a decree or a law, for we are not entirely confident of its scientific substantiation. We are not always familiar with alternate viewpoints. We are frequently not informed of the socioeconomic consequences of such an act.

**N. Rimashevskaya:** By the logic of things, all of this should precede any serious situational analysis and the formulation of new approaches to the very methodology of planning. A long time ago we should have converted to a problem-oriented strategy in the formulation of plans, something which has been repeatedly written about by many scientists.

Today it is no longer necessary to prove and substantiate the need for social reorientation for it is acknowledged by everyone, on all levels. Occasionally, however, I get the impression that these words are being pronounced as some kind of incantation. What specifically do they mean, where is the criterion which determines the level of "social orientation" of the laws, plans and programs which are being adopted today? I fear that not every minister would be able to provide a sufficiently convincing answer to this question.

Matters will not improve unless, once and for all, we realize that the turn toward man will not take place by itself and that social policy is an autonomous area which requires a scientific substantiation, specific organizational forms and a corresponding decision-making mechanism. In our country it has already become customary to consider democratization, glasnost and economic reform as the basic components of perestroika. What about social policy? It is as though it is implied through these three components. However, as in the past, it is kept "outside." With such an approach the serious danger exists that, in the final account, once again it will be pushed into the background or even entirely forgotten.

**N. Gritsenko:** The deputies as well are being increasingly dissatisfied. On the one hand, we speak of the social reorientation of the economy; on the other, we keep coming across the fact that ministries, departments and planning authorities continue to follow the beaten track.

During the summer session of the Supreme Soviet, when the government was being formed, we sent to the presidium a note expressing our concern for the fact that the majority of people aspiring to ministerial positions were discussing in their programmatic speeches essentially technocratic problems. In discussing Yu.D. Maslyukov's candidacy, on behalf of our commission I asked him how, should he be appointed USSR Gosplan chairman, he intended to restructure the planning system, taking into consideration the turn of the economy toward man and the exercise of a strong social policy.

Allow me to quote what Yuriy Dmitriyevich answered at that time: "What is social policy? Obviously, it is a policy which is expressed in specific figures and specific ratios. In other words, it is an index of the living standard and the purchasing power in rubles as well as another system of indicators which coordinates our general understanding with the type of life which the average Soviet person should have. It is on the basis of such measures that the concept of development for the 13th 5-Year Plan is being drafted."

He also said: "Each ministry, as long as we have not abandoned this part of the command-administrative work style and which, in all likelihood, we shall not abandon as long as there are ministries, will plan the basic indicators related to the life of the people.... Today you see no program because you have neither a concept nor any basic directions for the 13th 5-year period. However, in this document everything must be clearly expressed."

The time came to consider the plan for 1990 and, subsequently, the concept of the new 5-year period. It became obvious that the projections were quite different from the real implementation. All changes in the social area are planned for this year, as in the past, on the basis of the already attained level: so many hospital beds were available and there will be a thus and such a percentage higher.... Well, we decided to take into consideration

that this was the last year of the 5-year plan and that it would be difficult to change anything but that the plan for the next 5-year period should be drafted in a new fashion. It is important for the second Congress, in its resolution "On Measures to Heal the Economy, on the Stages of the Economic Reform and on the Basic Approaches to the Formulation of the 13th 5-Year Plan" to pay particular attention to such problems, making it incumbent upon the USSR Council of Ministers radically to change the very methodology of the formulation of the plan.

**N. Rimashevskaya:** We must know the type of social diseases which are afflicting our society and clearly to imagine the type of problems which concern the people the most at this point and what are their needs. Such is the foundation on which we must structure our plans and programmatic documents. All technical and economic projects should be submitted to social expertise. It must be determined whether they will be of use to man or, perhaps, harm him. We must review the hierarchy of objectives and approach the strategy of social development in such a way that it is based not on labor productivity by itself or the growth of output or even the prestige of the country but the needs and interests of our fellow citizens, of individual population groups and strata.

The skill to manage means, above all, the ability accurately to set priorities and determine what is an objective and what is a means. It seems to me, Nikolay Nikolayevich, that in this respect the members of your commission have always taken a firm and principle-minded position. At least such is the impression which develops when we look at television transmissions of the sessions of the congresses of people's deputies and Supreme Soviet sessions.

**N. Gritsenko:** Yes, our viewpoint in this matter is firm: any decision must be evaluated above all from the positions of the interests of man. The present social policy still reminds us of a pyramid upside-down and we must turn it the right way. Therefore, most of the funds must be invested in the family, in the protection of motherhood and childhood, and in health care. Obviously, in this case we must apply new concepts, such as health economics, culture economics, education economics, etc. I believe that they will prove the advantages of investing funds in the social area, thanks to which we shall be able to protect the genetic stock and steadily enhance the intellectual potential of society.

In my view, the main thing now is to restructure the future 5-year plan, abandoning any orientation on the "average" consumer. We acknowledge the need to meet the needs of different social strata and groups, for which reason our plans as well should not include the "mean-arithmetic phantom."

**N. Rimashevskaya:** As early as 20 years ago, both I and like-minded people, argued that we must not be oriented toward average indicators. As it advances, our society

will become increasingly heterogeneous and it is impossible to reduce everything to a single denominator.

Generally speaking, what does "average" needs mean? This is no more than an abstraction or, as they say, "the average temperature of patients in a hospital." Old people and the young, the population of the North and the South, healthy people and the disabled do not have identical needs. An average could be only the result of the addition of interests, but what does such an addition constitute in terms of the social policy of the state?

Setting the minimal level below which we must not drop, be it a case of health care, pensions or family income, is a different matter. We usually speak of the maximal satisfaction of needs. This is a noble task. However, as we bear it in mind, we must above all think of those whose minimal needs even are not being satisfied.

**N. Gritsenko:** The present averaged approach actually leaves outside the plan problems which affect a significant percentage of the population. For example, I would single out unemployment. Until very recently it was believed that in our country there neither is nor could there be any; all of a sudden, it turns out that we have millions of unemployed in the country. As the new forms of economic management development, their number will more than likely increase. The plan totally ignores problems of retraining and job placement of the unemployed population. Such obligations must be assumed by the state, as is the case elsewhere in the world.

When the draft Law on Lease was discussed, our commission insisted on including in it a stipulation which guarantees the right to work to people laid-off as a result of a conversion to a new form of economic management. Furthermore, the Union and republic councils of ministers were assigned the duty of ensuring full employment to laid-off workers and employees. We proceeded from the fact that all citizens of the socialist society should be protected from the vicissitudes of fate. We cannot build the prosperity of some on the misfortune of other and even of a single socially harmed person.

**N. Rimashevskaya:** You accurately point out that the main task of the socialist society is that no one within it should be socially defenseless. Thus, the state must precisely identify and always follow the line of poverty and the way changes under the influence of prices, who turns out to be below the poverty line as a result of specific reasons, what should be changed in the distribution mechanism in order to reduce the number of low income people and the gravity of the problem. It is entirely obvious that it is precisely this that should be the purpose of our planning. As to the rest, we should give scope to the initiative and activeness of the individual and let him determine alone his own needs. In recent decades our planning workers were quite concerned with norming, and "rational consumption," as a result of which a total shortage of consumer goods developed.

**N. Gritsenko:** In my view, we cannot totally reject the normative approach, particularly now, in the transitional period. Whether we like it or not, we must live under norming conditions. If we hope to guarantee social justice for all social strata, this cannot be accomplished without rational consumption indicators.

I agree that there must be standards guaranteeing a certain minimum, a living standard, after which you may earn, and live on your earnings according to your needs. In our country, however, there is a planning system which should determine how much meat, milk, shoes and other goods and products should be produced.

For example, the Nutrition Institute submits its figures to the Gosplan, which then stipulates that in order to increase meat consumption from 65 to 80 kilograms per capita, so many animal husbandry complexes are needed, which will require so many rubles or foreign exchange for the purchase of equipment. Let us think realistically: more than a couple of years will have to pass before we can abandon the norming system. This will take place whenever our economy really begins to function on the basis of market conditions.

**N. Rimashevskaya:** At this point I totally disagree with you. It is precisely the opposite: if we wish to advance we must be oriented not toward norming-rational budgets but objective laws governing the dynamics of consumption, characterizing the development of human needs regardless of country or system under which the country lives.

Incidentally, our institute recently completed the development of a methodology for forecasting the consumption structure, based precisely on those same principles. One must be familiar with the objective laws and be guided by them and not indiscriminately adopt "rational standards." I may be too critical of them but remember when they appeared—at the end of the 1950s—when the question arose of what is communism. It was at that time that it was decided to establish scientifically what goods did the "average" person need, and to draft a "rational budget" and, the moment the country would reach these indicators, it would mean that communism has already been built. For the past several decades we have been aspiring toward a "rational consumption."...

**N. Gritsenko:** I must admit that the present concept of the government, suggested to the second Congress of People's Deputies, is structured on the same principle.

**N. Rimashevskaya:** Precisely. Once again we have invented an artificial structure and proceed, on its basis, to structure all social production. The farther the economic reform will advance, the more people will become involved in the cooperative movement, engage in individual labor activity and combine jobs. Income will increase and, therefore, so will consumption, which will not agree in the least with imaginary standards. This precisely is the tragedy of our planning: those who formulate it proceed from the fact that people will

behave in accordance with the rules which have been set for them and will restrict their consumer interests to the standards set from above.

**N. Gritsenko:** Nonetheless, there are population groups whose interests are quite stable and must be protected by the state. This applies, for example, to the disabled. In their case there should exist a kind of state order so that, regardless of conditions, the needs of this category of our fellow citizens are met.

**N. Rimashevskaya:** This is a different matter. I too believe that the special interests of such groups should be thoroughly studied. For the first time in the country, our institute developed a subdivision which studies the socioeconomic problems of the elderly, children, the handicapped, women and marginal groups.... Generally speaking, this applies to population strata which require exceptional societal attention and special social protection.

**N. Gritsenko:** I believe that in this important matter deputies and scientists must work in close contact with each other. In my view, it is necessary not only to determine and study the different needs of the people but, somehow, to classify them in some kind of "Mendeleyev table," and fill each slot.

In the case of the handicapped, let us say (it is no accident that I go back to them, for they are one of the socially most deprived categories of our population), special types of jobs should be planned and we should think about organizing their training, way of life and recreation. Finally, we should produce special buses with lifts for the wheelchairs....

**N. Rimashevskaya:** The old people, for instance, would like their bread delivered at home....

**N. Gritsenko:** Therefore, we must plan for the production of special small vans. This is no petty matter....

If we wish to be thoroughly familiar with the entire range of population requirements, in my view, on all levels of the executive authorities we must set up special subdivisions which would scientifically study the social problems and needs of the various strata. It so happens that today the USSR Supreme Soviet and the departments are not always able to find a common language. We now have a unique parliament which reflects not only territorial and ethnic interests but also the requirements of virtually all social groups. Nonetheless, the executive mechanism remains structured on the basis of the sectorial and functional system. We must reform the management system on all levels, for otherwise our laws and resolutions would be obstructed and nullified by it.

Let me repeat: we need special structures which would study and take into consideration not the averaged but the differentiated needs of all population strata and groups. The Gosplan, State Committee for Labor, Ministry of Finance, ministries and councils of ministers of Union republics should have departments in charge of

social policy with their subdivisions, which would deal with problems of veterans, women, the handicapped, young people, children and other groups, representing and defending their needs and interests in the course of the formulation of plans. Otherwise, whenever the latest budget or law is discussed, People's Deputy Aleksandr Neumyvakin would rise and once again justifiably remind us that the authors of this draft forgot the blind, whom he represents in the Supreme Soviet....

**N. Rimashevskaya:** The readers of *KOMMUNIST*, who write of the need for an all-Union service which would compare the standard and quality of life of the people by city and percentage in the country, and would submit suitable recommendations to the central and local authorities, are right. In this case the scientists could play a substantial role, the more so since world science already has a tested array of instruments which would make it possible to formulate and set priorities.

Naturally, however, such a service would not solve all problems. As you said, we need radical changes in the management system itself. Our present difficulties, in my view, are largely due to the fact that the sectorial principle prevails over everything. Even the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for Social Development has a sectorial structure.

**N. Gritsenko:** According to my observations, the USSR Supreme Soviet is increasingly realizing the priority of the social sphere and is developing a new style of thinking. Today new people who have passed their examination as deputies, have assumed ministerial positions. However, the cadre corps of the apparat has remained the same, as a result of which we have the old attitude toward social problems, based on the residual principle, as being something secondary. We need (which is also a prime concern) economic indicators, economic efficiency.

Incidentally, speaking of efficiency (even consciously ignoring political and moral aspects), as has been convincingly confirmed, "investments in man" in addition to everything else are also profitable. We know that in many countries funds invested in the material elements of production forces and in the "human factor" are roughly equal. What about in our country? Three years ago I found in our press the following data: 1 ruble for industrial needs and 15 kopeks for man.

"The stingy pay double." In our country, for example, 40 percent of children who graduate from school have weak eyesight for the lighting in the classrooms should be, according to standards, no less than 300 luxes. In many cases, however, it is significantly lower, sometimes no more than half that number. Subsequently, we do not resent spending substantially higher state funds to restore their eyesight although, true, this comes under another item—health care—rather than education.

**N. Rimashevskaya:** As always, these are miserable savings and we do not consider even basically the possible consequences.

**N. Gritsenko:** Not so long ago, our commission considered deputy queries. The deputies suggested that enterprises be allowed independently to introduce a 40-hour workweek, extend the length of paid leave, and make additional payments to women who raise children under 3 years of age. However, the standard answer of the Ministry of Finance was that this is not allowed, for all of this would lead to losses into the billions. The term it used was precisely this, losses!

I recall that at that point a member of our commission, kolkhoz chairman Alina Vedmid stood up and said: "I do not intend to wait for your permission. We have already organized for milkmaids work on two shifts and paid leave based on work seniority. We have introduced other benefits as well. As a result, both their health and revenue have improved...."

**N. Rimashevskaya:** I am afraid that it is not all that simple to redirect the thinking of officials, for took decades to develop. I have participated in the formulation of social programs along with Gosplan personnel. I have realized that they do not need any social knowledge. The Gosplan "ideology" is structured on the basis of categories such as funds, capital investments, kilograms, tons and pieces.... As long as in our planning staff there are no people tuned to a different "human wavelength," I believe that we should not expect any truly socially oriented trend in planning.

We already mentioned how important it is now to know what is our "poverty line," and the living minimum (for quite some time there has been talk about it but as yet no results), etc. You can describe them any way you like but one should take up this problem as soon as possible. I believe that a special commission of experts should be set up under the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers, the Gosplan and, possibly, other authorities. This is not my idea, for such commissions also exist within the Common Market, in the United States and in many other countries, where people realize how important it is constantly to check the level of poverty and take it into consideration in making all essential economic decisions. For many years, on different levels, I have realized the need for such a commission in our country but you know how slowly we move!

Social information as well should be organized on an essentially new level, for so far no one has been able to answer the question of how much meat we use (naturally, I am thinking not of the "mean-arithmetical" 65 kilograms), what is our living minimum and what is the extent of the scarcity of goods in the market.

**N. Gritsenko:** How can we organize such social information? In your view, who should gather and sum it up?

**N. Rimashevskaya:** Why do we keep rediscovering America? Every year special compilations are published in many countries, dealing with their social development and problems. One such collection was published by the USSR State Committee for Statistics, but it is far from being ideal. We publish the yearbook "*Narodnoye*

*Khozyaystvo SSSR*" [National Economy of the USSR]. However, we should also have a "*Social Development of the USSR*," which would provide data on the people's living standard, the situation of the different social groups and strata and their problems. It is also important to use the results of studies conducted by scientific institutes. The scientists have the proper methodology and array of instruments.

The quality of social information depends, among others, on the way it is organized. Understandably, if a faulty study of the population has been made, the results would be distorted. They would misinform the authorities which make the decisions and mislead them. For example, based on the statistical information of the 1970s, the conclusion was reached that the main reason for poverty is the large number of children in a family, whereas an entire range of factors have an influence in this case. The result was a ukase on helping low-income families with children; the elderly, for example, were ignored.

**N. Gritsenko:** Although our conversation has dealt more with method (based on the relevance of the revision of the plan for the next 5-year period), I would draw a more general conclusion: the need to rally the best scientific forces to formulate a **concept of a strong social policy**. This is important for, although certain changes have taken place today, this remains more an ideal, a slogan rather than daily practice. Also, in particular, because there is as yet no clear understanding of the very essence of social policy. The appeal of turning the economy toward man has not acquired a specific meaning. Let us point out that the legislative authorities as well have still not joined efforts with the scientists but are moving with them on a parallel course.

Natalya Mikhaylovna, could we, for instance, hope that your institute will give us its evaluations of approaches to planning and of submitted plans, and recommendations for the formulation of a strong social policy, so that we would not be dependent on any given department?

**N. Rimashevskaya:** Unquestionably, you can count on us.

**N. Gritsenko:** Furthermore, we would like to know whether science is able today to provide the same type of recommendations to the heads of republics, krais, oblasts, sectors and enterprises, bearing in mind that now it is precisely to here that the center of gravity is shifting in solving the majority of economic and social problems. Strictly speaking, I am continuing here my idea of having a minimum of social protection. It should indeed be guaranteed by the state. However, under the conditions of autonomy and cost accounting of republics and enterprises, those same kolkhozes could assume and, as was pointed out here are already assuming, some of the concern for upgrading the living standard of the people.

**N. Rimashevskaya:** Yes, this is so, but in order to formulate an accurate social policy, both central and



local, once again we must be well-familiar with the actual situation. When we created our institute, we set ourselves the task of studying problems not exclusively on the macrolevel, for which reason we intended to organize several branches and revive scientific forces in regions and republics. Unfortunately, so far we have been unable to do so mainly because of lack of financing. However, I also see difficulties elsewhere. Let us assume that we formulate the recommendations which you, Nikolay Nikolayevich mentioned. Would they remain ignored? We are already sending notes to the State Committee for Labor and the Council of Ministers, and where are the results?

**N. Gritsenko:** This is something that exceptionally concerns me as well. To the best of my knowledge, however, a countermovement is taking place currently, from parliamentary committees and commissions, on the one hand, and scientific councils of some institutes, on the other, aimed at establishing direct relations. Incidentally, some departments, the Gosplan, and the Ministry of Finance in particular, have made it incumbent upon their departments to be in constant touch with the respective subdivisions of the Supreme Soviet. It seems to me that this practice should be followed also by the Academy of Sciences by "assigning" to us its institutes, scientific councils and departments.

We took the following step as well: together with Deputy Lyudmila Petrova we filed with the USSR Academy of Sciences, VASKHNIL and the State Committee for Education a query on the state of scientific development of socioeconomic problems. Based on our query, the Supreme Soviet passed a special resolution with which it ordered such organizations "decisively to intensify" scientific investigations. We have already received their report. This work, based on an agreement with the heads of the Academy of Sciences, will be expanded. The subcommission in charge of living standards and social guarantees is preparing to hold a roundtable meeting with the participation of scientists and specialists, to discuss new approaches to social policy for the 13th 5-year period, in accordance with the resolutions of the second Congress of People's Deputies.

We hope that in the immediate future the legislators will begin to receive scientific support not based on the individual initiative of one scientist or another (something which, naturally, we value) but also of entire collectives, so to say automatically. This is quite necessary, for today a packet of laws most important to the country is being adopted. This will have a decisive influence on our future, on the social structure and on socioeconomic relations. In this case we cannot do without the competent opinion of scientists, and individual "efforts" are clearly insufficient. The participation of entire scientific collectives in the formulation of legislative acts is important.

**N. Rimashevskaya:** In other words, this must be professionalized. Many people believe that anyone is capable of understanding social problems and that they are

obvious. It is only now, finally, that they have begun to realize how complex such work is. Since we intend to turn the economy toward man not in words but in deeds, such a turn must be done professionally. It is only under such circumstances that we shall be able to protect ourselves from impulsive approaches and emotional excesses and, therefore, from many errors which become simply inadmissible in making such serious decisions. You personally, Nikolay Nikolayevich, are you confident that this "coupling" between administrative structures and science could become reality in the immediate future?

**N. Gritsenko:** Yes. At least on the part of the corps of deputies and the scientists, there is an understanding of the importance of such cooperation and a tremendous desire to achieve it. It seems to me that we have proved this during our short activities in parliament.

**N. Rimashevskaya:** I and my colleagues have a more restrained attitude. This is probably because we have tried to promote our ideas too long but were listened to only with one ear and, if heard at all, we saw no change. Hence a certain skepticism.

**N. Gritsenko:** The situation now, however, is clearly changing. I would call upon the scientists to be even more persistent and principle-minded in promoting their ideas. On the parliamentary level you have our support, for without science we would be unable to promote a truly strong social policy. We are more confident than ever before that there are no alternatives to such a policy and that if anyone would like to turn us away from our chosen path we would be prevented from doing so by the miners, the metallurgical workers or the railroad workers.... Generally speaking, the entire people and its corps of deputies. They have formulated their choice quite clearly. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## IDEOLOGY, CULTURE, MORALITY

### Freedom of Conscience and Revival of Humanism. Roundtable Meeting

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[Text] On the eve of debate on the Law on the Freedom of Conscience by the USSR Supreme Soviet, the journal sponsored a roundtable meeting at which problems of the coexistence between the religious and atheistic outlooks, the relationship between church and state and their legal support, and the dialogue between believers and atheists under the conditions of the humanizing of Soviet society were considered. The following participated in the discussion: V. Alyulis, Roman Catholic priest, editor in chief of the journal KATOLICHESKIY MIR; E.A. Arab-Ogly, doctor of philosophical sciences, KOMMUNIST editor; V.S. Bibler, candidate of philosophical sciences, head of group at the Institute of General and Pedagogical Psychology, USSR Academy of

Pedagogical Sciences; **N.B. Bikkenin**, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, KOMMUNIST editor in chief; **V.I. Garadzha**, doctor of philosophical sciences, director of the Institute of Scientific Atheism, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; **Kirill**, doctor of theology, archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad; **N.A. Kovalskiy**, doctor of historical sciences, editor of the journal *NAUKA I RELIGIYA*; **E.Yu. Solovyev**, candidate of philosophical sciences, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy; **Ye.L. Feynberg**, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, counselor, office of the Physics Institute imeni P.N. Lebedev, USSR Academy of Sciences; and **A.M. Yakovlev**, doctor of juridical sciences, head of sector at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law.

### Realism and Renovation in Theory and Practice

**N.B. Bikkenin.** Under the conditions of a radical renovation of socialism in the country, extensive and sharp debates are taking place on its economic and political problems. This is entirely natural, considering the scale and depth of the changes which are being made. However, as an old and well-familiar book says, man does not live by bread alone. For this reason, it is no less important today to discuss problems of the cultural and moral life of society and its development in its new humanistic dimension, for without a moral and cultural renovation no economic or politically progressive development is possible. In the final account, one or another answer to the challenge of our time depends on the nature of the spiritual values professed by the people and their inspirational moral ideals and ethical principles and the moral choice made by society and by all of its members.

In formulating the new approaches to spiritual life, particular attention must be paid to the problem of the freedom of conscience and to the contemporary processes in the development of religious and nonreligious awareness. Many serious theoretical and practical problems have accumulated here related to the interrelationship between the state and the church, and believers and atheists, requiring a fundamental and realistic interpretation and urgent resolution. We cannot postpone their broad and free discussion if we wish to formulate a policy which reflects the expectations and needs of all the members of society.

Naturally, the people hold, and have the right to hold, different and substantially differing outlooks. They can and should support their inner convictions and their views on the world, on man, and on reality. However, our time demands the lifting of the artificial barriers which divide people on the basis of their way of thinking. We must try to better understand one another, for today what is essentially important is what unites us and not what divides us. The pivot of this unification is perestroika, the search of ways for the creation of a more humane law-governed society.

In this connection, we must firmly distance ourselves from the distortions of Marxism which led to errors in party and state policy toward the church and religious life during the period of the cult of personality and stagnation. The grossest possible deformations, which appeared under the influence of the dogmatic interpretation of individual statements made by Marx, Engels and Lenin, furthermore taken out of the context of their works, had nothing in common with the scientific, the dialectical-materialistic outlook and the Marxist understanding of the problem of the freedom of conscience. One of the main tasks is to restore the true meaning of the Marxist doctrine. In terms of both theory and practice we must prove that it has never been linked to a hostile attitude toward believers and toward violent actions which have hindered the free manifestation of their will.

We must also debunk the myth according to which moral relativism is inherent in Marxism. Grounds for such claims are found, in particular, in the sectarian and simplistic interpretation of the familiar view on the morality of means and actions aimed at building a communist society and the immorality of anything which does not contribute to the assertion of communist ideals. Naturally, the Marxist concept of the place and role of religion in contemporary society cannot be structured on such a vulgar and primitive approach to universal moral and cultural values. Marxism rejects the artificial confrontation. It proceeds from the morality of anything which enhances man, which makes him spiritually right and morally purer.

**N.A. Kovalskiy.** Indeed, perestroika, which is gathering strength, forces us to reinterpret many things in our approach to religious life. For the time being, in my view, there is no single satisfactory answer to the question of what is religion in its present aspect and what is its place under the conditions of the contemporary stage of scientific and technical progress. However, it is extremely important for us to understand this phenomenon and the sources and mechanisms for the reproduction of religious awareness and to formulate an adequate attitude toward it, for it is impossible to ignore the very fact of the existence of a huge human mass throughout the globe influenced by religious ideology.

If we interpret religion as a form of social awareness and emphasize the word "social," we must approach it as a developing phenomenon which changes along with society and man. Religion is not a frozen formation. At the end of the 20th century, it is manifested differently than it did in the 19th century when, actually, the fundamental scientific concepts which are being used by us to this day, were formulated. In a dynamically renovating world the overwhelming majority of the people who profess religious values and principles of behavior are socially active. In our country, for example, believers, who accepted in their own way the ideals of socialism, actively joined the process of humanistic reorganization of social life. Abroad, many believers are making a major contribution to the national liberation

movement, the struggle for peace and social renovation of society, and the resolution of ecological and other global problems. In other words, both church and believers share the contemporary concerns of mankind.

Thorough considerations must be given to all such problems. We must correct our theoretical positions taking into consideration the currently developing and previously nonexistent social relations. This is an imperative of scientific and political thinking, consistent with the realities of the world. On the threshold of the third millennium, when a new civilization and a new world order are developing on the basis of universal human values, it brings the Marxist closer to the progressive supporters of other ideological and conceptual trends and to the people of the global religious community. Here as well the problem must be seen as it is and not as we would like to see it, as we had become accustomed to approach it.

**Archbishop Kirill.** We cannot fail to note that the attitude toward the church in our society is changing. However, perestroika in the area of church-state relations can be considered as having started not in 1985 but only in 1988, for during the 3 years which followed the crucial April CPSU Central Committee Plenum, virtually nothing essential took place. Furthermore, some believers began to fear that the sad years of the "Khrushchev thaw" could be repeated, when a relative democratization of social life was accompanied by the harshest possible administrative persecution of religion and, as you know, thousands of churches were closed down and even destroyed. "What do these new ideas and slogans of 1985 mean?" was a question which believers asked fearfully. "Would it not be a repetition of the old and sad tradition?" We lived in expectation of the answer for 3 years, until the time when M.S. Gorbachev met His Holiness Patriarch Pimen and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church. This was a truly historical meeting.

It is precisely after that meeting that the active study and discussion of the question of a new legislation concerning the freedom of conscience began. The question is difficult and is being solved slowly. What is important, however, is immediately to emphasize that believers do not demand any special privileges for themselves in a democratically secularized state, such as the Soviet Union. We perfectly realize that such an approach would be unfair, above all from the moral viewpoint, for historical experience teaches us that, as a rule, the privileges granted to some people are at the expense of other, for they always require some kind of potential which would make them possible. Throughout the entire history of human society, such a potential was developed at the expense of violating the rights and opportunities of dissidents. This is an all too tragic, difficult and morally unjustified way. Therefore, there can be a question of one thing only: of equal opportunities and a just combination of sensible interests.

It is precisely this concept that we particularly emphasize, for so far there is no full assurance to the effect that in both the legislation and social practices the principle of absolute equality will be sufficiently implemented in all of its aspects. Perestroika seems to have advanced a long way. Glasnost has spread throughout all areas of society; the pluralism of opinions is being asserted, democratic institutions have developed, and the new USSR Supreme Soviet is actively at work. So far, however, there have been no real changes in granting equal rights to citizens regardless of their religious beliefs and outlook.

What are the reasons for this situation? I believe, above all, that this is the result of an inertia in thinking, a tradition of a one-sided approach to spiritual reality. In this case we must not seek the effect of some kind of ill-will. I do not believe in the least that some people should be accused of deliberate prejudice. It is precisely the strong inertia and a certain lack of understanding of the importance of an immediate solution of pressing problems that are the foundations for the slow pace in achieving true freedom of conscience and beliefs.

**N.B. Bikkenin.** Naturally, for the time being not everything is taking place as rapidly as we would like it to be. This applies not only to establishing more acceptable relations between church and state. The economic reform is being implemented with difficulty. There has been no substantial change in resolving the food problem or in providing housing to all those who need it, and in many other areas.

However, we must not fail to see the positive changes. In particular, a certain intellectual and, above all, sociopolitical climate has developed in the country for nurturing the shoots of a new spirituality, restoring universal human cultural values, and ensuring the broader satisfaction of the needs of believers.

In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to another important aspect. The archbishop mentioned the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and the head of the Russian Orthodox Church. There also was the meeting between our party leader and the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope John Paul, a first such meeting in the history of the Soviet state. It was emphasized at the Vatican that in the course of perestroika we have begun to learn the difficult yet necessary matter of comprehensive cooperation and consolidation of society. I believe that these truly momentous meetings open favorable opportunities for a broadening dialogue between atheists and believers. Cooperation and consolidation, based on renovation and on the re-creation of traditional values, must be the result of our joint efforts and of our active and constructive work for the education of a highly moral person.

#### Universal Human Values

**Ye.L. Feynberg.** I believe that the use of the term "freedom of conscience" itself is unsuitable, if we take into consideration the entire range of contradictions

which have accumulated in the spiritual and cultural-moral life of society. The range of this concept is limited. Its narrow frame does not allow us to see the problem in its entirety.

What is conscience? The philosophical dictionary explains it as the ability of the individual to engage in a critical self-assessment. In my view, this is a partial definition, for it lacks not only an indication of the ethical and emotional aspects of man's assessments of his own actions and thoughts but also the aspect of his critical social attitude toward the actions of other people and the correlation between his own and other views. Reducing freedom to the freedom of the individual conscience leads to the fact that any criminal can justify his illegal actions by claiming the inviolability of his individual conscience and the strict legitimacy of his strictly personal assessment of processes and circumstances. Freedom of conscience thus becomes also freedom of lack of conscience.

Therefore, in discussing our topic, we should speak of the freedom of perception of the world, of the possibility of choosing an atheistic or any kind of religious outlook, making a choice which would not violate any one else's rights, which could be consistent with universally accepted standards and would not cause harm to other people or to all mankind. If we identify the right to choose a religious faith or atheistic values with the concept of conscience in general, we would inevitably acknowledge the latter as being a strictly personal characteristic, the ability of man to engage exclusively in an egotistical self-evaluation and to an acknowledgment of the monopoly right of social awareness to adopt a religion or atheism.

Nonetheless, we must not ignore the fact that neither an atheistic nor a religious outlook can be logically justified or refuted. In any case, an outlook is, essentially, the result of a nonlogical, an intuitive judgment, in the philosophical sense, a judgment which is entirely individual and which develops into an inner conviction. If such is the case, if any outlook is asserted through personal independent convictions and a certain inner standard, from the viewpoint of the freedom of choice it is equal to its opposite. The choice, however, must be truly equal, free, and comprehensively guaranteed.

**V.I. Garadzha.** I agree that the term "freedom of conscience" is not entirely appropriate. Today it has become largely conventional. However, this conventionality has been dictated by historical circumstances. We traveled a long way of spiritual development from a narrow to a broader understanding of the problem of conscience and religious tolerance: from simply acknowledging the admissibility of choosing among various religions and religious faiths to acknowledging the right to freedom of conscience and the need for a conscious choice in formulating one's conceptual views.

The philosophers who introduced in scientific circulation the concept of freedom of conscience (such as

Voltaire and John Locke) used it as a synonym of tolerance. In our time as well the same interpretation remains valid. In my view, tolerance is an inseparable sign of a democratic society, of truly humane actions in any area: social, political, and cultural. Democracy and humanism actually begin with tolerance of the views of others, of a different view on the world. This is a fundamental standard of behavior in a civilized society.

It seems to me that tolerance is not only a prerequisite for proclaiming the right to the freedom of choice of convictions but also a kind of mechanism for its practical implementation. It is no accident that a very important document of the UN, which was passed in 1981, is known as the "Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination on the Basis of Religion or Belief." Life itself forces us to pay attention to this aspect of the problem. Related to it are spiritual and humanistic renovation, a conversion from intolerance, which was cultivated for many long years as a norm of ideological and political relations, to new positions of a dialogue. Tolerance is precisely that which we lack most of all in the interpretation and resolution of the pressing problems facing society.

The problem of tolerance, let me reemphasize the idea which was expressed, is inseparable from the problem of freedom. This is in the sense that a person can and must rely on the opportunity to defend his own views and to practice them in life as would any other person. In other words, the problem of tolerance, as a prerequisite for the democratization of our way of life and way of thinking, is many-faceted and broader than the problem of conscience.

**Roman Catholic Priest V. Alyulis.** It is entirely natural for concepts to have both a narrower and broader significance. However, the problem arises of the use made of their various contents and meaning in the course of practical activities. In my view, the freedom of conscience is nothing other than, in general, the right independently to formulate one's conceptual and moral choice. This means that no one is allowed to coerce someone else and, to the same extent, no one should subject himself to coercion. Let us especially emphasize that nor should anyone act against his own conscience and convictions. The latter is particularly important by virtue of the fact that the crimes committed against mankind during the period of Hitlerite Germany and Stalinist repressions are frequently justified by referring to orders. However, if a person was aware of the immorality and injustice of the order, it means that he should not have yielded to coercion. No other way is possible if one is to retain his conscience and remain a highly moral citizen.

The problem of freedom of conscience, in its practical aspect, applies not only to relations among people but also directly to the relationship between church and state. Their separation, interpreted as a signal for the destruction of religion, led to the fact that secularism began to be connected exclusively to atheism and an

atheistic outlook. It was also considered the opposite of clericalism, bearing new moral values and proclaiming them as permanent. It was on this basis that it was interpreted as an indifference toward religion to which no spiritual-constructive principle was acknowledged. Therefore, forgetting the tolerance of freedom of conscience and truth, religion was deprived of its civil rights. The problem was resolved one-sidedly: the rights of the church were ignored and, to a certain extent, the church became enslaved by the state. Naturally, under those circumstances the church could not efficiently fulfill its purpose in life.

**E.A. Arab-Ogly.** Although in principle I support everything that has been said on the matter of tolerance, let me point out the following. Freedom of conscience, as a theoretical concept and as a social, a spiritual phenomenon, could hardly be reduced essentially to religious tolerance. The atheists need freedom of conscience to a no lesser extent. The point is that historical experience convincingly proves that if the freedom of conscience and dissidence is not granted to the latter, or the freedom to be an atheist not in the same but in different ways, a direct threat exists of the loss of rights both to atheists and believers.

This touches upon yet another important aspect of the freedom of conscience. We have no right to classify citizens either on the basis of faith or conceptual convictions into progressive and backward, developed or underdeveloped, culturally maimed or spiritually rich. Historical practices and daily life convinced us that religious people could, in a number of respects, be superior to atheists in terms of moral, social, and other qualities. At the same time, however, the atheists are no worse than the believers and may be superior to them in terms of their intellectual, cultural, and other human qualities. The unacceptability of such a division among people is an additional yet practically important argument in favor of substantiating the need for freedom of conscience for all without exception.

Freedom of conscience, regardless of historical turns in the development of society, was and remains one of the basic universal human values. It is a fundamental value perhaps from the viewpoint alone that it is in a state of organic interconnection with the other freedoms. We must consider it not simply as the possibility acknowledged by a civilized society for every man to profess his own personal convictions but also, which is much more essential, his given right to promote them and to suggest that they be discussed by other people. Freedom of conscience implies freedom of speech, freedom of assembly within religious communities, and freedom of activities of secular and clerical organizations in all creative manifestations of the human spirit.

Furthermore, it is also a question of rights which are sometimes officially not codified in the constitutions of countries, and of legislative acts and decrees. For example, no single law stipulates that man has a free will. However, without the direct or indirect acknowledgment

of free will there neither is nor could there be any freedom of conscience or any law or morality.

**Archbishop Kirill.** The very association of the words "freedom" and "conscience" is to me quite problematical. I have no doubt whatsoever that even in a prison cell, a person locked there for his convictions, does not entirely lose his freedom of conscience. Allow me, as proof of this fact, to say a few words about the history of this matter.

The concept of freedom of conscience is inseparable from the bourgeois French Revolution of the 18th century. At that time it was interpreted as freedom, if you wish, from the ideological monopoly in the spiritual area enjoyed by the Roman Catholic Church in the West, in France in particular. It was this term and this understanding of the problem taken from the context of the French Revolution that came to our country during and after the socialist revolution. It was as though the old principles and approaches were somewhat duplicated on the conceptual and the purely practical levels. Hence a certain looseness and conventionality of the very term. Its primary significance does not correspond to the reality which we encounter in daily life.

What do Christians understand by "freedom" and "conscience?" The Holy Scriptures, naturally, do not include such a word combination although, naturally, they make numerous mentions of both. Such a state of affairs is entirely natural for, as a rule, we speak of freedom on the social level, on the historical level as we do about freedom from slavery and personal dependence. In the Holy Scriptures the main emphasis is on the inner freedom of man, the freedom from sin. In other words, it is a question of freedom from the instinctively destructive principle which threatens human life and, to use contemporary terminology, which threatens the survival of mankind. Therefore, freedom is something which elevates man above the remaining animal world, which makes him, precisely, man.

The church interprets the term conscience as the ability of man to determine the distance between the moral ideals instilled by God in human nature, known in the language of Christian tradition as the moral law, and reality, constituting the moral behavior of the individual. Should it separate itself from moral ideals, a signal light starts blinking, a certain internal indicator, which confirm that reality is distant from the ideal. The more the actual behavior of man is separated from moral law the greater the gap becomes and the louder must the voice of conscience sound. In the opposite case, a condition develops which is characterized best of all by the remarkable expression of the Apostle Paul—a burned conscience. In other words, conscience is the quality of man which is not ensured against deformations under the influence of surrounding reality. The latter either develops it or, conversely, suppresses and even virtually reduces it to naught. The conscience too could be burned!



The concept of "freedom of conscience" (once again I put this expression in quotations marks) should not be applied exclusively to the relationship between a religious and an atheistic outlook. In support of the idea expressed here, it should be a question, above all, of the freedom of conviction, i.e., of the admissibility of concepts, views, and conclusions different from our own. However, the admissibility of a variety of outlooks or "tolerance" must mandatorily have certain limits. There are situations in which we must not become bewitched by the principle of sovereign rights of man to have his own perception of the world. Thus, I neither wish to nor could respect any racism, any man-hating approach to people. If I find myself sitting next to a person who has such views, I cannot allow myself to say anything which could insult or denigrate him. However, my tolerance ends when he begins to implement his convictions in practice, in the political area. At that point we are indeed separated by an unbridgeable gap.

**V.S. Bibler.** The very idea of combining the two aspects of spiritual reality (at this point, to a certain extent, I agree with the basic definition of conscience as formulated by Archbishop Kirill) is an expression of an essential theoretical aspect of the problem which is of great importance in our social and civic life. In particular, it is that the concept of freedom of conscience is not entirely identical to conceptual freedom. Freedom of conscience is the possibility and need to listen to one's own inner human "I," directly and phenomenologically greater than the "I" conceived under the viewpoint of ordinary circumstances in life. It is a freedom which obeys the inner voice, the judge or the witness which encourages us to observe a certain moral behavior.

Freedom of conscience, through the lens of the freedom to listen to the inner big "I" is shaped within culture and the history of the small "I," and is imperative to it. This circumstance, this inner sovereignty of the individual, must be taken fully into account on the legal and moral levels and in the aspect of conscience and the social contract, when it becomes a subject which can only delegate its rights to one social establishment or institution or another. If we fail to consider this problem in depth, any discussion about a law-governed state and a civil society would be nothing but a discussion about the tip of the iceberg.

The idea of listening to the historically concentrated and morally inner voice of the big "I," the idea of the sovereignty of the individual regardless of philosophical and historical tensions, does not bear in the least within itself any kind of bad or infinite individualism. On every occasion this inner judge and witness (the Romans used to say that conscience has 1,000 witnesses) is by no means the result of any evil arbitrariness but an essentially significant cultural phenomenon, a noumenon.

Each cultural age concentrates its cultural dynamics within a certain internal concentration of the life of the individual. It bears not simply a responsibility but a historically concentrated responsibility. For example,

according to the old concept of the acme, when in the middle of human life the past and the present come together, there even appears his fate, linked to preceding generations, and man finds himself at that moment of acme, of a heroic action, historically responsible both for the past and the future essence of life.

The same theme is manifested in Hamlet's question "to be or not to be?" Despite the seeming distance between man and his own past, once again, as he goes through the ordeal of suicide, he becomes responsible for his own life. This is a deep stress, an essentially significant problem of the unfinished life of man who is considering not only his own fate and the possibility of predetermining it, but also historical destiny as a whole. Once again we note the catharsis of individual responsibility and of the free and yet truly responsible act which is the concentration of the idea of conscience.

Therefore, matters are not limited to the proclamation and implementation of the principle of tolerance, let us say, in terms of a religious outlook. We must bear in mind that religion is not simply one of the outlooks but one of the inner concentrations, of the thoughts of the awareness, embodying the idea of the sovereignty of the individual as such and the universal greatness of the individual existence. It is not merely a question of a tolerant attitude toward religion but of understanding that it is based on the intensified idea of conscience, the freedom of will inseparable from any legal, moral or social existence. Furthermore, the freedom of conscience which may seem to exist outside the legal institutions, is nothing other than a basic prerequisite for the possible existence of a law-governed civil society. Exceeding the limits of the idea of the law, it is at the same time its root, without which the law itself becomes meaningless.

### The Materialization of Ideas

**E.Yu. Solovyev.** The legal recognition of the freedom of conscience and the inner voice to which we must listen is needed, generally, not only to the individual but also to society. At this point we could make an interesting analogy by looking at the history of the Reformation. Let us remember that in defining the freedom of conscience in its moral aspect, Luther saw in it essentially a supernatural force. Consequently, to order any one person, to force him to think not the way he thinks is a futile effort, as useless as to try to give an order to the moon and demand it not to shine. In a certain sense, in terms of the individual, all this may be true. But in interpreting the comparison with the moon, Luther warned: Would we not, by this token, act as fools?

What does this mean? The illusion, the dangerous concept arises that even without the right of conscience, a person can be free and that whatever the social and political conditions may be, he can retain his inner freedom, proud of the awareness of the freedom of his individual conscience. Naturally, this is not so, for the law cannot be separated from conscience. Naturally, society must acknowledge the ordinary, the ontological

power of the conscience in man unless it wants to find itself in a pitiful situation, in a situation in which it limits its own possibilities of selecting among different options in terms of the problem of legal protection and achieving a democratic consensus in the case of a conflict of interests.

The legal foundations of freedom and freedom of conscience as a principle of civil law are deeply rooted in moral exigency. The broader the freedom of conscience becomes the greater becomes the need for the people independently to behave conscientiously in the implementation of the principle itself. Nonetheless, in the course of the practical implementation, interpretation, and resolution of the problems which face society, we must not ignore two essential and interrelated aspects. The first may be found in Spinoza's statement. He pointed out that blessed is a society in which everyone thinks what he wants and says what he thinks. The second is the concept formulated by the 20th century philosopher Ortega y Gasset, who asked the following question: Do we always wish that which we wish and do we truly, on each occasion, think that which we believe to be thinking?

In comparing these two statements in terms of the topic of our discussions, we can see that the right to freedom of conscience, like any other juridical norm, should presume the mandatory formulation of a sum of prohibitions. This sum is accompanied by moral restrictions in the exercise, shall we say, of the right to freedom of speech and the press, public speeches, meetings, assemblies, and so on, and so forth, by the responsibility of man for the views he expresses. Having the freedom of conscience, man does not have the right to present unconfirmed views as being highly accurate and as unquestionable and definitive knowledge and absolute truths. In other words, in his statements man must observe the mode of his own and instilled concepts which they actually possess.

Practical experience indicates that man must behave under the new conditions of freedom and democratization and glasnost according to the common moral standards which stem from the law and the moral-cognitive and moral conceptual requirements. He must apply them to himself in order truly and efficiently to make use of this new and very important social opportunity.

**Archbishop Kirill.** In analyzing the problem of the specific implementation of the idea of "freedom of conscience" we cannot ignore the question of the practical implementation in the country of the universally acknowledged right of believers to live a life without restrictions. This is, above all, a question of the current legislation which regulates relations between church and state and the need radically to revise it with a view to eliminating the historical injustices which were committed here and to formulating new constitutional concepts consistent with the contemporary requirements of the people who profess religious values and traditions.

Work has now been undertaken on a new Union law. However, a paradoxical situation has developed: essentially, neither the Orthodox nor the other churches or religious associations have become involved in its drafting. In other words, the Synod, the clergy, the believers, those who are the most profoundly interested in the adoption of more democratic legal foundations for religious activities on the individual and social levels, have been removed from the discussion and formulation of the legislative regulations. For the sake of justice we must point out that the Synod was able to suggest its amendments to the draft through the Religious Affairs Council. However, not one representative of the church was allowed to participate in the discussion. Naturally, this is erroneous and unfair. All sides must participate in an open and free discussion of the draft bill which will soon be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet. We are in favor of a democratic discussion, of a live dialogue, taking into consideration all constructive views and sensible opinions.

The draft which is on the desks of our members of parliament should reflect three main aspects of church life, which are in the center of attention of all religious associations in the Soviet Union. The first is the recognition of the juridical aspect of the church. What am I talking about?

In 1975 limited juridical rights were granted to the parishes, to the church subdivisions, so to say. They were given the opportunity to acquire property, to be parties to a court trial, etc. However, while giving the right of juridical person to the primary religious groups, the law did not extend it to the church as a whole, as a single social organization. The result is that the Russian Orthodox Church does not exist from the legal viewpoint. We have a *de facto* Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia, who is a USSR people's deputy and is respected throughout the world as the head of the Russian Orthodox Church. *De jure*, he does not have any legal responsibility. He can dispose only of his own residence. He is not given the right to speak in the name of the entire church. The nature of his canonical ties with bishops and monasteries and parishes is not defined from the viewpoint of Soviet law. Who represents the clergy in a public organization such as the peace foundation? A clergyman represents no one other than himself, for a bishop or any other church leader has no juridical status in our state.

If we live in a law-governed state and aspire to reach it, I do not see even a single sensible argument opposing the recognition of the church as a social organization, alongside other secular associations. If we legitimized the society of fishermen and hunters, why could we not do the same for the Russian Orthodox Church or the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan? What is preventing us from doing so? To us this is not simply a narrow, technical, and juridical but a fundamental question: is our society ready to accept the church as a social organization and grant it corresponding rights?

To explain my idea let me cite yet another example. We frequently come across property problems when, for a variety of reasons, parish municipalities are closed down. Today the question which arise in such cases are regulated not by the church but the local soviets. Whatever the decision, it depends on the single will and action of a not always competent individual (a soviet official) and on his tolerant or intolerant attitude toward religion and the church. It frequently happens that somehow most valuable icons, church utensils, historical monuments of culture and of the spirit of the people, disappear who knows where. Is this a normal phenomenon? One of the reasons for this is the fact that the church is not a juridical person.

Allow me now to discuss a second aspect of church life: its social activeness in the implementation of its inherent mission of charity and philanthropy. Unfortunately, the law which was passed in 1929 and which has still not been abolished denies the church the possibility to do good. It prohibits it to help people both within the religious communities as well as in the broad social context.

I believe that the time is ripe for the new law to grant and not to restrict the right of people (and not only of believers) to do good to one another and to be useful in all respects. To this effect, the church should be allowed to formulate its own philanthropic programs and corresponding institutions and to participate through its own facilities and forces in state programs and various funds of aid to all the needy. The legal obstacles in its activities and its social work aimed at instilling moral principles and the humanistic principles of goodness, mutual support in social life, and improvement of national and other relations in our fatherland and the consolidation of all healthy forces within society for the sake of strengthening peace and well-being, must be lifted.

Finally, the third aspect. An equal right must be granted to obtain atheistic or religious education. This is an extremely complex and difficult matter, for it exceeds the framework of simple constitutional law.

The fourth generation of Soviet people is not abandoning the church. Where are such people obtaining religious knowledge? Above all, from religious services. However, it is difficult to learn Christianity from religious services alone for, in the Orthodox churches at least, services are in Church Slavonic. The young people are unfamiliar with that language or else do not understand it fully.

It is for that reason that most young people of today gain an idea of religion and the church from foreign sources introduced in the country through publications or foreign radio broadcasts. The following question arises: Do the Soviet citizens have the right to obtain truthful and complete information, the right to know the thousand-year old faith of their compatriots with the help of Union, of Russian mass information media? It is my

profound conviction that our fellow citizens are worthy of such a right and should have it.

Let me reemphasize that believers seek no advantages whatsoever. It is precisely for that reason that, in a certain sense, the Orthodox church which had significant privileges before the October Revolution, suffered. Historical experience has taught us that Christians live the best lives when they do not enjoy state support or are granted special benefits. Being independent, they can fulfill their mission more fully and more extensively. That is precisely why we must go back to Lenin's Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church. The decree stipulates that religion should be taught on a private basis, i.e., without the financial and administrative support of the state. However, it can be taught! Any citizen who wishes to have such training should be guaranteed the respective right to do so. Obviously, this approach should be extended also to atheistic education. It too should become a private matter for the family and for all citizens, i.e., it should rely on the financial, administrative, and moral support not of the state but of individuals and informal societies which profess atheism.

**A.M. Yakovlev.** To go back to the starting point of our discussion, i.e., the content of the concept of freedom of conscience, let me emphasize that, with logical inevitability, we must speak both about the freedom of thought, conscience, and convictions as well as, in general, the freedom of the spiritual existence of man. This cannot be reduced merely to the freedom of religious activities. Having identified the relative autonomy of such categories, we must immediately point out their inseparable unity both in terms of their theoretical content and meaning as well as the phenomena and processes of social life they encompass. Specifically, I am referring to a certain spiritual pivot in the development of the individual and his awareness, thoughts, and behavior, described by some as the moral imperative and by other as the intuitive rising over the material-causal determination of the world or the Christian canons, as the spokesmen for the church believe. Actually, this is a supraorganic something which makes man Man, which sets him apart from the world of other living beings. Such an interpretation and understanding of the superior nature of man can obviously be a base for a consensus in the various approaches to the spiritual values of man and society.

Above all, however, we must not imagine in the least matters as though the more religion is "suppressed," religion toward which quite frequently and unjustifiably the insulting term "obscurantism" is applied, the freer becomes the spirit of man. Conversely, the more limited man becomes in his awareness of spiritual reality, the sooner he loses his independence. Any restriction of freedom and, under our circumstances, the easiest thing of all was to show a negative attitude toward religion and the church, leads to the stultifying of the mind, its dogmatizing, and the fettering of the spiritual development of man, which is always needed by society. In the

final account, it leads to holding back the development of socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and legal rights and freedoms of the citizens, without which no social progress is possible. It is precisely with such an understanding that we must structure of legislative activities as we aspire toward a law-governed state.

In our theoretical concepts and methodological approaches used in the formulation of new legislative structures, we must get rid of the concepts that rights and freedoms are gifts of the state and are the result of a good political system. No, they are an inalienable feature of man, a man who was born to be free. The state may remove them but cannot arbitrarily, based on good intentions, grant man freedom and make him happy. Ascribing to the state extraneous functions is a false structure, a utopian wish. In fact, by passing laws and eliminating old legislative acts, the state must consolidate the level reached in the free development of man and, by streamlining and regulating his inherent rights, provide new opportunities for man's free self-expression, specifically from the viewpoint of the rights to the freedom of conscience.

**Roman Catholic Priest V. Alyulis.** Since we are discussing problems of legislation, allow me to describe my practical experience in drafting the Law on the Freedom of Conscience in Lithuania which, under the conditions of perestroyka, is in many aspects the first to follow the path of the creation of a democratic law-governed state. On this level, we recently adopted a new draft of the respective constitutional article, which was extensively discussed at the republic's Supreme Soviet session and, prior to it, in the press and the other mass information media.

According to the new status, the freedom of thought, conscience, belief or disbelief is guaranteed in the Lithuanian SSR, along with the equal right individually or together with other people to profess and peacefully to express and disseminate one's views and convictions. No one can be forced to speak or act in violation of his conscience.

State institutions and educational and training establishments are secular. However, in accordance with the stipulation of the law they can cooperate with the church and the religious organizations in the development or encouragement of morality within society.

The church and the other religious organizations are granted the status of juridical person, and guaranteed the right independently to handle matters of their internal life.

Jurists, believers, atheists, and church representatives participated in the drafting of these concepts. They set up a task force under the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium. In my view, however, the activities of this task force should not end there, for the need exists to develop the constitutionally formulated concepts and to express them more specifically and explain what is

meant, for example, by some expressions, terms, and juridical forms and how they can be put to practical use.

It seems to me that we must define more precisely the fact that the purpose of the law is the harmonious development of the individual on the basis both of the freedom of a moral choice in general as well as the choice of views and attitudes toward the church. It must be clearly emphasized that it is only tolerance and mutual tolerance that leads to united coexistence within society. It must also be taken into consideration that the various religions and philosophical trends concentrate within them the wisdom, the age-old experience of mankind. Therefore, the task is to provide equal opportunities for everyone to become acquainted with such wisdom and to be guided by it according to his free choice, i.e., to guarantee the freedom of thought. In other words, to stipulate that no one, no group has the right to a monopoly of thoughts and actions.

The law should stipulate more clearly and substantively that matters of education are resolved through agreements between the church and the respective ministry. Such a practice is already being applied. If parents wish for their children to be taught religion, they turn to the senior priest. He files a request with the territorial public education department and can be granted for such purposes an unoccupied school premise, for the churches are not adapted for such a purpose and all other church buildings were confiscated for other purposes in 1948.

As far as other matters of the development of the new legislation are concerned, let me add my voice to the opinion of Archbishop Kirill on the importance of equalizing the rights of religious associations with those of secular social organizations, let us say in terms of property rights, financial obligations, and social insurance. Thus, a contract between a worker and a church should be registered with the trade union, at which point the worker should not pay an additional tax. Furthermore, in that case he should be granted the possibility of enjoying social security along with workers and employees in state and public bodies. The same should apply to publishing and production activities by church associations. They should be taxed equally with the other social organizations.

**E.Yu. Solov'yev.** Any civilized society should grant the church the unquestionable status of a juridical person. However, matters should not stop there. For example, having formulated the legal stipulations, we must also consider all the democratic facets of the new status of the Law on the Freedom of Conscience which we shall pass, such as, in particular, excluding a situation in which a more powerful church organization would enjoy any advantages compared to a weaker one. It is particularly important systematically to observe this principle in the republic legislations, taking into consideration the different strengths of religious communities and groups.

In precisely the same way there should be no basic objections to the idea of granting equal rights to churches

and believers, compared to public organizations, to engage in more active philanthropic and social activities. Once again let us point out, however, providing that such activities do not bear the features of a religious, a conventional favoritism. Generally speaking, both church and secular philanthropy are based, as a rule, on certain preferences. This has been historically the case. However, has such a policy always been justified and just? Therefore, the legislator faces the difficult and pressing task of seeing to it that philanthropy does not follow the line of encouraging any church or other obedience but provide the greatest possible help to those who need it.

Finally, it seems to me that the law must guarantee the true right to religious upbringing, providing that it is truly structured on the principle of voluntary participation, without coercion, particularly in terms of bringing up the person. It must be of a private nature. Therefore, the church should be granted equal opportunities in terms of moral and social preaching, including the possibility of access to the television screen, the mass publications, and the radio.

I would like especially to single out this concept proceeding, strange though it might be, from the present situation prevailing in the atheistic upbringing of the population. Such education as well should be free. In solving legislative problems related to the freedom of conscience, we must stipulate the right to engage in any type of atheistic propaganda which would take into consideration the variety of forms of atheism, the atheistic awareness which E.A. Arab-Ogly mentioned in his statement. The process of democratization must touch upon this area of our life as well.

#### **Atheism and Dialogue as an Imperative of the Times**

**E.Yu. Solovyev.** For many centuries atheism was one of the superior and developed manifestations of free-thinking. In the past atheistic convictions did not come free. They were born as a result of profound questions in the process of the formulation of a personal and an independent view of the world. In the language of philosophy, throughout history atheism has been most closely associated with the entire multiple-aspect problem of the moral autonomy of the individual. On each occasion it tested its strength in the new social situations and was forced, in order to assert itself, to resort to ever more developed and fundamental proofs.

In the past 100 years of its development, as all of us well know, under the influence of a multi-faceted process of secularization, an important factor of which was the tempestuous development of the scientific and technical concepts of the world, its development changed substantially. In our society this process unjustifiably converted atheism into a variety of state ideology. It remained without any officially admissible opponents, which led to paradoxical results. Man's atheistic convictions

became a sum of concepts obtained without an independent philosophical interpretation of the world and unreliable, superficial, and nondurable views on reality. It is not astounding that the strict and frequently militant nature of our propaganda of Godlessness and the creation of greenhouse conditions for the development of atheistic views in man led to the fact that man was unable to hold his own in an open and extensive discussion with any other type of world outlook.

In our country the antithesis-opposition of religion and atheism were frequently confused with the antithesis-opposition of knowledge and faith. Actually, relations in this case are much more complex. The fact is that, strictly considered, the view that it would be hardly expedient to treat atheism, from beginning to end as a stance of purely scientific knowledge is exceptionally important. Unquestionably, it includes a component of faith, precisely a nonreligious faith.

In particular, true and consistent atheism does not exist and cannot exist without faith in the possibilities of man. Lack of faith in God as a conceptual stipulation is closely related to the problem of man's abilities, his intellectual and moral potential, and the freedom to act as the true creator of his destiny. It is a question of the recognition of man and not of faith in infinite human power. For faith in its all-embracing power is, in general, nothing other than a theistic concept turned around. To present man as a demiurge means to fall into the dangerous mythology of titanism.

Contemporary atheism has nothing in common with such interpretations of man. Man is not omnipotent. However, he possesses, to the fullest extent, the possibility of attaining even the most maximally conceivable, the highest possible ideals and aspirations. The entire history of secularization indicates that the moral motif of faith in man was a fruitful source of social development. It was of tremendous importance in atheistic activities, but activities which were free, independent of current situations and not bound ideologically, in the course of arguments with certain opposite claims made by religion and the church. To eliminate this dimension of atheism in contemporary awareness would be theoretically and practically erroneous and, perhaps, even dangerous.

**E.A. Arab-Ogly.** Chaadayev expressed the interesting thought that the path from faithlessness to faith is much more complex and painful than shifting from faith to faithlessness. This concept is applicable to all people, regardless of whether they are atheists or believers. The importance of the profound clarification of the methodological content of this thesis formulated by the philosopher, including its various aspects, is dictated today by the fact alone that under the conditions of perestroika we must restore the faith of all citizens in socialism and in its humanistic and democratic ideals and values, a faith which had been destroyed over many recent decades.



However, this is also directly related to a human outlook which we are currently trying to develop. Paradoxically, we see in our society that millions of nonbelievers, people who even consider themselves atheists, enthusiastically look at television programs presenting extrasensory miracle makers, astrologers, and all kinds of healers. In this case we are dealing not simply with the lack of religious faith but with prejudices and superstitions which extensively imbue the social awareness and with the illusory faith in something supernatural, superhuman. This is a dangerous phenomenon which triggers a mass passiveness and a hope of coming out of the difficult situation in which society has found itself without the required use of willpower and energy. Here as well, in particular, the sermons of the clergy, who are called upon to heal the spiritual wounds of man, could be of some value.

We must really stop identifying scientific atheism with the antireligious struggle, the consequences of which were disastrous, as we pointed out. In terms of its definition and by tradition atheism expresses a neutral attitude toward any god and religious faith, and any religious concept and theory concerning human existence. Atheism means, above all, free-thinking and, therefore, something greater than the rejection of various world outlooks and attitudes. If its main mission is the antireligious struggle, it turns into simple antitheism. And, like any "anti"—from anti-Sovietism to anti-Americanism—it triggers the image of the "terrible" enemy, a feeling of envy and hatred, breaking up mankind into incompatible parts. All that exists in the world is classified, with such an approach, into the forces of good and evil, which is Manicheism. At that point the antireligious struggle develops into persecution of church and believers, while the "scientific" nature of atheism turns into a kind of secular religion.

Something similar occurred in our life. It is still with us. The rejection of Manicheism in politics, ideology, and daily life is a vital problem of the new thinking which is developing today. It presumes the organization of a broad dialogue between atheists and believers, developing it into a constructive cooperation in the encouragement of highly moral and truly civilized relations within society.

**V.I. Garadzha.** It would be wrong to imagine tolerance as a support of the principle of live and let live. In my understanding, it is the direct opposite of such "wisdom." It has nothing in common with the various manifestations of apathy and indifference.

When we speak of the freedom of conscience and tolerance, it should be a question of firmly getting rid of dogmatic thinking, including in the area of religion, and of an aspect related to the problem of interpreting truth and manipulating it. Those who lay a claim to possessing the absolute truth, in whatever form, are more to be feared than those who direct their aspirations and ambitions against one and all. To such people no pluralism of opinion exists. No dialogue can be conducted with them.

To a great extent I agree with what Archbishop Kirill said, but not with everything. He suggested that the problem of conscience be solved essentially in terms of the rights of believers to enjoy parity with atheists. But how can this be accomplished? By codifying the rights of believers? Would that be all? What about the nonbelievers? Such is the root of the real problem which we face. The problem must be common for all of us. Freedom is indivisible. It either exists or does not. There can be no separate freedom for believers and nonbelievers. That is why both on the practical level and in terms of the law which we discussed today, this can mean only one thing: to promote precisely not the division or concentration on the rights of individual particular groups. We must agree on a common rule for all citizens. The opposite, when a law is based on differences between believers and nonbelievers, will retain its particular aspects and will not be properly consistent with the ideas of consolidation of our society.

As to the problem of atheism, in my view this is a question less of a dialogue between believers and nonbelievers than a dialogue among nonbelievers themselves. Naturally, atheism does not mandatorily mean a struggle against religion. It is rather antitheism, simply another way of thinking. Naturally, one could interpret a theory and concept differently. However, the precise meaning of the terms, if we stick to the content of the conceptual apparatus and what is backing it, nonetheless remains the following: atheism means Godlessness, a denial of religion and faith in God. Our vital task is to interpret our atheistic outlook, foreshortened into said negation, agrees today with the problem of democratization and humanizing of society and a dialogue between atheists and believers.

Noting the meaningful definition of atheism, on each occasion, as was accurately pointed out, we consider its various aspects. Atheism could be Nietzschean, with its critique of Christian morality, appealing for taking a side in the choice between good and evil and thereby putting an end to morality. However, there also could be an atheism, as is fashionable today to say, with a human face, which appeals precisely to the moral universal human principle. The past and currently existing forms of atheism make us seriously consider the way we understand it and the meaning and nature of atheistic propaganda. It is only under those circumstances that we can approach the solution of a number of vital practical problems, such as that of religious and atheistic upbringing in schools.

What does atheistic upbringing imply? Does it mean a particular knowledge, in addition to the knowledge obtained by the students in school? Do we need some kind of special atheistic upbringing here? In my view, we do not, in the sense that the necessary sum of knowledge the student can obtain, let us say, in the study of history. However, it must include a component such as the history of religion. It is hardly applicable to provide the student with a strictly atheistic knowledge. He will acquire it in the study of subjects dealing with nature,

society, and man. In that sense, any scientific knowledge is atheistic in nature, for it depicts a world within which there is no superior creator, observer, ruler, and so on. In my view, this alone would solve the problem of the secular nature of the school and eliminate the narrow alternative of religious, atheistic or any other special type of upbringing.

**N.A. Kovalskiy.** When we touch upon the problem of dialogue, frequently the following question unwittingly arises: Is it necessary, for the sake of cooperation, to abandon our convictions, or else who should yield? It is my deep conviction that such an interpretation is basically wrong. We cannot reduce everything to a contrast between black and white. Consequently, neither side should in any way follow this direction. Naturally, in establishing contacts and in getting together on scientific or other grounds, whether we wish it or not, we exert a certain influence on one another. We become reciprocally enriched. This, however, does not lead to any loss of the values we profess. A dialogue should not lead to total dependence on the partner or, even less so, to suppressing him. In other words, obviously, there are certain limits to reciprocal rapprochement which must not be exceeded.

Thus, in the ideological area, every opponent-partner, displaying greater efforts than in other areas of social life, preserves the inviolability of his convictions. He introduces certain corrections only under the influence of a new spiritual reality which demands the rejection of historically and not always justified accretions. He allows changes to the extent to which he himself deems possible and which do not conflict with his existence. Therefore, any external pressure on him cannot be justified.

As to the political area, here we have the opportunity to meet one another much more extensively. Both sides are interested in the establishment of a new, a more humane world. Unquestionably, in that world will live both those who support Marxist views and those who profess religious views. A dialogue is particularly promising in this area, for the contemporary world is so interconnected that no other way is possible.

**N.B. Bikkenin.** In concluding our meeting, let me note the open nature of this first discussion, sponsored by the journal, on the problems of the freedom of conscience, which frees all of us from the need to formulate any kind of expanded conclusions or to draw definitive and precisely checked conclusions. To begin with, this would be inexpedient, considering that we have only begun a joint discussion and have not acquired sufficient experience in adopting a varied yet joint approach to such a complex and many-faceted problem which requires a thorough and profound consideration. Even greater joint work lies ahead of us before substantially significant changes have become apparent.

Second, the time is past when individual social scientists or ideologues assign to themselves the function of infallible spokesmen for the final truth, a truth which the public had to welcome unanimously, not questioning any one of its aspects. The time of ready-made prescriptions for all cases in life is becoming increasingly part of the past. I believe that the readers themselves can understand the tangle of the thoughts, views, and positions which were expressed. Anyone could compare them and check them against his own understanding of the problems, agree with some, argue against other, and thus, on the basis of real pluralism of opinions, formulate an independent position. Today this seems to me to be the most important thing.

Let me make one remark only. Some people may find our considerations abstract. Words and concepts are subjects of extensive debates. Naturally, in their real daily life people do not express their concerns and worries in philosophical categories. They do not resort to purely scientific or theological terminology. Nonetheless, however abstract they may be, as sometimes theoretical considerations appear, one way or another they are aimed at that difficult and alarming world in which we live and which we are trying to remake for the good of man. In this case the concepts of ideas should develop into a consensus of acts of believers and unbelievers, communists and nonparty people. We need the real consolidation of all healthy forces to take the country out of the economic, political, and, possibly, moral crisis. This is of equal interest to all citizens of our country. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES

### Socialism. Present and Future. Reactions to Our Publications

905B0017J Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 3, Feb 90 (signed to press 2 Feb 90) pp 81-91

[Text] The theme of the renovation of society is the focal point of our journal, reflecting the moods of the people, and the discussions of this topic by all population strata. No 13 for 1989 of the journal carried the article "For a New Face of Socialism," on the basic ideas of which we invited the readers to respond. Issue No 17 was entirely dedicated to problems of socialism, including a survey of editorial mail presenting the views of the readers. No 18 reprinted M.S. Gorbachev's article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika," previously published in PRAVDA. This was obviously useful for, as one of our readers writes, "Having received the journal I reread the article, this time pencil in hand." The editors are receiving articles, letters, and views in the course of this debate. The debate will be continued in the journal in various forms. In this issue we are offering some letters-reactions to our publications.

**A. Morozov, party committee secretary, All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic Materials imeni Academician A.A. Bochvar: Appeal to the 'Sleepers'**

Our collective—the party organization of our institute has more than 1,200 party members—discussed M.S. Gorbachev's article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroyka." We believe that in connection with the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress a serious discussion on the concept of the development of the party and the society, as presented in that article, is very important.

Honestly speaking, what is amazing is that in the press and on television both communists and nonparty members are speaking out much more energetically on a variety of secondary problems rather than on the programmatic statement made by the party's general secretary. The impression is created that efforts are being made to distract us from discussing the global problems raised in the article. This may sound incredible but we must admit that now, when all of us are trying to find a way to pull the party out of its critical situation and find ways to increase its authority, and while we are arguing about its role and place in society and the new draft statutes, at the same time we are displaying virtual indifference toward a document which could essentially become the foundation for the new party program.

This may not be accidental. For some members of the CPSU, who support the Stalinist-type of socialism, this article is political heresy. Others may simply not have read it.

We are among those who assess the revolutionary nature of its ideas and single out the following among them: first, proclaiming the priority of universal human over class values. Second, the concept of the closeness between the forms of organization and level of socialization of production under capitalism and socialism, confirming that not purely formative but general civilization mechanisms are becoming activated. This raises the idea of the need for a turn from confrontation to cooperation among the different social systems, something which in the past we could not even think about, in the "hullabaloo of our direct opposition to capitalism...." Third is the overall idea in the article of returning to the global trend of democratic socialism, supported by the theses of global categories, such as the freedom and the rights of the individual, the criteria of socialism, and the variety of forms of ownership.

We also agree with the assessment that the October Revolution was an effort to solve social problems in the interest of the people, and that this effort remains our party duty to the people. Today one frequently hears the following: I am an ordinary party member and I am not responsible for the actions of the party leadership. The article properly states that the party members must remember all the obligations assumed by the party and that "what was not done and accomplished should be

done and accomplished," without which we cannot restore the party's authority.

That is how we accepted the basic ideas in the article and we give proper credit to M.S. Gorbachev's courage as a communist and a citizen who did not fear openly to express his thoughts during such a difficult time and thus expose himself to the fire of criticism from the left and the right. We assume that not all CPSU Central Committee members share these thoughts and, furthermore, we are certain that M.S. Gorbachev's present situation is quite difficult. That is precisely why we appeal to all the party members who are still "sleeping" to wake up. They must do this now, before it is too late!

**L. Selchenkov, CPSU member, war and labor veteran, Arzamas: My Doubts**

I am not so sure about some views expressed in the article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroyka." First is the method itself suggested for perestroyka. It is found in the heading of the article as the very foundation of our movement. The appeal for revolutionism is subsequently and repeatedly mentioned in the text. I believe that that is not the right method.

Our entire 70 years of experience in revolutionary changes in society proves the pernicious consequences of any spasmodic interference in the life of nations. The October Revolution, collectivization, industrialization, and the insane armament race led to suffering and to the hunger and death of millions of people. Even the lighter leaps (such as the struggle against drunkenness and unearned income) or else the spasmodic granting autonomy to enterprises are bringing to people essentially unpleasantness, for they are founded on theoretical elaborations which are inconsistent with the habits of the people and the circumstances of the country's social life.

The Supreme Soviet is currently beginning to act more cautiously. Possible, the pace of such action has slowed down somewhat, although the people want faster action and the appeal for revolutionism intensifies that wish. M.S. Gorbachev himself writes in the article that today we are changing the form of organization of social life "step by step," i.e., not by leaps. I think that that is precisely the way our situation can be corrected. But if such is the case, what specific meaning could we invest in the concept of "revolutionism?"

The second thing which bothers me is this: The socialist idea has become so worn out that it is difficult today even to understand whether it did contain, to begin with, some kind of nonutopian profound meaning, of positive value to the people? M.S. Gorbachev notes that the elimination of commodity production, related to the "highest level of development of production forces" has not been attained so far anywhere in the world. After the revolution, we called our party communist and inscribed on our banners the word "communism." In other words, we intended to eliminate commodity production immediately and did everything possible to implement that idea. Yet if commodity production should remain at

least for another century, would it not be simpler to attain the "highest level" through capitalism, which would yield greater successes in terms of the peoples' well-being?

But let us set communism aside and return to socialism. "Socialism is as yet to become properly aware of itself," the article stipulates. In other words, the nature of the new socialism remains, for the time being, unclear. M.S. Gorbachev suggests that we advance toward an economically efficient, progressive, humane, and democratic society, i.e., that we advance toward the age-old dream of mankind, toward a "golden age," a variety of which would be socialism. However, socialism has already been given in our history specific features and if this is the case, why do we have to give to the new society an old name? In my view, this definition is still loose and not specific, for which reason it cannot be used as a good beacon. Marching step by step, choosing where our feet will have a firmer ground appears like a vague objective. The very concepts of "better" and "stronger" are equally unclear.

We are being told that "it was not a question, it is not a question, and it cannot be a question of fabricating a tempting image of the future and then imposing it on life." But how can we advance without any image of the future? Where will the road take us? What if there is a fork in the road? We already experienced such forks with two roads, each one of which was good. We chose the road of technical progress and found ourselves in a swamp. Should we have chosen the path of spiritual progress? But in order to make a choice, one should have a clearer idea of what is preferable.

M.S. Gorbachev's appeals to man, to his conscience, and to the social area deserve unquestionable approval. The author accurately states that the future must stem from the present, from its inherent contradictions and development trends. However, those who make the laws in and rule our country must have a profound understanding of the essence of the present (which, unfortunately, we do not see so far). They must steadily feel its pulse beat and react efficiently and promptly to changes in the rhythm, without ignoring the outcome of any sharp change. But in order properly to react, we must know the type of future toward which we are aspiring.

#### **I. Nastavshev, department head, Kaliningrad State University: Vector of Movement**

The opponents of perestroika accuse its leaders of the fact that the party, having proclaimed a course of revolutionary renovation of society, does not have an suitably formulated program for action and no clear visions of the outcome. In rejecting such and similar critical remarks, M.S. Gorbachev has repeatedly emphasized that the party has an expanded concept of perestroika. Nonetheless, we feel that both in the party and in society as a whole there are millions of people who are clearly dissatisfied with the fact that all there is is a concept of perestroika. Raised in an environment of thoroughly

formulated plans and having become accustomed to act strictly in accordance with the letter of directives issued from above, such people are eager to have something more than a simple concept. They are demanding a new model of socialism. They want a detailed plan for perestroika as a guarantee that the socialist ideals and values of socialism will not be lost.

Is this approach of modeling social life fruitful? Will social progress, based on it, not become a new addition to the type of revolutionary arbitrariness and hare-brained schemes which were the foundations of our crisis? I believe that the negative experience of formulating a priori strict criteria of what is socialism and the uncontrollable zeal to make a refractory life fit them give us the full right not only to question but also to have a deep suspicion of any "new models" and their creators. That is precisely why the concept of perestroika seems much more preferable and useful since (unlike the "models") it does not anticipate the future in its specifics and details but indicates the vector of the movement, i.e., it determines the direction to be followed in revolutionary renovation, in accordance with the natural historical laws of social development.

In this connection, the problem of the criteria for judging the accuracy of the vector arises. In other words, where are we going, and what are we trying to accomplish?

The answer to this question is the development of contemporary concepts of socialism and a vision of its renovated aspect. By virtue of historical limitations and the low results of our own efforts to attain the socialist ideal, we must once and for all abandon arrogant concepts and claims to a monopoly on the truth of socialism. There are no secrets in the socialist ideal and we should not be like the priests who claimed that they were the only ones who held the key to the "tower of socialism."

Social progress bears with itself the **code of socialism**, and the natural historical development of mankind is the development of the information included in this code. In this light we should acknowledge that history as a whole has advanced faster toward socialism compared to the way we built it, and that this process has involved all countries and nations without exception.

In its most general aspect, the purpose of perestroika, in the case of our country, is the aspiration to become part of the main common channel in the progress of the world toward civilization. Even after perestroika has achieved full victory, even then we shall not be outstanding but become a normal civilized society. Consequently, we could obtain our concepts as to the new aspect of socialism above all by relying on a thorough analysis of the realities of contemporary world civilization, particularly in its socially most developed forms aimed at the future, and by mastering the laws governing their functioning and development.

This does not mean in the least any belittling or even less excluding the role of our experience and attempts in the

search of ways leading to the best possible system, resting on the principles of humanism, equality, and justice.

Now let me say a few words on the experience of building socialism in the USSR. We have heard many claims that in more than 70 years the Soviet people have acquired tremendous and varied experience in this area. Naturally, in the course of the decades since October 1917, our society gained a great deal of practical experience. However, in this connection I would like to make an essentially important remark concerning the nature of this experience: What determined it, and how was it acquired? If in the course of 70 years we have used the very same ways, means and methods, this has not meant gaining experience but merely developing automatic actions and durable behavioral stereotypes. Experience is the result of a **variety of attempts** at finding the best choices such as, for example, socialization of means of production, and better ways for the firm linking of private with public interests. Can we claim that we have achieved the necessary experience in such most important problems of building socialism and found the optimal solutions? Unfortunately, we cannot. Decade after decade, for the sake of the "purity" of socialism or, rather, for respect for a memorized dogma, with fanatical stubbornness we rejected the market-commodity variant of the economy, established over huge areas a single form of economic management, etc.

We must sadly acknowledge that many generations of people who revered Lenin did not notice the main, the basic aspects of the essence of Leninism, i.e., the recognition of popular initiative and of the live creativity of the masses as decisive prerequisites for building socialism. The tragedy of the people during the times of Stalin and Brezhnev and the big trouble of socialism were the type of life in which initiative and quest were savagely suppressed (let us recall the fate of Ivan Khudenko and of thousands of other restless people, the innocent victims of arbitrariness and illegality), squeezing them into the Procrustean bed of all possible prohibitions and regulations. They fettered the activities of the people and paralyzed their initiative. Permits, visas, and coordinations—how accustomed we became to them, tolerating something which was an essentially stupid order.

This sad experience did its work and is continuing to influence the social behavior of the people. In the decades of existence under conditions of total alienation of man from ownership and power, grave transformations took place in his awareness and mentality, as a result of which a type of personality was shaped incapable of acting independently and with initiative, creativity, and risk.

In order for the people to trust in the irreversibility of changes, become the makers of their own destiny, be able to get rid of the hardships of an exhausted type of life and basically feed themselves, their hands must be firmly untied. Conditions for the constructive activities of the working people and their initiative and autonomous

activities in the assertion of the new forms of life could include, most generally speaking, economic and political pluralism, a variety of forms of ownership, a true market, including manpower, freedom of choice and risk, economic and legal guarantees of the sovereignty and freedom of the individual, a developed civil society, and an unquestionable right to think differently and be treated with dignity.

The process of shaping these and other conditions will mean not only the shaping of a new image of socialism but also the rebuilding of man, whose guiding principle in life will be creativity through activeness.

#### **P. Kolobanov, CPSU member, Moscow: Is This Socialism?**

Science does not tolerate phraseology and vague and loose formulations. Yet it is precisely as amorphous that I consider the article "Toward a New Image of Socialism," drafted by a group of social scientists.

Having pointed out that the content of the New Age is the transition from capitalism to socialism, the authors give it a definition which would be accepted by any bourgeois scientist as defining the essence of neocapitalism. This definition presents capitalism as a society of universal well-being, structured on the principles of humaneness and respect for human rights, a society of high cultural standards and morality, etc. Therefore, the socialism suggested by the authors of the article is a glossed-over capitalism and nothing else (incidentally, as proof of this, Academician O. Bogomolov believes that we should speak of "Swiss socialism" without putting it between quotations marks any longer). But if the definition of the new society contains such concepts as "socialist democracy," "socialist law-governed state," and other derivatives of the word "socialism," forgive me but this is incorrect.

The very mention of "public ownership," on which socialist society is built, provides a certain specific definition of socialism. Subsequent considerations, alas, do not inform us as to what the authors understand by "public" form of ownership, including private. Therefore, here as well socialism is not explained.

The result? Whereas in the past, in accordance with the conclusions of the Marxist classics, a clear distinction existed between the two social systems, based on form of ownership, relationship among classes, the presence or absence of the exploitation of man by man—today we are being offered a cosmetic difference. Has science become so impoverished or is socialism indeed one of the varieties of capitalism?

Having adopted the concept of the Western scientists on the need for a multiplicity of forms of ownership in order to ensure the political freedom of man, the scientists, I imagine, are unable to tie up the ends and introduce a great deal of confusion both in the theory and the practical implementation of the concept they formulate.



Actually, having accepted private property as a structural component of the socialist base, they were bound to reach the conclusion that socialist society would include antagonistic classes, created by it, exploitation, and political parties corresponding to those classes. What then is left of socialism? Or is it that our scientists already believe in the existence of a universal brotherhood of nations without class contradictions and in which everyone is concerned with the good of society? Is it not too early to put back into the scabbard the ideological weapon of the communists—Marxism-Leninism?

It is true that some efforts are being made to explain a few things, particularly by that same O. Bogomolov. For example, he sees nothing terrible for socialism to include the exploitation of man by man, claiming that there already exists in our country the exploitation of the working people by the state (clearly, referring to the significant withholdings from socialist enterprises for the budget). But why confuse the appropriation of someone else's labor for the satisfaction of one's private needs with taxation, the funds for which are used to meet public needs? Unquestionably, for a variety of reasons, a certain share of the added product goes to the support of an unnecessary apparatus; however, this is based on the imperfection of the social system and not on its essence.

Academician O. Bogomolov tries to prove that the state has all the necessary possibility to set conditions for an entrepreneur, which would exclude the exploitation of outside labor. In that case, however, why should the employer produce if this does not earn for him additional profits? Would it be from humane or universal human purposes? Such gestures are made only by those who have already acquired wealth at the expense of outside labor.

Let us now consider the cooperatives. Essentially and unquestionably they are useful and needed under socialism. Cooperatives are always beneficial if they develop under the conditions of free market relations and equality among partners. If the leading role in the country is played by the state sector and the distribution system, the prices of goods and services are set essentially by state authorities, as a result of which the cooperatives inevitably turn into organizations which lead a parasitical life at the expense of the state sector.

Therefore, the article in *KOMMUNIST* on the new aspect of socialism reminds us a great deal of the theory of the bourgeois scientists on the post-industrial society and convergence. It is an example of a virtually open acknowledgment of the failure of the Marxist-Leninist theory of socialism and a worshiping of capitalism. Incidentally, all mass information media are intensively trying to convince us of how good it is "elsewhere" and how bad it is "at home." Perhaps, therefore, the time may have come, following the Hungarian example, to rename the communist into socialist party?

I believe that some scientists are true communists with firm faith in the rightness of the theory of Marx and Lenin concerning a classless society—communism—people who have mastered the theory of this problem. The journal should let them speak.

**Yu. Beloded, candidate of philosophical sciences, Zhito-mir: On the Problem of Freedom**

A rich flow of writings on the problem of the new image of socialism discuss a great deal of topics **not inherent** in socialism in principle, while the flow of new positive ideas is lean. Against this background the article "For a New Image of Socialism" is a noticeable phenomenon. I shall try to present my own view of some problems.

First of all, a remark on the methodological level. Obviously, shaping the new image of socialism by comparing it exclusively to previous systems and to capitalism, would be somewhat simplistic. This has already done a great deal of harm to the theory of Marxism in our country. The more so since the authors of the article note that "socialism appeared within universal history as the embodiment and extension of the humanistic ideals formulated by mankind." But if such is the case, the basic parameters of the new system should also take shape in accordance with world historical experience. In "*Das Kapital*" Marx gave us a splendid model of a historical approach to the analysis of social processes. On this basis, it would be logical to structure the outlines of the model of the future based not only on the study of the contemporary level of development; in such a complex theoretical matter it is important dialectically to interpret the basic trends in the development of mankind as such.

Although mankind as a whole and every person individually are always specific in a given historical period, there is something in this specificity which distinguishes them from any other age. In all likelihood, this "something" is the essential forces of mankind. If that is the case, the efficiency of a societal organization will be determined by the scope, by the degree of freedom which one socioeconomic system or another allows for the development of these forces.

What does a retrospective look indicate? At a given stage, having resolved the contradiction between nature and society "in his favor," it may seem that man had gained his freedom. However, having left behind the elements of nature, he found himself within the elements of social relations and turned out to be totally nonfree on the social level. The entire history of the exploiting society is one of constant struggle for liberation. What degree of freedom has contemporary capitalism offered man?

In the mass awareness, under the influence of the criticism of administrative-command socialism, the illusion arose that by its own methods capitalism had been able to solve the problems of our time. Yes, the bulk of the people have been guaranteed a specific living standard. In order to be able to develop his production activities,

man was freed from concern for his daily bread. Capital is invested in the worker and the attitude toward him is as attentive and concerned as the one displayed toward means of production. However, this in no way means that the owner of such means shares with his workers the right of ownership and economic power. Since in society there neither is nor could there be any equal opportunity to own the means of production and have access to economic power, there is no economic freedom.

The problem of economic freedom has always been a priority topic in the history of mankind. The struggle for it has been the foundation of social movements and spiritual trends. Marx scientifically proved the need for the economic liberation of man.

The article "For a New Image of Socialism" raises the question of the economic freedom of the individual but does not go deep into the nature of the concept. The authors interpret freedom itself as a lengthy list of specific economic relations important in and of themselves. This includes the "possibility of choosing the place and form of application of one's labor efforts," the "freedom of the producer," and the choice of a "living standard." However, on what basis will all of this be accomplished?

It is difficult for us to define the economic freedom of the individual, for in the course of its history, mankind has still not been able to attain it. It is only aspiring to reach it, as an ideal. Let us start on the basis of "non-freedom," in which society has rich experience. Let us remember the well-familiar truth about presocialist systems: the reason for the economic lack of freedom of individuals was private ownership. Since such is the case, the best minds of mankind have long suggested that it be removed as the major obstacle. In advancing along this path, our Soviet socialism eliminated private ownership but in such a way that both the individual and the entire society found themselves alienated from the means of production. Today we would like to bring the owner back into the economy in a variety of ways, as an individual, a member of a cooperative, a lessee, a member of an association, and as member of society as a whole.

Clearly, replacing one strict economic principle ("private ownership is sacred and inviolable") with another, equally single and strict ("public ownership is sacred and inviolable") is unproductive. Ownership is a means of combining the worker with means of production. It seems to us that the logical conclusion would be that the freedom of the individual in the area of economics means the possibility of combining with the means of production any means which is consistent with a given level of development of production forces. In other words, the individual will have the real opportunity, with a public ownership of the means of production, to become their owner or co-owner as a member of an association or, in general, he may refuse to own means of production and, in accordance with his wish, hire his labor, become a lessee, etc. In that case society must

prevent the gaining of economic power by one person over another. A totally efficient way for achieving such protection is the economic power of the entire people, based on public ownership and manifested through the political features of a system. All other aspects and elements of economic relations would become part of the principle of the freedom to make such choice.

The search for new economic models of renovated socialism leads, in the final account, to a search for forms of free development of creative essential forces of man in the production area. It is only in that case that socialism would justify its historical purpose by giving the individual and, therefore, the entire society a greater degree of freedom compared with previous sociohistorical development stages. It is a question not of competing on the basis of quantitative indicators or having a greater or lesser amount of commodities, services, democratic institutions, cultural values, and so on; it is a question of a new quality of society which means, above all, a new degree of freedom. The moment this new degree becomes an economic freedom which mankind has lacked so far, we should expect a new level of social development.

#### **Yu. Safonov, Rostov-na-Donu: What Is Socialism?**

Of late your journal, as our entire press, has raised the question of socialism. A variety of views have been expressed on this subject, extreme right as well as extreme left. In my view, however, no one has as yet answered the main question: What is socialism? Following are my own considerations, inspired by the selection of letters published in issue No 17, and in the hope that both the selection as well as my own notes will generate a discussion.

In my view, an answer to this main question can be obtained by looking at the condition of production forces. In the capitalist society (less subject to political control) we can see that the function of the producer is transferred from man to machine. The reasons for and stages of development of this type of process are not the subject of these notes. It is obvious, however, that this process will be intensified and expanded. Removed from the production process, man becomes unemployed. It is at this point, in my view, that the basic difference between the two systems appears.

Under capitalism, a person replaced by a machine is no longer needed by the employer, for if he does not work he does not bring any profit. Concern for the further fate of the unemployed is assumed by society to which, in the literal meaning of the term, he becomes a "useless mouth" (not producing anything, requiring support, he does lower the level of well-being of the society).

Under a socialist system it may seem that the unemployed has been assigned the same role: This man is "unsuitable" whatever the society. He can only consume. That is why it is in the interest of society to

provide him with conditions for creative labor (something which will always be with us), thus contributing to the development of the human potential and the further progress of society.

Starting with the fact that man has lost the function stipulated in the Old Testament, that of earning his bread by the sweat of his brow, one could look at both the future and the present in determining why has this happened and what it is.

The reason is understandable for, having begun to develop, as stipulated by the classics, an economic foundation for the new society, in terms of the basic direction (development of production forces) we failed to take even a single step forward. We not only failed to create the theory of the development of such forces but even failed to try to evaluate the precedent which had been developed in the world, i.e., we acted as true dogmatists who were observing the letter of the doctrine while forgetting its spirit.

If we speak of "spirit," which is what I am writing about, from the very first years of the existence of the socialist system we should have engaged in facilitating human labor on a daily basis or, I would say, even on an hourly basis, by developing and applying the necessary machines and mechanisms to this effect. For according to the "spirit," 50 years before the Japanese we **had to**(!), invent all those robots, computers, and so on, for our own workers. For it is only by strengthening the production forces of their society, thanks to the achievements of the human mind, that the Japanese could achieve such tremendous growth.

So, did we or did we not build socialism? In my view, the only possible answer is that we did not! Having reached in the course of the revolution the initial stage of a society which could build socialism, we stopped there, adding nothing (in the sense that I spoke about).

By changing our society, thanks to a reform of its economic foundation, we shall convert to the track of the "Western European" socialist way (down which we can travel!). The point, however, is that subsequently both it and we will nonetheless have to lay this same foundation. Therefore, the question is legitimate: Is it worth it for us, having already traveled part of the way, to go back?

#### **N. Malkov, docent, Ikurtsk: Classical Socialism and Contemporary Practices**

This heading may puzzle my opponents. What is classical socialism? What shall we be discussing? There has been no classical socialism in the past. However, nor is there socialism today.

The article "For a New Image of Socialism," which you published in your journal, is of an abstract-scholastic nature, for which reason it is not convincing. It is a question of a selection of **desirable** features: the so-called "democratic humane socialism," social justice, and so

on, although neither humanism nor social justice could be ensured by socialism, and even less so during a transitional period, because of the objective nature of both.

The trouble with all scholastic incantations about socialism is that they do not contain even a hint of any kind of methodology. In his study of Marx, Lenin pointed out that Marx did not engage in scholastic-far-fetched schemes. He derived socialism from capitalism in the same way that the natural scientist can develop a new biological species. This is a noteworthy nuance, indicating that the development of society is a natural historical process. In Marx's concept, socialism is the product of a post-bourgeois society, the naturally extracted product of a lengthy and painful development process. Pointing out the natural historical nature of the appearance of socialism is not accidental. Socialism requires specific material prerequisites.

Yes, Marx's methodology is impeccable. It alone allows us to formulate a scientific concept of socialism. Any "new images" are nothing other than abstract-scholastic schemes, unrelated to science, the consequences of which we shall continue to feel within the foreseeable future in the same way that we are experiencing the consequences of "Arakcheyev's socialism," against which Yu. Martov cautioned us.

In a KOMMUNIST issue, Academician N. Moiseyev justifiably pointed out that it is not difficult to create an efficient economic mechanism, for we have an analog: an efficiently operating capitalist model of economic management. This is accurate. However, this is by no means sufficient for classical socialism. The economic structures which developed under capitalism could become an economic analog. However, as far as economic regulators are concerned, they are essentially unacceptable. They must be interpreted dialectically.

Guided by dialectics, Marx proved that under capitalism, which is based on commodity production, social relations function "not directly as social relations among individuals in the course of their labor but, conversely, as object relations among individuals and social relations among objects" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 23, p 83). In this case relations among individuals act as relations among objects. In that situation the possibility of speaking about humanism is minimal. Furthermore, in commodity output labor invested in the production of goods is manifested as the cost of such products, as one of their physical characteristics. Such are Marx's conclusions on commodity production with its socioeconomic consequences. Are such conclusions not confirmed by our reality? What kind of humanism could there be a question of if social relations are of a fetishistic nature? In this case there is not even a hint of socialist values.

Marx reached the conclusion that socialist society will throw off the mystical vague blanket and that social relations among people will be transparently clear both

in the production and distribution areas. However, this will take place when the material production process becomes a product of free social association among people and is placed under their conscious systematic control. This will require a certain social material foundation.

Marx's concept of socialism, therefore, proceeds from two premises: the acknowledgment of socialism as a universal system and its noncommodity nature. Since the solution of such problems is beyond the range of the foreseeable future, it makes no sense to speak of socialism as such. We must persistently and patiently build socialism, guided by the principles formulated by Marx.

Lenin voiced the idea that in the 20th century man cannot go forward without advancing toward socialism and that socialism grows out of each major step taken by the bourgeoisie. Many are those who believe (as was mentioned at the First Congress of People's Deputies) that Sweden and Switzerland are closer to socialism than the USSR. Said *KOMMUNIST* article considers a feature of socialism the role which a given form of ownership plays in satisfying the needs of society. With such a consumerist approach we shall be unable to distinguish capitalist from socialist economic forms. Such distinction can be clearly traced in Marx and Lenin: the form of ownership could be collective (the Swedish cooperative) but labor is private. The same applies to our own cooperative movement, which functions on the basis of free trade. With the principle of free trade in mind, Lenin wrote that this is a petit bourgeois, a capitalist development; it is the basis of political economy. Therefore, the socialist society is based not only on collective principles but also on the social nature of labor. An enterprise may be collectively owned but labor could be private.

What matters in the characterization of socialism is not only the form but also the nature of ownership. In said works we find an answer to the question of enterprises of a systematic socialist type. It is entirely clear that state-private (mixed) enterprises, cooperatives, and individual labor activity are not elements of a socialist system. However, their existence is necessary during the transitional period.

If a socialist society is a "free association of producers" (Marx), as was written, naturally the forms of organization and management of the production process must be structured, by analogy, with similar forms in the nonsocialist world, for the formal classification of ownership into state, republic, or municipal does not solve the problem. The labor collective must become a self-governing free association of producers, independently determining the expediency of various administrative bodies, partners in production cooperation, and so on, which function on a cost-accounting basis. All that is left for the state (represented by planning-financial authorities) would be the functions of preserving certain proportions, and formulating investment policy, credits,

and taxes). COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## PUBLIC OPINION

### Reader-Journal

905B0017 Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 3, Feb 90 (signed to press 2 Feb 90) pp 92-97

[Survey compiled by N. Boldina, N. Klyukhin, and V. Nekhotin]

### [Text]About the 'Real Circulation'

The reduced subscription to our journal has not been ignored by our readers. The editors expressed their views on this topic in the editorial "Socialist Idea and Socialist Creativity" (No 17, 1989). This was not an effort to ignore the main topic: If it is to be an organ of creative thinking, the journal must rely on the interested participation of its readers. The editorial mail provides grounds for pursuing this topic.

Naturally, we are grateful to the letter writers, most of whom are writing us to express their approval and support (we believe that no one would blame us for not opening this discussion with criticism). "Of late the materials published in the journal have shown significant changes. One could say that now it is fully consistent with its purpose, both theoretical and political" (N. Sergeyev, Ryazan). "The journal has become very interesting and, finally, respectable. Do not be concerned by a decline in circulation, for you are not the reason" (S. Argunov, Moscow). "I share your concern about the declined circulation. Clearly, there must be some errors in the work of the editors, as mentioned in the editorial. However, this is also an indicator of the ideological standard of the party members, the aktiv above all. An outburst of political activeness has drawn many people to meetings and sensationalism. They do not think that our journal fits such purposes. Conversely, of late it has become even more necessary to me, for it has clarified many questions" (G. Shvartsburd, Chelyabinsk). "No cheap sensationalism may be found in this journal which deals with the grave problems of today. I catch myself thinking: Am I not flattering the editor? No, I am simply expressing a feeling of gratitude for your truly good work. It is very needed today" (L.D., Krasnodar). "With the passing of the law on leasing and ownership, the country entered the final stage of perestroika. Your journal did everything possible for this to happen" (Petrov, Moscow).

At the same time, we have received letters written in an entirely different spirit. "None of your articles or the people whose articles you publish will rescue your journal from the state of isolation in which you find yourselves today," writes, for instance, V. Chaykin, from Cherepovets, who warns us at the very start that "I neither read nor subscribe to your journal." One could ask, therefore, why does he have to voice an opinion in

such a case. Unfortunately, however, this is the reality and it is on such "ground" that frequently evaluations, not exclusively related to the journal's activities, originate.

Naturally, we are interested in the grounds for the various views as well as in the reasons for which subscriptions have declined. "Do not be distraught by the decline in circulation. This has made your circulation more or less realistic," believes Leningrader Yu. Golosov. We made an effort to study the figures which were given to us by Soyuzpechat and Izdatelstvo Pravda. What do the figures show?

In the past departmental subscription was a subject of extensive debates. Indeed, in 1987 it accounted for nearly 60 percent of the increased circulation of the journal. It also accounted for approximately three-quarters of the loss of circulation in 1988. Apparently, subsequently no one collected data on the correlation between departmental and private subscription throughout the country. We believe, however, that whereas last year nine out of 10 Moscow subscribers subscribed privately, their present share is unlikely to have declined both in Moscow and in the rest of the country (the opposite may even have occurred).

Are "semi-coercive methods of pressuring party members to subscribe to the party press" being applied today (from the letter by Ye. Khurgin, Sevastopol)? Reports of this nature have virtually stopped reaching us. Soyuzpechat has been the target of charges, the accuracy of which would be difficult to prove. For example, according to Muscovite R. Ragimov, "enterprises whose workers 'actively' subscribe to the party press are being encouraged by allowing them to subscribe to specially allocated limited editions, the distribution of which is proportional to the subscription to party publications." However, other letters are typical. "I am an ordinary reader. In the past I subscribed to the journal because I was forced to do so; today I catch myself waiting for the next issue" (R. Kapshuk, Berezoveskiy Rayon, Tyumen Oblast). Possibly, such overt or covert "apportionments" may not have been abandoned everywhere. We have asked our readers to report such facts to us. However, in the present circumstances, this method is hardly likely to have a substantial influence on subscriptions.

Obviously, the main reason lies elsewhere. "From my viewpoint, the journal is interesting. However, in our association (1,100 people) there are only two subscribers, I and our party committee," notes Yu. Golosov, whose letter we already mentioned. "Few people are reading you, and as a librarian I can see this. This is regrettable, for your journal is necessary for educating the mind," believes L. Kolbenkova (Beloyarskiy settlement, Sverdlovsk Oblast). "Over the past 5 years the journal has become almost irreplaceable. It is needed. It seems as though I am the only subscriber, however, in our entire scientific production association. The party committee does not use the journal although the political and

theoretical training of the party members is clearly behind the requirements of today and the new opportunities," reports Muscovite V. Potkin.

We are concerned by the fact that we have lost more than one-half of our readers in Lithuania and in Kemerovo, Magadan, Odessa, and Syrdarya oblasts; more than 40 percent in Georgia, in 10 areas of the RSFSR, Leningrad, Kiev, Voroshilovgrad, Donetsk, and Kharkov oblasts, in Tashkent and in Samarkand Oblast.

All in all, some 4 percent of our readers are uncertain as to whether they would extend their subscription for the second half of the year.

The only part of the country in which the number of subscribers has increased (by more than 15 percent compared to last year) is Bukhara Oblast. Another indicator is also important: the share of subscribers among the population in that same Bukhara Oblast, is small (57 subscribers per 100,000 population). For the country at large, the indicator is 196 subscribers but it fluctuates from one area to another, substantially exceeding the average in the large cities, most of the chernozem oblasts in the RSFSR, the central and lower reaches of the Volga, the northern Caucasus, the Urals, the Far East, the Ukraine, and several Kazakhstan oblasts.

As in the past, it is the highest in Moscow (567 subscribers per 100,000 population). However, whereas last year a subscription to our journal here had virtually remained stable (about 92 percent of the 1988 level), it has now declined by nearly one-half (the smallest loss is in Sevastopolskiy Rayon, 76.6 percent; the highest is in Zelenograd, 30.5). In the Moscow newsstands, however, the journal was sold out (the number of copies sold exceeded the requests of the vendors).

The question as to the extent to which all such data reflect the real preferences of the readers is a difficult one to answer. We intend to study it more thoroughly. Unquestionably, the editorial mail will help in this matter.

#### Suggestions, Remarks, Evaluations

What do the readers expect of our publications, how do they assess them, what do they suggest?

"It seems to me that the journal should mandatorily raise with the party questions which contribute to the development of theoretical thinking and improvements in our lives. Members of the Politburo and the government should write more frequently for the journal, answering the most basic and pressing problems of the theory and practice of party and state building, including answering letters by the working people" (A. Poberezhets, Leningrad). "I think that our journal (I can consider it my own as well) particularly needs a great variety of articles written by the lower strata, for many of our difficulties precisely come from the huge gap and sometimes lack of understanding between the central and local authorities, which also applies to the party press" (B. Nikitenko,



Izmail, Odessa Oblast). "I need hope for the future. I am in favor of considered and substantiated publications" (V. Vasilenko, Volzhskiy City).

The readers send us a great variety in the suggestions, remarks, and assessments. The cannot be reduced to a single denominator. "The journal does not anticipate events. It does not forecast their development, but is falling increasingly behind the processes occurring in society. There is virtually no alternate interpretation of processes which are occurring and ripening; the materials published in the journal become very rapidly obsolete" (G. Morozov, Moscow). "Smooth," commissioned publications continue to predominate in the journal. There is no sharpness of polemics and debates on specific topics" (Ye. Pokrovskiy, Kiev).

Here as well almost totally opposed opinions are expressed. "Of late I have been reading the journal with interest and I believe that its publications are even anticipating some events in the country and creating a good scientific foundation for a radical economic reform," thinks Yu. Baltgaytis, postgraduate student in Moscow. Prof S. Brandt from Irkutsk, notes that the topics raised by the journal are being covered "thoughtfully and daringly," jocularly qualifying the journal (as a compliment) as being almost "seditious." In the already mentioned letter from Krasnodar, signed "L.D.," the writer emphasizes that "to me the journal is a model of democracy. It publishes articles less for reasons of duty than intelligence. That is the way I interpret it."

Actually, here as well there is no unity in assessments. "Judging by the titles of most authors, the editors seem to prefer titles rather than knowledge" (from the letter by G. Morozov). "The authors are journalists and scientists mainly middle-aged or elderly. Probably that is why in some cases they are unable to avoid dogmatism. The topics are frequently related to current concepts. The quality of the articles greatly fluctuates from one issue to another. I cannot understand the reason for this. You have all the required possibilities of choosing your authors," believes A. Martuykov (Velikiy Ustyug).

The main topic for the last few months has been that of the place of the party in the processes of renovation of society. A debate on this topic is being conducted in the journal. "However, it seems to me that in the assessment of events and phenomena in the life of the country and the party letters to the editors are little taken into consideration," notes A. Poteryakhin, secretary of the Sovetskiy Party Raykom, Moscow. "We write to you when the situation reaches a painful level. I believe, however, that to be ahead means not only to be the first to express public opinion but also to try to influence it. One such problem, in my view, is the correlation between elective authorities and the apparat structures." "Problems such as improving the structural organization of party authorities are not being properly reflected," believes I. Lepekhin (Cherkessk, Stavropol Kray). Here are other typical remarks: "The journal is the theoretical

organ of the CPSU. Where else could we turn to?" (A. Yakimenko, student, Moscow Physical-Technical Institute).

Equal interest is shown in problems of the spiritual life of society. "It seems to me that the journal should raise questions which contribute to the development of morality. A great deal is being said and written today about the tremendous harm which was inflicted to it. This is true. However, equally true is the fact that our people who, incidentally, proved to be quite trusting, have still not truly accepted such appeals. Perestroika cannot advance without belief in the triumph of truth. We shall not promote high morality among the people if the people feel that they are not free and are being debased...." "Along with articles by scientists, why do you not publish works by our noted writers, those whom we consider to be the conscience of the nation? It would be interesting even to interview them. We need 'teachers of life' who have something to say. Let me mention the names of D. Likhachev, D. Granin, N. Moiseyev, etc." (from the letters of A. Poberezhets and A. Martuykov).

The assessments and views of the readers lead to specific suggestions.

The readers value **brevity** of presentation (naturally, providing that the content is rich). "A steady subscriber to your journal and an active participant in the February and October Revolution and the civil war is addressing himself to you. I can no longer recall (I may be forgiven, for I am almost 95 years old) the name of the noted Russian writer who, in a letter to another writer, wrote: 'Forgive me for writing you at length, I have no time to write a short letter.' Your editorial in issue No 15 was a model of brevity and of what a refined and talented article should be. Particularly relevant in it was the search for an optimal model of socialism. Thank you for such an editorial!" (Yu. Flakserman, CPSU member since 1 March 1917).

The readers are clearly "for" **polemical** articles. "I would like to see the journal to be not so passive, somnolent, and polemically toothless as it is now".... "Why do you display such unexplainable 'delicacy' by not naming the specific publications and authors with whom you argue and which (I would even dare use this word) you exposed. It seems to me that this weakens the power and persuasiveness of your articles."... "Why is there no rubric entitled 'Party Criticism,' in which the journal would 'strike' at specific targets? Forgive me, but are you short of intellectual gunpowder or else is it that the Central Committee 'is not ordering it?' Or is it both?... Take up a letter which disagrees with the views of the journal and provide an intelligent and specific criticism, let us say when dealing with the problem of nationalities" (from the letters of V. Starostin, Leningrad; D. Tokman, Gorkiy; and Ye. Pokrovskiy, Kiev).

The readers favor greater **stylistic exigency** for the articles (not simplification but an inventive approach, and "lofty" simplicity). "The current writings, albeit on

matters of perestroika are only for people with higher education. Had such writing been more accessible, particularly about perestroika 'on the lower levels,' work with readers of all categories would become more lively" (S. Rakhmanov, Katon-Karagay, Kazakh SSR).

Another topic is that of relations with the readers and respect for them. "I strongly urge you to pay greater attention, in the future, to the letters you receive from the readers and to their articles. Perhaps you may have to increase the size of your journal to this effect," writes V. Gushchin from Vichugi, Ivanovo Oblast.

"By the end of November a meeting took place in our city between KOMMUNIST editors and propagandists. I cannot describe it as a roundtable meeting, for it was an evening of questions and answers. However, this is not a question of what they are called, but of the fact that such meetings are not being held systematically. This is one of the reasons for the loss of subscribers to the journal. One should not think that the reader is silent. We argue, we discuss, and we draw our own conclusions. Frankly speaking, however, occasionally we, the readers, are trapped by the illusions created by our omniscient journalists. Not every reader will take a pen in hand to write to the editors and nor will a piece of paper ever replace personal contacts. That is why, however difficult, inconvenient, and bothersome you may consider this, you must develop a system for such meetings, discuss in advance the materials in your portfolio and submit to the readers information for their consideration and scientific development, from the standpoint of the various social strata. Your editorial mail is a small bit of what could and should be said about the journal and its publications.

"In addition to the rubric 'After the Journal's Publications,' in my view you need a section in which the efficiency of the journal would be assessed. We should not tolerate the fact that profound scientific and theoretical substantiations and conclusions drawn in publications are not put to practical use and, conversely, that important practical steps are not summed up scientifically. The efficiency of the journal should be evaluated not only by the CPSU Central Committee but on all levels of the party's organizational structure and it is the reader who must be the main participant in this effort.

"Furthermore, you must improve the quality of the printing. You must have your own typeface, which would be specific to KOMMUNIST. For example, issues 14 and 15 both include 49 fine print pages per 128 pages of text, which makes reading quite difficult. KOMMUNIST deserves increased size and better print," is the opinion of A. Kashintsev, CPSU member and lecturer at the Knowledge Society, Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast.

"You must promote the activeness of the reader, sponsor competitions, and so on," believes A. Martyukov, whose letter we already mentioned in this survey. He has sent us quite extensive material related to the content and presentation of the journal ("in the same way that one

points out the weaknesses in one's friend, I would like to help you to correct them while supporting your strong features"). We discussed it at an editorial meeting. Following are some suggestions concerning the form of presentation of the articles: "Understanding the proceedings of roundtable meetings is quite difficult and reading them is very fatiguing. It seems to me that they should not be a regular feature. The roundtable form should not be wasted on petty matters. Two or three interesting statements would suffice.... The journal looks dull. Year after year it comes out with the same dull cover, highfalutin rubrics, which are pompous and borrowed from the 'good old times.' Are you afraid of dynamic titles?... It would help if you put on the cover a brief information on the next issue, listing the most important articles."

Incidentally, on this subject as well there is the opposite viewpoint, particularly as far as the cover is concerned: "There are no excesses 'for the sake of embellishment,' or for luring the readers. One can sense that your journal is not playing up to them by saying 'please pay attention as to how smart we are, subscribe.' That is not what matters, what matters is the essence" (N. Fuzeynikova, Volosovo settlement, Leningrad Oblast).

The editors have also received suggestions such as "in order to bring the materials and the entire content of the journal closer to the level of truly scientific publications, it is extremely necessary to precede the main text, with a brief summary. I do not believe that this would harm the journal but, conversely, it could only enhance its reputation."... "My suggestion is to publish an addition to KOMMUNIST, as practiced by old and 'thick' journals, consisting of works by noted Marxists. You could also add debate on problems, such as a commentary on the work of Duhring and 'Anti-Duhring'." Today this is necessary, for otherwise the reputation of Marxism among the masses, already undermined by its ignorant interpretation, would be of short duration" (from the letters of A. Smirnov and A. Yakimenko, Moscow).

The editors have also received letters such as "what about popularizing the views of the 'nonelect?' The solution in this case would be quite appropriate: 'Thank you for your attention. We shall try to take into consideration and use in our survey your letter and the thoughts it contains.' This would be a model of politeness. No one is rejecting the letter. The promise is made to take into consideration and to use it..." (S. Bolotov, Vitebsk). Unfortunately, we cannot promise that we shall abandon the survey genre. In each issue, published once every 20 days, we can publish 15 to 20 works. Meanwhile, in those 20 days we receive an average of 400 letters, articles, and opinions....

### Some Conclusions

We are pleased by all the letters in which the readers express their assessments and make suggestions. Frequently they become subjects for discussion at KOMMUNIST editorial meetings and work conferences. It is

very important to listen to the readers. It is also important to develop an aspect of the journal which would make it possible to combine two sides of our work—the political and the theoretical—in such a way as not to lose its specific personality and yet, at the same time, be maximally open to the variety of problems and opinions.

"I admit that, of late, I do not feel like reading the press. There are too many repetition and verbosity. Some hastily constructed, circumstantial, and scientifically unsubstantiated articles can only excite. The mind is not put to work. However, one must read and the soul must be put to work. After receiving the KOMMUNIST issue, I read with interest the article by the three historians. It provided a historical approach to the study of events. There were detailed references to respective sources, which make the mind work. I thank the authors of this article for the respect they have shown for their readers," writes R. Prodan from Kiev.

With almost aphoristic accuracy, this writer speaks of the criteria on the basis of which the readers have the right to approach—and do approach—articles in a theoretical and political journal: to awaken the mind and excite the heart; not to be primitive but to be clear; not to replace arguments with emotions but also to avoid a bureaucratic style, peremptory judgments, and a high-faluting attitude. We realize that by no means do we always succeed in achieving such a combination.

We agree with the readers who expect of the journal greater efficiency. It is neither possible nor necessary to try to compete with the daily press in terms of the speed of reacting to current events. We rather believe that our objective is to highlight the problems which will be facing society as it takes its next step forward, without avoiding evaluations or concealing our own view on society's past, present, and future. In this we are greatly helped by the readers' mail. Here is a typical statement: "This may not be a suitable subject, for your journal is a theoretical one, and yet here I come with my own life" (from the letter by L. Kolbenkova). Such thoughts are always useful, for theory itself is a means of understanding life. Such thoughts enable us to gain a better idea of what excites the people today, what type of changes do they expect and, in this connection, what should and could KOMMUNIST say.

Essentially, 1990 will be noted for the partywide and nationwide debate on the way to reorganize our society. It will demand a serious theoretical interpretation of economic, social, and spiritual life and practical suggestions. Nor will the journal stand aside from this process. Our pages are open to a variety of viewpoints and opinions, providing that they are expressed in a responsible fashion, supported by facts, and based on their analysis.

We have neither sought nor are seeking "seditiousness" and sensationalism. Nor do we intend to conceal our preferences and viewpoints, for we see in the pluralism of views a search for the truth and for the best practical

solutions. This also applies to problems of the development of theory, party restructuring, and problems of the spiritual culture of the society, topics in the interpretation of which, judging by the letters, we have by no means accomplished all we should.

Some readers tend to see the effectiveness of our materials in the fact that everything said in the journal should become reality the very next day, virtually through our single efforts. We believe that this would depend on everyone: on us and on those to whom we turn, the members of society, the party members, people who are involved and who are not indifferent, party and state authorities, and public organizations. Our duty, as we understand it, is to express and mold public opinion which must be strong, competent, and responsible and, therefore, to shape the actively changing life.

### A Special Topic

In speaking of the "reader-journal" relationship, we must not ignore letters which we usually describe with a single word: "complaints." They account for 20 percent of the entire editorial mail and deal with a great variety of subjects. Following are some of them, culled from the latest mail. Members of a cooperative in Kaluga complain of violations of their legitimate rights. Yu. Ivashchenko, from Krasnodar Kray, writes about thefts. Worker V. Sergeyev from Sakskiy Rayon, Crimean Oblast, and U. Abdulayev, a former sovkhos director from Dagestan, complain to the journal about what they consider to be their illegal dismissal. A. Avtandilyan, Moscow, reports on a conflict situation in a truck gardening association. S. Cherkes, from Odessa, writes about being deprived of the right to travel abroad, etc.

In short, complaints dealing with all kinds of aspects of daily life, may be supplemented with appeals, such as "please issue instructions to the trade procurement base to send me treads and transmission belts for my snowmobile. I am attaching a blank for the order, which you should add to your own letter" (A. Shishelov, Naberezhny settlement, Komi ASSR). I. Tutov from Kursk asks that "we publish the facts of the nature of crimes committed by people who violate the laws, and instruct the office of the USSR Prosecutor General to consider all 34 complaints and to seek an indictment of the culprits." His complaint deals with repairs done to his apartment, obtaining a car and a plot for starting a rabbit breeding farm, and facilities for obtaining food and medicine. He ends by asking, "When will the Soviet system come to Kursk?..."

Quite typically, people turn not exclusively to us but simultaneously to several recipients, clearly guided by the principle that "somewhere something may be done." The view prevails that any problem of ordinary life can be resolved with the help of newspapers and journals. Traditionally, the journal has personnel who deal exclusively with complaints: they study them, direct them to

the respective organizations which should take measures, keep track of deadlines for consideration of such letters, and note the substantive nature of the answers received.

We admit that issuing "instructions" to reputable establishments and "pressuring them" with the threat that we would publish unseemly facts is not a pleasant occupation. However, nor can we indifferently file away a letter when it shrieks of injustice. Does this yield any kind of results? Most frequently it does, when the question can be essentially solved on the spot. For example, it could have been possible, without the intervention of the editors, to settle the matter of the telephone of V. Samoylova, a resident of Klaypeda. For quite some time she had to listen to indignant tirades by the station workers; after they seriously looked into her complaints, it turned out that the reason for frequent interruptions was the unauthorized tapping of her line by her neighbors.

M. Oparina, from Chistopol, Tatar ASSR, had been refused access to the chairman of the city executive committee. For more than 2 years the widow of a soldier who had died at the front, and who had raised five children, had been unable to register her granddaughter and lived without receiving any pension or a ration card. In its answer to the editors, the CPSU Obkom calmly wrote: "It was pointed out to Comrade Zhelochkin, chief of the production-housing sector No 1, by the party gorkom, that his attitude toward the petitions of the citizens showed lack of attention."

The rehabilitation of innocent people is a very difficult matter. We deem it our duty to respond to the authors of such letters for the sake of fairness, truth, conscience, and justice. Nonetheless, as the good reputation is being restored to the victims of Stalinist repression, we must not remain indifferent to the fate of those who suffered during the period of stagnation, when abuse of power and punishment for criticizing superiors were virtually limitless. The dead feel no shame while the living would like to be able to look at the people straight in the eye and erase the undeserved stigma. It is precisely for that reason that we have done everything possible to help the Suchilov father and son, from Kurtamyshskiy Rayon, Kurgan Oblast: They were exonerated after 2 years of correspondence between the editors and the law-enforcement authorities. It took more than 6 years to achieve the full rehabilitation of construction engineer V. Pedchenets, from Zelenograd, near Moscow. This is the 12th consecutive year that several editorial boards have been fighting for the rehiring of inventor S. Mazanov, from Ulyanovsk.

Even today the path to the truth is incredibly long and difficult. "I consider the reason for my endless tribulations to be the irresponsibility of an entire array of officials who deliberately manufacture red tape," writes A. Zhuklyayev, from Feodosiya. Indeed, sometimes it takes years of degrading trips to "departments" where frequently the person is not even listened to, not to say

helped. It also happens that a fighter for justice gains the "reputation" of being litigious.

A law was enacted in 1988 granting the right to appeal to the court decisions made by individual state officials. However, the law has not dealt with many controversial situations, which include labor conflicts and, above all, does not give the right to appeal decisions made by collegiums. These omissions were eliminated by the current USSR Supreme Soviet only, and the updated law will be enacted this coming July. Let us hope that the situation with such complaints as well will substantially change for the better.

As we redirect a reader's petition, with our accompanying letter, we realize the entire difficulty of its further progress. Here we have to rely only on the conscientiousness and principle-mindedness of the officials who, in answer to our request, will undertake to investigate the report. Unfortunately, in frequent cases our hopes are not justified and instead of business-like answers, the editors receive formal replies, which are then followed by more letters sent by the same readers. "Everything seems to indicate that our letter was not seriously considered," write, for instance, Kherson residents A. Foroshchuk, S. and L. Zosimov, T. Vishnevetskaya, and N. Morozova, after they received the answer of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. "The data were borrowed from the previous replies of the Kherson Obkom, the city executive committee, and the oblast prosecutor's office." This is followed by yet another request sent by the journal, followed by the republic's prosecutor's office report that the authors of that letter had been right....

Quite frequently, the letters we receive include the request that they not be sent to the local authorities. The people request and, sometimes even demand of the journal's associates personally to handle a conflict, to go to the site and study the situation.... The editorial personnel is small and we do not have our own regional correspondents, hence our difficulties in on-site analysis of the situation. And even after any, albeit motivated, refusal, we are usually accused of bureaucratism and hypocrisy....

We shall soon be noting the 10th anniversary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase "On the Procedure for Considering the Suggestions, Petitions, and Complaints of Citizens." Although it does not mention newspapers and journals, nonetheless their work with letters is also regulated with this Ukase. However, no single editorial board has any administrative-economic, executive or any other kind of power. It cannot take the place of directive-issuing, law-enforcement or other authorities and, naturally, does not have their rights. It would be hard to imagine the type of staff of specialists in different problems which we would have to employ in order thoroughly and skillfully to deal with each request we receive. The established procedure for the consideration of complaints by the editors (which is essentially one of passing them along) today looks anachronistic and

fits the simple system: complaints from below and instructions from above; you inform and we decide how to act.

Of late the USSR people's deputies have become actively involved in this paper whirlpool, unwittingly turning into one more transshipment agency. Editorial statistics confirm a drastic reduction in the number of complaints after the First Congress of People's Deputies. Subsequently, the volume doubled, to be followed once again by a drop, after the second congress. Obviously, many were those who turned with requests for help directly to the representatives of the supreme authority. The scale reached by this can be confirmed by the following fact alone: Recently the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee received 120 deputy queries related to the recall of V.S. Zhukov, a members of the Kemerovo Oblast court; the reason for such uniform complaints, which continue to be received, was his own statement that "the matter can be solved only by the Party Control Committee." However, it is obvious that this is a matter for the RSFSR Ministry of Justice, to which the personnel of the Party Control Committee addressed themselves....

Incidentally, we recently received a query-petition bearing the letterhead of a deputy, asking why were the editors not publishing repeatedly sent articles by thus and such an author. Actually, we gave this author repeated answers but there he was, in a hurry to find backing....

When we discussed within our collective the draft Law on the Press, a great deal was said about changing the procedure of work with letters. One of the proposals was as follows: giving the editors the right not to deal with complaints addressed to several authorities and to determine which complaints are essentially not within the range of competence of the journal. We are convinced that everyone in our country should do his own job with a high degree of professionalism. As is the case with the entire press, KOMMUNIST must actively fight arbitrariness, illegality, and bureaucratism and defend the dignity of man and his rights and civic freedoms, mold public opinion on the basis of moral standards and encourage their acceptance. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

### The Adolescent as Defendant

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Feb 90 (signed to press 2 Feb 90) pp 98-105

[Article by Larisa Semenova Alekseyeva, candidate of psychological sciences]

[Text] The assembly hall of the executive committee. Adults, sitting behind a massive table, and on the carpet, facing them, a seventh grader from a of the Moscow schools, charged with the fact that in front of everyone,

in the middle of the day, he decided to settle his accounts with a fellow classmate, in the school yard.

In listening to the development of events, I could imagine the teachers watching the quarrel, not lifting a single finger to put an end to the brawl, instead, calling the security guards. The perpetrator makes his deposition and the papers are processed at the militia department. The mother of the "victim" comes and urgently demands that a criminal case be instigated. Finally, there is the medical examination. No traces of violence have been found, for which reason there is no indictment. Furthermore, the victim admits that the complaint of the plaintiff was fully justified and right.

If such was the case, what kind of problem could there be? The relationship was made clear and they went their own way, ashamed of the outburst! However, this did not happen. The wheels began to turn and gathered such momentum that finding a victim became necessary.

The woman-inspector states that the least the quarrelsome fellow could do would be to apologize. The latter, however, described by all the others as a calm and balanced individual, with a heightened feeling for justice, refuses sharply. The inspector insists. The boy remains inflexible. Anger and indignation take over the woman to such an extent that she immediately puts him on record with the militia for this disobedience alone, thus violating the instruction of the need for a preliminary investigation of affairs involving adolescents under 16 by a commission in charge of cases involving minors. As a rule, no one pays attention to such a "petty" matter.

Having reached its maximal speed, this new case goes straight into the files of the militia department.

And so, the rayon commission on matters involving minors is in session. If we are to trust the Legal Encyclopedia, officially it is an authority entrusted with "protecting the rights of minors,... and coordinating the activities of all governmental and social organizations on such matters and considering cases of juvenile delinquency."

The case involving our adolescent in no way involves such functions. Were those present here concerned with protecting rights by registering this boy, not to mention the fact that they approved all the actions which had already been taken against him? If the rights are not guaranteed but, conversely, are openly violated, this in itself is a violation of the law. What kind of warning could exist here? Punishment without guilt or punishment for the slightest infraction depreciate the idea of social concern.

We seem to have already determined the reason for which this was possible in cases involving adults. Let us try to understand how children may find themselves in a similar situation.



### Commissions and Inspectorates

In our country commission were created with the decree dated 9 January 1918. The new society categorically rejected as unacceptable the old children's courts with all of their traditions. The principles of protecting the interests of small citizens, based on V.I. Lenin's instructions on the priority of education and, consequently, of the preference of measures of social censure compared to punishment, were proclaimed. Consequently, all cases involving minors were transferred under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of State Welfare and, subsequently, the People's Commissariat of Education. Increasingly, the commissions became typical educational authorities. Almost immediately after Lenin's death, they began to work under the aegis of the Cheka and, subsequently, the GPU. Educational work began to be performed on the basis of other laws. However, as yet this did not mean any definitive change for the worse.

The Law on the Measures of the Struggle Against Juvenile Delinquency was enacted by the Central Executive Committee and the Sovnarkom on 7 April 1935. According to the law the age of criminal liability was lowered drastically, from 16 to 12. Henceforth, children could be criminally tried for even the slightest violation, and all available criminal punishment measures could be applied. It was at that point that in one fell swoop an end was put to the commissions as well.

The commissions were remembered once again in the 1960s. At that time, they acquired an interested partner. The idea came about of assigning priority in "crime prevention" to the militia. The most important matter which should have been the concern of the entire society and its governmental institution was entrusted to new major subdivisions in charge of crime prevention of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was at that point that each school and backyard, with the adolescents in their territory, were put under the jurisdiction of inspectors in charge of minors' affairs.

The present commissions which, according to the 1967 regulation, are being set up under executive committees and, therefore, embody the power, the peak of law enforcement authorities for children, consist of a single full-time official who has assumed all the obligations of prevention, defense of rights, and coordination. He is the responsible secretary and it is precisely he who must telephone the permanent members, who have their own main duties, and who are members of the various rayon organizations and departments, appointed on the basis of superior instructions, and performing this obligation on a voluntary basis.

It is by no means always possible to gather together all the 15 or 16 members. Nonetheless, one can single out among them a nucleus which should not be reminded of a forthcoming session or begged to attend. For long periods of time the prosecutor, the Komsomol leaders, and the personnel and deputies on the rayon level may

not show up in the executive committee premises. However, nothing of the sort happens with this nucleus: educators (school principals, principals of vocational-technical schools, directors of studies, teachers, representatives of public education authorities on the managerial level) and inspectors. Such commissions are very precious to them. This is their professional field, as a class, as teachers, as members of a pedagogical council, and the stronghold in maintaining public order. Having only recently signed an order of expelling someone from school, the principal will be sitting here, side by side with the inspector who drew up the indictment at the militia for that same adolescent, and both of them here, both the "victims" and the judges ratify resolutions which are passed without any red tape, within the 10 to 15 minutes allocated for this purpose. There cannot even be a question of fine points, such as demanding proof or witness testimony, or else allowing any kind of defense. It is a question of simple voting and counting raised hands, and that is all. The like or dislike of those who are present and assumptions such as "what if?" "but suddenly?" "and what if something else did happen?" are entirely adequate in terms of proof that something could have indeed happened, for which reason it must be punished.

### In the Center and Standing at Attention

Here is the nature of the "cases" which crowd every working day of the commissions.

A seventh grader, taken to the militia department, slightly intoxicated from having drunk beer in school. A fifth grader expelled for systematic violation of discipline. A school petition to consider the question of the grades and behavior of eighth graders. A second grader expelled from the school by decision of the pedagogical council and remaining out of school for several months; a 15-year old adolescent detained in the subway "for appearing intoxicated and insulting human dignity." Also included are known youngsters who gather every evening in the yard by the transformer booth. Any one of their initiatives is feared by those around them like fire, and the reaction to such a gathering is to summon a militia patrol. The school has long tried to get rid of those who, according to the neighbors, have lost all human appearance!

Every individual has his own path in life and makes his down delusions. Nonetheless, the youngsters are trying to think and, strange though it might seem, do so quite sensibly. "We are bored. We have nothing to do. Everything is dull. What else is there? My mother is dead, I live with my grandmother. She is old, life with her is not interesting. One could live normally only with the other kids. No one has ever done anything for me...."

One thing is clear from such explanations: No one is to be trusted, no one is worthy of unreserved respect. Adults can only persecute or else pretend that nothing is happening.

At commission sessions the adolescents show up with their parents, mostly the mother, naturally, the difficulty of whose life—to procure, to earn, to provide—results in an even greater shortage of what is usually known as “spirituality.” This shortage destroys the restraining principles which could block the path to delinquency and fall.

What is even more terrible and sad is something else: the efforts to apply, by inertia, black or white conceptual systems within the walls of the executive committee. Such procedures are practiced with solemnity. Their purpose is to emphasize the significance of the event, with the help of flags, statues, and portraits of leaders, heavy oak tables, behind which adults, with an expression of moral superiority, stare at their latest victim. The victim comes into the hall accompanied by the secretary and, on his instruction, stands where instructed. In the center and at attention. Now just try not to be confused or to remain firm! The more so since the only weapon here is fear. Making no effort to conceal their wish to frighten and to deprive the youngster of the gift of speech, the adults believe quite sincerely that they are succeeding. But is such the case?

Yes, lengthy monologues are being delivered, full of the most accurate words. Nor are transitions from indignation to threats appear unexpected, from shouts to admonitions and from insults to labeling. But let us not anticipate!

One evening, two ninth graders were taken to the Luzhniki precinct for refusal to obey the militiaman on duty, who had ordered them to get off the back of the bench and sit “properly.” The explanation to the commission was presented by B.A.: It was a cold evening and we could not sit on this wet bench covered with leaves. We were simply talking.... The comrade sergeant came... he lectured us... we did not abuse him... we did not resist... we were absolutely confident that he would threaten us, say something rude, and move on... Being taken in a patrol car is a serious matter... we had never been in one....

Chairman: All you have said so far is childish babbling. What is it, were you all that weak that you could not stand if you could not sit down? The more so since you were ordered to do that?

Inspector: Why are we admonishing them? They are both thinking that all of this is nonsense, simple like two and two makes four.

Commission member: What you have told us... you know, that is precisely the way opposition begins. First militia, then the authorities. It seems to me that you are underestimating the situation. You are on the verge of committing a crime. I can guarantee that you will in the future.

Home room teacher: As member of the collective I have no charges against B.A. He is respected in the classroom. He does not have a single disciplinary violation. I believe

that in this situation they became somewhat hot under the collar. There was no malicious intent here. There was neither rudeness nor challenge, which are totally alien to B.A.'s nature.

Chairman: What bothers me is that they seem to be smiling and showing no fear or embarrassment. Do they not understand where they are? What kind of license is this, may we know?

Home room teacher: To the best of my understanding, they are not in the least that way. They are reacting quite sharply to this situation and are serious.

Inspector: When the militiaman said that he will summon a patrol car, what did you think, that it was a joke?

B.A.: We did not think that this could be serious. We had not violated anything!

Inspector: Were you scared?

B.A.: No, I had no time to be scared. I was cautious.

Chairman: Let me tell you what truly happened. You were sitting around with girls. Yes. You swaggered in front of them. You wanted to prove your independence, your courage. All in all, you are too heavily influenced by your friends. That is why you will follow them in jail.

B.A.: But why jail right away?

Inspector: That part of Luzhniki where you decided to sit is considered a high-crime area. If the militiaman told you to leave this meant that you had to leave. He did not have to explain to you why. There is quite a lot to think about here! And you dared not to listen and here you are now!

Chairman: I want to tell you, youngsters, stop it! Do not put yourselves in such a horrible situation. Listen to us! We could easily put you behind bars. However, we wish you good....

Both the guilty and the innocent who are standing on that same “carpet,” try to pretend that they are repentant sinners, agreeing with everything they are accused of for the sake of getting out of there, and not find themselves in the reception center and, subsequently, in a worse place. For these dads and uncles could easily do that! And when the children are able to get out of there, they are very pleased to slam the door beyond which stand other unfortunates waiting their turn; these ones run taking with them, naturally, nothing but scorn.

#### Preventive Measures

The first preventive measure is the decision of the commission about registering the individual for preventive militia supervision, under the inspectorate in charge of minors' affairs.

Let us admit it, the militia does not gain anything. It is not for nothing that a significant percentage of those who

have been kept under supervision, after a couple of months, having no intention of amending their behavior, increasingly escape from under the militia's control, preferring simple and accessible consolations, such as drinking and loafing, and the company of those who entirely accept their shortcomings, thus aggravating the already tense situation in streets and backyards. But why? Everything should have been exactly the opposite. The school puts its "failed" students in stronger and more reliable hands, in the hope that they will be given proper supervision. Yet this does not take place. Nor could it! What matters to the militia is that even a purely formal behavior be maintained and that everything remain within the bounds of what is permissible. As to the rest—moral aspect, intellect, and character features—that should be the concern of the school. The only thing that the school is concerned with, however, is for the bad influence not to affect the "good" students, for which reason it does everything possible to throw out those who are registered with the militia.

"Form 22" clearly describes the nature of the preventive work with adolescents by the militia. We find in the item "Reason for Registration," along with items such as "After Release From Place of Incarceration," "For Truancy," and "Gambling," the following: "Other Antisocial Behavior" and "Underline." In the item "Reason for Neglect," after "Negative Influence of Parents," "Lack of Supervision," "Unwillingness to Learn," we find "Other" and "Underline." Most frequently underlined are the items "Other" and "Etc." In items such as "Approval of Public Educator" or "Assigning a Tutor," there either are no notes at all or else the notes are most incredible: enterprise director, city prosecutor, raykom secretary. The same principle is followed in educational work itself, which is reduced to a talk once every 2 weeks. The inspectors concern themselves essentially either with small children or relatively well-behaved children, while older and more experienced ones are ignored. They are left alone until they commit a crime. Furthermore, they themselves have sufficient reasons for having as little to do with the militia as possible.

In June 1988 the collegium of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, which discussed problems of juvenile delinquency, for the first time made the figure public: the militia has files on 500,000 adolescents. According to selective studies, about 65 percent of youngsters who have been processed by the commissions for minors' affairs and who are registered have committed no crime. They have either been truants or been expelled from school. This is a huge army. About 40 percent of students are unwilling to go to school and 67 percent of all teachers try to get rid of those who, in their view, show no interest in studies. Two-thirds of the personnel directly involved in work with children believe that strict educational measures are the most acceptable.

Disobedient and poor students, with whom the educators do not like to deal, are thus put on the same footing as those who have truly violated laws and engaged in thefts, hijacking, beating, and raping. And all this is

occurring on a daily basis, right next door to us. We have become accustomed to it to such an extent that we are not even shocked.

In addition to the fact that such registration is a basic violation of the rights of such children, simply having anything to do with law enforcement authorities, as it becomes an ordinary matter, is fraught with a number of negative psychological consequences. This includes lifting the internal barrier of fear of violating a prohibition and adopting a loose attitude toward universally accepted rules of behavior.

Adolescents aged 16 or older, who have committed a crime, fall into the hands of the justice system. The law not only protects them from improper treatment but also demands that the standards of investigation, interrogation, witness testimony, and the presence of a lawyer are observed. The sentence is passed by a real court. The delinquents are punished according to their crime. Something almost identical is practiced in the case of minors who have disturbed the public order. The indictment, most frequently, comes from the reference issued by the school, which may read as follows: "Not interested in learning. Rude behavior in class. Does not react to remarks. Skips classes. Does not participate in class projects. Tends to engage in immoral acts such as rude language, smoking, collecting foreign labels." The sentence of the commission is to send the child to the special school or the special vocational-technical school. This is the same type of colony and electrified barbed wire, and deprivation of freedom, with the sole difference that it is administered not by the MVD but by the Soviet educational system, although the security of the "site" is fully militarized.

On 13 September 1988 a 15-year old adolescent did not look at the members of the commission in session at the Kuybyshevskiy Rayon in Moscow. This was the sole reason for the youngster to be sent to the special vocational-technical school. Here are the reasons given by some commission members:

**The commission's responsible secretary:** "This youngster is only registered in our rayon. He lives and attends school in Leningradskiy Rayon. That is why we took part in the session essentially for official reasons, making use exclusively of the information provided by Leningradskiy Rayon. The director of studies and the home room teacher spoke. They described the 'exploits' of the boy. You can well imagine that no one could approve of them."

**Rayon deputy prosecutor:** "The boy made a very unfavorable impression on us, for which reason I did not object to the decision. I do not know anything about him in detail and can judge only by what the representatives of the school said. They favored the strictest possible punishment. And since external impressions were most negative, there was nothing else but to agree with the general opinion. True, I did not like the way in which the discussion with the adolescent was held and the way they

addressed him. His objections were ignored. As an accidental member of the commission, I did not dare to speak out. However, all of this is scandalous. But what to do? Better send him to the special vocational-technical school. You call it a jail? But if he stays here, who will deal with him? You realize that in terms of his own school he is a potential enemy and no one would all of a sudden start loving him. No one would be concerned and try to re-educate him."

**Commission chairman:** "Our task was to give him a warning. The teachers are fed up. His situation at home is bad and the school is fed up with him!" But here is the heartfelt statement of the principal of one such special vocational-technical school: "I address myself to all the members of the commissions in charge of minors' affairs, educators, militia personnel, and prosecutors! Order anyone whose job it is to work with problem children. How could you send a child to a special vocational-technical school because of truancy? What about the school itself, where is its own responsibility for the fate of that child? Yes, there are problem children and families in difficulty. However, in not a single one of the children who have come here could one sense that you have fought for the life of this adolescent. What is striking is the scrupulous bookkeeping collection and records of compromising materials aimed at the fastest possible sending of the problem child to a special vocational-technical school."

Yes, it is precisely the attitude toward adolescents as being "the enemy," with whom one should deal "more harshly," that has turned many commissions into tribunals and, at the same time, made the situation of the special correctional institutions catastrophic. Because of lack of space accomplices in real crimes, for whom such establishments were organized, are being released. According to a senior official of the USSR MVD, in 104 of 159 krais, oblasts, and republics no special schools are to be found, and there are special schools in only 122 regions. They were planned even before the "symbiosis" of the militia with the school and no one could anticipate such difficulties at that point.

Today the "competition" for placing someone in a special institution is much greater than in placing a child in a music or physical-mathematical school for especially gifted children. In Tyumen Oblast, for example, where there is not a single special school, in 1988 more than 2,000 adolescents guilty of committing crimes were set free.

Let us add to each group children who are simply unwanted, who are on the road, who neither go to school nor have a job. Thus, there were 4,269 such adolescents in Moscow in 1987 and 7,189 in 1988. The commissions are unable to help them find jobs, which can be done only by mandating authorities. The situation has become especially bad as the enterprises have been converting to cost accounting, for in the past they could more or less deal with such problems. It has become even more difficult to show a semblance of concern on the part of

the voluntary commissions which have total power over the adolescents but are absolutely helpless in dealing with departments.

We are familiar with what one could expect by bringing together, under the roof of the special institution, youngsters who have been accused of truancy and bumming and those who already have "rich experience" and have deliberately chosen a life of crime. What could one expect of such contacts on the street?

In October 1988 the collegium of the USSR State Education passed a resolution on converting some ordinary general education and vocational-technical schools into "special," thus increasing the number of "forced assignment" places. Does this not equate (once again!) prevention of crime with punishment for it?

### What Is To Be Done?

Let us frankly admit that today adolescents undergo such "training" not only in colonies and jails but also long before they get there and that it is we, "the entire world" who lead them into it. We ourselves have made students to hate the schools by creating all the necessary conditions to punish them for this hatred. This kind of zeal does not vanish without a trace. No one is any longer upset by hearing the sad statement that childhood has become as much a pressing problem as the spoiling of the environment. For that reason, we must not blame exclusively the commissions for the rightless situation of minors or the measures they take, for they are merely the executors of our own will, the people who execute it in the last resort. The fact that this is the visible link, the actions of which hinder the positive solution of many pressing problems, is a different matter.

The situation will not change if, as in the past, increasing the capacity of correctional institutions is considered a reserve for protecting the mental and physical health of adolescents. We must seriously take to task the schools in charge of educating the students, but we must also help them.

Each urban and rural district in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR has its psychological-pedagogical consultation services in charge of a certain number of "its own" schools. They have the same rights as state public education institutions and schools. The principle on the basis of which they operate is the timely and the earliest possible detection and subsequent elimination of any difficulty in the development of the child, be it mental, moral or psychological. All of this is based on age and individual features. The number of variants in solving this problem is always equal to the number of patients.

Such concern for the state of the child, who is never ignored but, conversely, always taken into consideration, is continuous. It changes as the children grow up. This trend is noted particularly clearly in the activities of

school psychologists, who deal with the different age groups, based on which they have their own tasks cut out.

With all this, however, the strict rule is observed: doing everything possible not to let the children fall into the hands of the punitive authorities. Almost from the moment that the child is born society becomes concerned with surrounding him with the close attention of specialists in the most humane professions: psychologists, physicians, educators, and sociologists. The moral consequences of such an attitude are difficult to overestimate. Life without unnecessary fears, hurts, and guilt becomes a guarantee for a calm and natural development and growing up, having nothing in common with a situation in which nothing is explained but only dictated and in which the child is doomed merely to a physical survival and that in the best of cases.

In Hungary, for instance, institutions conventionally described as "consultation offices" include their own consultation-correctional services, family-defectology aid to families in trouble, an institute for school psychology, and children's recreation centers.

In Czechoslovakia, diagnostic centers gather under their roof delinquent adolescents in order to establish the extent to which they have deviated from normal development and determine the corresponding actions in places for social rehabilitation (and not in places of deprivation of freedom as is the case in our country!). These are units with a comprehensive program for the upbringing of the young generation, with the participation of all social institutions and social strata and not reduced to separate and fragmented efforts and futile attempts. It is high time to organize in our country as well such a governmental program. The establishment of such centers is a vital necessity for us. However, this is only one side of the matter. The other, equally important, is the daily life of the child and the elimination of the constant feeling of discomfort, deprivation and uselessness.

Meanwhile... not even in Moscow is there a single psychological-pedagogical consultation office or something similar (let us not confuse this with family or marital counseling). To this day the schools have no psychological services. Preventive efforts suffer from the lack of specific approach. No consideration is given to the age and individual characteristics and factors of social development. Meanwhile, we have registration with the militia, which the other countries do not have; nor do they have commissions such as ours.

Every delinquent adolescent must be answerable to the law and not to a group of angry citizens who have been given exceptional rights. A just law-governed society must exist not only for its adult members but for the children as well, to an even greater extent.

We begin to struggle with a great many difficulties once they have become social evils. Anything which motivates the adolescent today—daring, unwillingness to tolerate

an impersonal approach, callousness, and lack of elementary standards—is not an anomaly but a natural reaction of healthy living beings who challenge us, the adults: "Enough just hitting us, start thinking of your own mistakes!" COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

### Vietnam: Toward a New Economic Model

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[Article by Yevgeniya Romenovna Bogatova, candidate of economic sciences, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System]

[Text] The last 15 of the 60 years of activities of the Vietnamese Communist Party have been a time of work under the new relatively peaceful conditions of a united country. Now, in 1990, as we look back at that time segment, we can clearly see a significant evolution of approaches on the part of the Vietnamese leadership to the country's socioeconomic and political development. Gradually, increasingly in both theory and practice, the complexity and variety of processes of social life were recognized, above all in economics, the polyphonic picture of society, and the impossibility of making radical changes with the help of rigid, inflexible, and once and for all chosen guidelines and instruments. The changes affected views on all matters—ownership, management, planning, combining the interests of the center with the local areas, the role and mechanism of relations with socialist and nonsocialist countries, foreign policy, and internal political relations.

Naturally, the evolution of approaches and the actual progress made in Vietnam in these directions have not been uniform. The most noticeable features of new development have been in the economic area, in the economic reform. In 15 years, the concepts of economic building and management covered a difficult road of changes: from effort at directly implementing the "classical" principles of the Stalinist-type transitional period to allowing a real multiplicity of market relations and abandoning the strict priority of heavy industry in structural policy. It was precisely 1989—the last of the 15-year cycle—that became the year of radical conversion to the new model reform in Vietnam.

Already by the end of the 1970s it had become obvious that efforts to carry out radical socialist changes on the basis of the extensive building of heavy industry projects, the accelerated elimination of the private sector, and the statification of most of the production areas and trade had failed. The basic reason for the aggravation of difficulties was the impossibility of implementing the main idea of the old model. There was no "reserve" for production growth in the agrarian area,



from which funds could be extracted for building industrial projects; nor was there any developed export sector as a source of accumulations; there was no "reserve" also in the level of population consumption, which could have been curtailed; above all, there were no premises whatsoever for the extensive use of the factor of noneconomic coercion for labor: people who had spent decades at war were unwilling to tolerate a hard life for the sake of future prosperity.

By the turn of the 1980s the VCP and the Vietnamese government made a decision of crucial importance: to abandon the traditional economic management systems and to undertake an economic reform. The reform was based on three basic areas: granting the provinces and, subsequently, the individual sectors, the right to engage in independent export and import operations on foreign markets, developing contractual relations in the countryside, lifting prohibitions on the free marketing of agricultural "surpluses," and introducing a three-step planning system at state industrial enterprises (with subsequent modifications), which presumed the freedom to sell above-plan goods produced with raw and other materials which had been independently procured on the marketplace.

Obviously, the main contradiction of the economic reform of the 1980s was the efforts made to make the incompatible compatible: the financial autonomy of enterprises, broadened area of internal marketing, and decentralized foreign trade, on the one hand, and a mandatory system of planning, price setting, and state trade (or, rather, distribution) in prime necessity goods and material and technical resources, on the other. Starting with 1983, the initial incentives of the steps taken with the economic reform substantially weakened. There was even a period marked by fluctuations, controversies, and delays in making the necessary decisions. Although no one openly opposed market relations, nonetheless the real possibility of action of a market mechanism as a regulator of the reproduction process was denied. Questions of the natural differentiation among producers under marketplace conditions, rivalry and competitiveness among enterprises of different types and forms of ownership were formulated quite timidly and inconsistently. The wish to eliminate, to block any negative consequences of the market through customary administrative methods could be clearly identified.

Equally characteristic was the fact that in the initial stages of the reform, it was not a question of applying it to the political area and of the inevitable reciprocal influence between economics and politics. The Sixth VCP Congress (1986) provided a major impetus to intensified research. Having reformulated a number of economic problems, for the first time it called for reorganizing the political system. All the proper reasons exist for linking this turn to the influence of the ideology of perestroika in the USSR and the other socialist countries. However, we cannot also fail to see the domestic

origin of the new approaches: the aggravated socioeconomic problems of the mid-1980s demanded the intensification of reforms, for a return to the old "pressure" system was threatened by clear failure. The renovated leadership of the VCP also played an active role. As a whole, most of the leaders were reformers although their preponderance was not definite. The fact that there were certain hesitations and compromises reached among supporters of measures of different degrees of radicalism is confirmed also by the fact that despite the revolutionary nature of the sixth congress, the practical implementation of the resolutions began as late as 1988.

The most important documents which concretized the course of restructuring included the Law on Foreign Capital Investments, the resolutions of the VCP Central Committee Politburo on the policy toward nongovernmental sectors in industry, services, and construction, renovating the management of agriculture, and the respective resolutions passed by the Vietnamese Council of Ministers. The reorganization of the banking system and the system for material and technical supplies and legalizing the existence of a private sector in trade were of great importance. Thanks to these steps, by 1988 the situation in the national economy improved substantially: the pace of inflation was reduced somewhat, the gross harvest of food crops increased, the quality of goods improved, foreign capital was attracted, the activeness of the population was enhanced, and so on.

However, the situation in the areas of economics and management took a truly radical turn only after a set of anti-inflationary steps was adopted. Starting with 1989, a substantially stricter budget policy compared to the past began to be implemented in terms of financing capital construction and the state sector as a whole. The prices of raw and other materials were raised by a factor of nearly eight, to the level of market prices; subsidies were reduced and most of the working capital of enterprises was set on a crediting base. Interest rates were raised sharply in order to attract deposits by enterprises and population and to provide lending funds. In other words, that which throughout the 1980s had prevented the pursuit of an efficient policy of attracting temporarily available funds to be used in national economic circulation was accomplished: the system of low interest rates and inexpensive loans, which depreciated the system of deposits and stimulated excessive demand, was eliminated.

Gold imports and allowing free operations involving gold and precious metals within the country by all economic systems were of major importance in removing depreciated money from circulation. According to various estimates, within a short period of time Vietnam imported about 10 to 15 tons of gold from Hong Kong. The state had certain difficulties in implementing such a policy. As a whole, however, reinforcing the market with gold and its free circulation on the market, along with withdrawing funds through the banks led to a substantial drop in gold prices and stabilized the dong. At the same time, steps were taken to reduce

demand for foreign currency. The main features of the new procedure in the foreign exchange area were setting and maintaining on a market level the current rates of exchange of the dong and main freely convertible currencies, the purchase and sale of foreign exchange based on such rates by enterprises and the population and narrowing the area of direct mandatory planned allocation of foreign exchange.

The lowering of the exchange rates of the dong stimulated exports and enabled organizations exporting on the market to increase their imports, some of which were smuggled. Trade on the northern border—with China—developed intensively. This contributed to a significant increase in the amount of available goods on the market. Competition provided by relatively inexpensive import goods, the prices of which no longer included mark-ups for losses from exports, was a major factor in increasing the difficulties of marketing domestically produced goods. The background against which such trade was carried out also played a substantial role: increased demand for dongs and private investment activities, which became allowed in mid-1988, and the actually unrestricted amounts of output and the hiring of manpower. This created conditions to interest trade not only in the rate of profit per unit commodity but also in terms of volume, i.e., to be able to sell more and at lower prices.

Let us note, furthermore, a step such as the actual elimination of the monopoly on state rice purchases, rationed rice procurements to the cities, and allowing legal private trade in rice. The increased interest of the peasants in production (influenced by the 1988-1989 new forms of contracting and leasing relations) and the bountiful rice crop in 1989 (20 million tons) had a beneficial impact on the food market by increasing supply and reducing fictitious demand. Filling the market with foodstuffs and the stabilization of and even drop in rice prices also led to the lowering of prices of industrial goods; correspondingly, the problem of marketing by industrial sectors related to agriculture became aggravated.

Therefore, the set of measures related to the new policy which were implemented had different consequences. On the one hand, the situation on the market improved. It became richer and less expensive. The dizzying drop in the real income of people employed in the state sector and other individuals with fixed salaries came to an end. On the other, there was a decline in business activities and a worsened dynamics of production and turnover, particularly in the state sector, and an aggravation of the problems of marketing and availability of funds for continued production-economic activities and for the employment of workers and employees.

In an effort successfully to solve the problem of commodity marketing and procuring funds for production activities, many enterprises started looking for new markets within the country and abroad and reducing production costs, which included reducing the number of

workers, introducing technical innovations, respecializing in other areas, organizing individual production facilities on the basis of independent cost accounting, improving advertising, expanding relations with consumers, floating stocks and bonds, and engaging in joint economic activities with enterprises operating under different systems.

The study of this kind of "overproduction crisis" and the steps taken to resolve it indicate the difficulty of the problem and the possible contradictory consequences. The standstill and unhealthy phenomena in the Vietnamese economy had developed over many years. Actually, the entire history of inflation in the postwar period was one of intensified decline: a production growth paralleling a much faster growth of reserves, increased reciprocal indebtedness among enterprises, oversaturation of consumers with goods and resources, stimulating their wasteful use, and a growing deficit. All of this undermined monetary circulation, and created discontent among the population.

The drastic lowering of payments to support such a system by the state budget, along with the simultaneous increase in the availability of gold, the reduced cost of imported goods and rice, and siphoning off available funds through a policy of interest rates all contributed to bringing the Vietnamese economy into a state of shock from which it has been unable to recover to this day. However, the recovery process has been initiated and its main result has been the fast chain development of reduced industrial demand, improved efficiency of consumer demand for food products, and structural channeling of overall solvent demand into other goods.

A partial solution of the overproduction crisis can be seen also in the gaining of new markets and in the reorganization of the production structure. Under the influence of the aggravated difficulties, one of the last bastions of the administrative-distribution system—the allocation of goods to consumers—was eliminated. As a result of the insolvency of consumers, supply enterprises were given the right to sell their goods to solvent customers, including private individuals.

The brief history of the post-shock development of the Vietnamese economy is also a history of gradual strengthening of the state sector which, however, was not always promptly updated. Harsh conditions faced it with the need to seek more efficient methods of organization and activities. The state provided tangible aid to the enterprises by applying protective measures: interest rates on loans were lowered and so was the turnover tax. This is the equivalent of subsidizing many weak enterprises at the expense of other.

Today it is still difficult to determine confidently whether the state will not have to retreat in terms of the strictness of measures set for the enterprises. The view which is spreading among economic managers is that the market is exerting an excessively strong influence on production and undermining the planned nature of the

economy. They admit that one should continue to advance toward a market, to develop competition and to master such instruments. Nonetheless, they believe that enterprises should not be allowed to become involved into a "purely market process without a plan."

Market components, such as money and commodity and exchanges through which one could follow the situation on the market, demand information about clients and suppliers and, on this basis, formulate a plan, are still being mentioned very timidly. The accurate reference to the helplessness of the majority of enterprises in organizing the marketing of their products leads many of them to seek their salvation in the strengthening of the old state functions.

Virtually no one is raising the question of the possibility of destatification of the state sector. The emphasis is on its restructuring on the basis of commercial principles and improving cadre work, etc. A number of economists have spoken out in favor of destatification and even privatization. Arguments on this subject took place, at the initial stage, at the highest power levels in Vietnam. Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the VCP Central Committee, emphasized at the Seventh VCP Central Committee Plenum (August 1989) that destatification is an option unacceptable to Vietnam. Today the emphasis is on the evolutionary nature of the restructuring of the state sector.

With every passing day the need for the theoretical interpretation of the changes occurring in society is becoming increasingly pressing. The VCP has recruited an large number of scientists and public figures in formulating a party program and a long-term socioeconomic strategy for the country's development. Life is raising increasingly new questions. The most difficult among them are the interconnection between economic and sociopolitical changes. At the present stage, the VCP Central Committee general secretary noted, it is precisely the economy, the economic reform, that is considered the key link and it is precisely in this area that profound changes are taking place. Democracy in the economy is the main thing. In the political area, a course was charted toward enhancing and democratizing the activities of the elected power authorities—the National Assembly, and the people's councils—improving and renovating cadre policy, conducting a social dialogue, and promoting the democratization of the party. Meanwhile, in the view of the VCP leadership, political pluralism, in terms of a multiparty system, is unacceptable to Vietnam. Fast political changes, the Seventh VCP Central Committee Plenum noted, could lead to undermining political stability, which would harm economic changes as well.

In celebrating the 60th anniversary of the founding of their party, the Vietnamese communists, supported by the broad toiling strata, are approaching with full responsibility the solution of the difficult problems which are facing society in the course of its historical development. The latest events in China and in Eastern Europe have

met with a lively reaction in Vietnam and provided additional impetus for enhancing the debate on the ways of renovation of the VCP, protecting and strengthening its vanguard role, and ways of preventing sharp conflicts within society without hindering the developing reform. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### **Paradigms of Socialism in Europe, History and Contemporaneity**

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[Theses by Thomas Mayer, director of the Gustav Heineman Academy (FRG)]

[Text] *KOMMUNIST* asked Thomas Mayer, director of the Gustav Heineman Academy (FRG) to acquaint our readers with the theoretical studies being conducted within the Socialist International. Doctor Mayer was kind enough to offer the editors his theses which, in our view, provide an idea of the studies conducted by the social democrats, an evaluation of the distance covered and the models they have developed for the future structure of the world.

The theses are published with minor cuts.

It is our profound conviction that democratic socialism is one of the major ideological, cultural and political achievements of Europe. It has provided new opportunities for the self-assertion of Europe and for general European cooperation. This is becoming all the more real considering that in the eastern part of our continent the ideas of the rights of man, pluralism, debureaucratization and the ideas of democracy and social self-determination are beginning to play an ever increasing role in the activities of the communist parties. The dialogue among democratic socialists could, in the near future, become a dialogue which links East with West. The democratic socialists, who are trying to implement a socially responsible policy aimed at the future, must promote dialogue, reciprocal understanding and coordinated actions if they wish to follow the common course, the course of social activeness and practical change. In these theses I discuss some new ideas formulated by our movement for Europe, in the political rather than geographic sense. When I speak of Europe I have in mind the EEC, NATO, Western Europe and even Europe of the Helsinki Process, which includes, in addition to the Soviet Union, Canada and the United States.

In our difficult times it is no longer possible for any single central political problem to be resolved within national boundaries. An efficient domestic all-European policy, which is needed today, would be inconceivable without a common program on the key problems of activities of socialist parties in Europe.

Anyone who realistically looks at the realities of the industrial society and our world as a whole will clearly realize that under the conditions of the contemporary

economic and ecological crisis our future cannot be a "by-product" of a policy of tolerance in the technical, industrial and economic areas. Such a policy would cause irreparable harm to prerequisites for the further physical survival of the people, social peace in our countries and foundations of the social conditions of a life worthy of man. Progress will have a future only when it is being implemented with full responsibility in both the social and ecological areas. In my view, democratic socialism is the type of European force which can accomplish this thanks to the scope of its understanding of the universal good, firmness of social positions and skill of the majority. This is both an opportunity and a great responsibility.

Allow me to formulate the crucial problems which arise in this connection and to trace the development of the programmatic ideas of the European socialist parties, so that I may define our possibilities of finding joint answers to them. Let me point out that, from the very beginning, inherent in the programmatic concepts and policies of the various socialist parties in Europe was a specific noncoincidence, based on cultural traditions, levels of economic renovation and features of the domestic situation in the individual countries. In order to gain a general idea of the ways and means of democratic socialism ever since the start of the international labor movement, we must have an idea of the three major conceptual debates on paradigms—totalities of theoretical and methodological prerequisites for scientific studies—which have occurred in this movement. Today, in my view, we find ourselves at the **initial stage of the fourth major debate on the historical paradigm**. Having an adequate idea of the nature of the three paradigms discussed in the past, we can determine the nature of the debates concerning the programmatic stipulations, currently taking place in the individual socialist parties in Western Europe, and find an explanation for the differences within the European labor movement between its communist and social democratic parts.

It is important to remember that in defining the main programmatic objective, throughout the history of the European socialist movement there have been no differences and contradictions among the various socialist parties or the socialist movement as a whole. I am referring to the intention of replacing the capitalist social order with a new, a better social system in which everyone would truly enjoy equal freedom not only in political but also in social and economic life. There have also never been any serious differences concerning the fact that equal freedom for all is identical to comprehensive democratization, ranging from political decision-making to the organization of social relations. Marxist and revisionist trends have always been unanimous in defining this programmatic objective.

In the course of the debates on the paradigms of European socialism, which I would like to mention, not only the basic values and standards were discussed but so were strategy and medium-term models of socialist policy. To this day they generate direct interest.

The **first** major debate on paradigms took place within the International Association of Workers (the First International), between anarchists and Marxists, in the 1860s and 1870s. It developed on the question of what road should lead to a free socialist society: taking over state power or creating an independent society within the state and, subsequently, through the destruction of the existing state. At that time it was a question of whether the state was able, in general, to assist in social self-determination or, as Proudhon and Bakunin invariably emphasized in their critique of Marx' theory and programmatic concepts, in the final account it could only shift the role of guardian of society from capitalism to the state bureaucracy. This was a confrontation between a fictitious concept of the objective and a realistic yet, to many people, debatable strategy. The Marxists supported their position on the main problem with the following argument: prerequisites for the right conditions for a joint life of people can be created in society only when the state, as a force organized within the framework of the entire society, becomes concerned with abolishing the private ownership of means of production.

Furthermore, from the very beginning the socialist theory formulated, as is particularly emphasized in Marxist theory, the paradoxical double requirement: to achieve the self-determination of man in labor and, at the same time, to achieve the rational organization of overall social relations. Attaining the final objective, which appeared as the most important socialist counter-utopia, opposing the anarchism of the capitalist market, was conceived of being nothing other than a way of having the central state assume the task of coordinating existing overall social relations.

This initial major discussion of paradigms was very binding to the socialist parties of Europe. It left even deeper marks than the Second International, which was founded in 1889, which rallied all the parties willing to join it and which assumed certain obligations in defining the labor movement's way to the liberation of man. Let me point out that today, in the face of the new problems within some European countries, the debate on the problems raised by anarchism is once again becoming topical. The question of a radical renovation of relations between the civil society and the political state is being quite clearly formulated in contemporary programs also in the discussion of programmatic concepts, as is the case, for instance, in the ranks of French, Italian, Austrian, Dutch and German social democrats.

The **second** broad discussion on paradigms began in the 1880s-1890s. To this day it is continuing in a number of socialist parties. It is related above all to Eduard Bernstein and the concept of "revisionism." However, even earlier it had assumed a clearly manifested nature in England, within the Fabian Society, in Italy and elsewhere. At that time attention was focused on the following: Could a complex capitalist economy, in the course of implementing the reform strategy, gradually turn into a socialist society, or would the creation of a

socialist alternative be initiated only after capitalism and its way of acting and logic had collapsed? By then many reformists were satisfied with the fact that their parties supported reform strategy in practice while in theory developing the programmatic ideas of the "defenders of the pure doctrine." However, the revisionists went farther. They wanted to ascribe a qualitatively new trend to the development of the theory and programmatic stipulations in order to ensure unity between theory and practice, which was the only means of systematically implementing reform strategy.

Their main argument was that in a highly organized industrial society, although a capitalist one, due to organizational and sociological reasons the only possibility was the gradual transformation of economic and social relations, consistent with the new requirements. The requirements of solidarity, democratization and coordination of all social life and self-determination could be implemented under the conditions of a highly organized society only gradually, step-by-step, in the course of the reorganization of existing structures. Any attempt at interrupting this gradual development would threaten the fundamental results of the reproduction process.

The revisionists added to this that the socialist reorganization of the economy of a highly organized industrial society would in no case lead to the total replacement of private ownership of means of production and market controls, for otherwise, given the development level which had already been attained in the Western European countries, this would have entailed the bureaucratic suppression of social relations, slowed down the dynamics of economic development and the growth of labor productivity, and restricted the possible participation of all members of society in solving production problems.

The Marxists pitted their own arguments against these considerations. They claimed that without a definitive break with the logic of the capitalist market and the use of capital, all social and economic reforms of the socialists would, in the final account, be adapted by the ruling system to its own needs and would only extent its existence instead of contributing to its elimination.

This split in the strategy of economic transformation drastically divided, and still do, the thinking, range of programmatic ideas and, to a lesser extent, the activities of European socialist parties. For example, the **concept of functional socialism** became widespread in the socialist parties in the Scandinavian countries, Great Britain, Austria, Switzerland and the German Federal Republic. This meant a return to the traditions of the Fabian Society, the tradition of the Swedish socialists and revisionists. This means that the problem of the forms of ownership is no longer the focal point of socialist strategy. A leading role is assigned to the differentiated impact of various social bodies on the actual economic **law of disposal** while retaining the essential elements of

market control and private ownership of the most important economic sectors. This concept also means that although the requirement of socialization of economic functions remains, such socialization could take place in a variety of forms of governmental standard organization and democratic participation in management, virtually independent of the private form of ownership.

Conversely, the socialist strategy in the Western European countries in the Mediterranean area and, subsequently, in Great Britain, for quite some time (and, to a certain extent, to this day) was oriented toward the theory of **breaking with capitalist logic**. According to this theory, it was only after the legal socialization of the key industrial sectors, and after the creation of a ruling social sector and mandatory use of the advantages of state planning that the alternate economic logic would begin to function, as the only one which could be considered socialist.

In other words, the reformist strategy considers socialism a process, specifically a process of reorganization of comprehensive economic and social structures, consistent with the socialist demands of self-determination, democracy and coordination on the scale of the entire society. Conversely, the Marxist strategy of transformation looks at socialism rather as a specific combination of public ownership with state planning. Such a combination can be achieved only after the logic of capitalism has been rejected.

The second argument about paradigms was resolved by the European socialist parties in the course of time by three different means. While the socialist parties in Northern Europe favored, in both theory and practice, a strategy of functional socialism, the socialist parties in Central Europe, before world war II, the German social democrats and the Austrians above all, combined a reformist practice with its conflicting revolutionary rhetoric on the subject of breaking with the logic of capitalism. To the best of my understanding, the socialist parties in France and Greece and the British Labor Party are now considering as the central point of their programs the alternate economic logic of socialism.

It was only in the 1950s that the majority of socialist parties in Central and Northern Europe adopted, almost simultaneously, a new program for action in which, for the first time after decades of painful arguments, the expediency of a socialist reform strategy was accepted. It is true that this argument about the paradigm in the majority of the parties kept breaking out again and again and was the reason for differences, becoming the main item on the agenda particularly during periods of crises.

The **third** paradigm dispute led to a division of the labor movement into two trends: socialist and communist. The discussion was focused on whether a "dictatorship of the proletariat" was necessary in order to ensure the fundamental transformation of society, or else were democracy and socialism identical, so that any retreat



from democracy also meant a retreat from socialist traditions, as the democratic socialists claimed.

In this argument about the paradigm, it was not in the least a question, as had been claimed in the past, of the role which Marxist theory or economic socialization should play in socialist policy. It was exclusively a question of the role of democracy and pluralism in socialist policy. Today, when under the influence of perestroika, within the Soviet Union itself and in some Eastern European countries, once again the question of "dictatorship" is being discussed and, in all likelihood, will be resolved in favor of pluralism and democracy, this paradigmatic discussion unexpectedly and in a new way links part of the communist world with the world of democratic socialism. The fact that despite all differences in the approaches to the organization of economic democracy, which would become identical to democratic socialism of the Western model, i.e., the unquestionable acceptance of political and social democracy, it is a though gradually the distinguishing criterion will disappear. Therefore, the likelihood appears of a new European discussion on the objectives and ways of socialism. It is at this point that we take up the **fourth** historical paradigm on the subject of which a broad debate has developed within our movement. One could see this even if one is only vaguely familiar with the discussions concerning the program within the Socialist International, discussions within the Association of Socialist Parties of the European Community and the debates on programmatic stipulations, which are taking place in virtually all European socialist parties. Actually, it is a question of a problem which is described in many European countries as a "crisis of progress," and which has exposed an entire layer of political problems which, so far, have played no role whatsoever in our discussions. All of a sudden, they have become primary, politically basic problems on the agendas not only of the socialist parties but of the public at large in many European industrialized societies. They include the concept of economic growth, the threat to the ecology, the management of technology by society, the future of the labor world, the socially responsible production of energy, new individualism, new forms of universal security and unparalleled scale of internationalization.

This list proves that the topic of the debates constitutes, to say the least, a model of industrial civilization, as a hypothesis of the creation of a new society based on democratic socialism. In the final account, we are discussing the type of model of scientific and technical civilization and domination of nature which would coincide with the plan for building a society of freedom and equality, which would jointly determine its own nature. One of the essential differences in the debates on the programmatic concepts of the European socialist parties is manifested already on the symbolic level. It has far-reaching consequences. The center of the new paradigmatic discussion is held by the problems of **protecting the natural foundations of human life, public control over dangerous technologies, and the risky policy of threats—the political threat of the use of mass destruction weapons.**

Some socialist parties in Central and Northern Europe have included them in their programs as problems of prime significance. These parties function in societies in which the scientific-individual potential of renovation has reached its peak and in which ecological movements or parties are able to mobilize a significant percentage of their country's population which supports a leftist orientation. The socialist parties see in the new threats a risk and a potential threat to the very foundations of the physical existence of mankind. It is a question, so to say, of a **new revisionism**. In this case, the essence is not the gradual implementation of reforms but the reconstruction of a model of industrial civilization.

As a result of such a shift of political demands, the basic values of democratic socialism, measured on the scale of the socialist renovation of societal, political and economic living conditions, are broadened, on an equal or even a priority basis, by the requirement of protecting the basic prerequisites for human existence. This is also influencing the economic policy of the socialist parties, emphasizing the importance of correlating policies in the areas of ecology, technical development and economic growth.

On the level of Realpolitik this means a revision of the political course in the areas of technical development, economics and culture in the light of the new formulation of problems of environmental protection, and a critical-rational attitude toward the use of new equipment and technology and problems of disarmament. As a result, noticeable changes have taken place in the systems of coordinates of general policies in defining the programmatic stipulations of some socialist parties although, let us point out, the extent and depth of the **new revisionism** of the socialist parties in Central and Northern Europe vary a great deal.

New political requirements have been clearly formulated in the programs of the Portuguese, Spanish, Greek and French socialist parties and in a number of documents of the British Labor Party. However, these parties do not intend to undertake a dramatic re-evaluation of the foundations of the socialist plan for progress on the basis of a new experience different from the one of the past. They are introducing in their economic programs a variety of additions and corrections.

The decisive significance in the programmatic self-awareness of the parties is explained not only by the actual level of the industrial and technological renovation of the national economies in the two groups of European countries but also the fact that the ecological movements and the "green" parties are less developed in the southern part of the continent than in the countries of the northern group.

The "density" of industrialization and the geographic location of said countries substantially influence the way they formulate problems of the critical perception of progress and the time of their formulation and degree of radicalism. For example, in this case it matters whether

all neighboring countries are industrial or if only some of them are. In programs as, actually, in Realpolitik, in any case in the social self-expression of the parties, such a different redistribution of emphases, which underscores the extent of the risk caused by traditional dynamics of progress, is quite plainly manifested.

Labor's future appears differently in the programs of the different parties. In the Netherlands, Austria and the FRG discussions on this topic are closely related to those of the emancipation of women.

The different interpretations of the concept of "productive labor" are the apple of discord between some social democrats and the majority of trade unions in the FRG. Taking into consideration the changed conditions of competitiveness after the establishment of the European domestic market, the vice-president of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, for example, spoke out in favor of further expanding the practice of sliding schedules of days off and an unnormed working day. This initiative has the same purpose as the challenge hurled at the parties to find new forms of individualization of labor. The trade unions have accepted this challenge and are struggling only for the adoption of sliding schedules of days off and the practice of flexible forms of labor within the limits of already concluded collective contracts. In the course of their debates on the programs, the other parties in the Northern European countries have come closer to acknowledging the need for making extensive use of flexible forms of labor.

The remaining differences in the policies and content of the programs are based not only on the class, historical and strategic differences in the views of the European socialist parties; they also depend on their understanding of progress. These differences are also manifested in debates on defense policy. The French socialists, together with some groups belonging to other socialist parties, consider the policy of nuclear threat a reliable guarantee for peace. Several years ago the socialist parties in the Netherlands and the FRG and the Swedish and Austrian social democrats reached the view that an end must be put to the policy of threats and that nuclear and other mass destruction weapons must be gradually eliminated. Only thus could a lengthy peace be secured in Europe and throughout the world. Many Western European NATO members consider the disarmament process agreed upon between East and West and the retooling of defense structures, preserving their strictly defensive purpose, an approach to the creation of a system of general security in Europe, which could dispense with the policy of threats and mass destruction means in guaranteeing peace for the nations.

One of the most interesting problems is that of the ability of most social democratic parties in a future Europe is their attitude toward the new individualism concerning collective forms of cohesive actions and the formulation of programs, taking into consideration the lessons of history and based on the principles of democratic socialism.

From the viewpoint of their ability to form alliances and majorities, the European socialist parties find themselves in a touchy situation. The development of the economy and the social structures in many countries, particularly in those in which a conversion to a society of services has become extensively developed, led to a substantial increase in the individualized nature of labor. Even if manifestations of social inequality in such a society could be suppressed to a certain extent, the substantial improvement in living standard and the increased opportunity to acquire and continue with one's education and the elimination of neutral (intermediary) social organizations for solidarity such as, for example, the specific shapes of the lower levels of the subculture, lead to unparalleled individualization of the way of life, and opportunities for success and for making choices. More than ever before, this depends on the individual: his happiness is in his own hands, from top to bottom, reaching the skilled laborer and the petty white collar worker, providing that he can professionally determine his path in life and follow it. He feels himself a particle of an atom, an individual facing society on a one-to-one basis, opposing it and as responsible for the way he can implement his opportunities and make his way in life and, in the final account, for what he can become and the use he makes of the various opportunities afforded to him by society, whether on a planned or unplanned basis.

This new process of individualization is clearly realized by both the individual and society. It is less obvious to either that the opportunities for a choice and the fields of action offered to the blue and white collar workers and petty owners, students, etc., are the result of political successes. The latter could be achieved through a variety of ways. Possibilities of obtaining and continuing with one's education, social assistance and unemployment compensations, access to the values of culture, medical services, use of transportation and housing, rights at the enterprise and participation in management, prohibition of unjustified dismissal and protection of tenant interests (to mention just a few cases) are the result of collective achievements. Put together, they constitute the initial base on which the socially and economically unsecured strata could, in general, use the opportunities offered to them to develop their personalities and make choices. Wherever such collective gains, which are not always easily attained, disappear from the vision of the main characters, any modern individualized existence could turn, on a mass scale, into individualized self-awareness. Such an awareness is no longer related to collectively formulated and jointly approved political plans, for the belief exists that such plans are no longer necessary for the professional activities of the individual and his social and private life.

Neoconservatives and liberals make quite clever use of this "pseudoreal conclusion" in all European industrial nations in promoting skillful ideological campaigns in the name of individual freedom and against collectivistic political concepts supported by the socialist parties. It is

thanks to this "pseudorealistic conclusion" about individualized life that such propaganda campaigns meet with a broad response. Particularly receptive to them are workers in the so-called privileged professions in services, whose share in the main trend of development in the progressive industrial countries, away from the production sectors and leaning toward information and services, is steadily increasing.

The result is that an exceptionally important challenge has been hurled at the policies and effectiveness of the majority of socialist parties, for the main item of their program is the demand for providing through collective efforts opportunities for an active life in the socially and economically weak and underpaid strata. The Dutch and German socialists and the supporters of the Kinnock Platform in the British Labor Party, have drawn similar conclusions from this conflicting and equivocal situation: primitive collectivistic counterpropaganda will not be fruitful. It will not bring any success or usefulness to the socialist parties, the more so since the socialist values are not aimed at restricting the individuality in favor of collectivistic forms of life but are aimed at ensuring conditions for the kind of individual types of activities and labor which, enjoying equal right in the self-discovery of the individual, could be socially acceptable and tolerable to all other.

The strategy of a majority, as proclaimed by the socialist parties, will be successful only when it will become consistent with the obvious aspiration of the people to develop their individual self-awareness and to broaden the opportunities for their individual activities. Furthermore, in the study of crises and problems which arise as a result of reduced social opportunities, it is necessary to prove persistently, clearly and convincingly, based on practical examples, the type of collectivistic achievements which truly anticipate and directly help to provide scope for individual actions. The policy pursued in education, the labor market, the right to work, housing, transportation, environmental protection and culture is the one through which this can be achieved, for social relations under situations of crisis are manifested in these areas more thoroughly and in their unadulterated aspect. They penetrate into the private, pseudoindividualized, life and are perceived as real power, as a counterbalance to individual self-awareness. The real programmatic concepts and political foundations of a trustworthy campaign among the masses throughout Europe, in the course of which the socialist parties present themselves as the true defenders of the individualization of life's opportunities, an individualization which is socially consistent, acceptable and tolerable to others and operates on a long-term basis, and in the course of which the ideological conflicting nature of conservative and neoliberal positions can be exposed have, in my view, three premises.

Naturally, the **first** is that the higher-skilled people in services, the technical elite and the masters of culture, whose self-awareness and experience are the first to be

embodied in the new individualization, must acknowledge that the programs and policies of the socialist parties offer them good and reliable prospects for professional activities and success in life and in their personal careers.

The **second** is that the socialist parties should not crowd their programs with collectivistic rhetoric, the purpose of which would be to insinuate that the actions of the centralized government and the solution of problems by the state are the only true strategy for social change.

The **third** means that relations between the state and society must be redefined by the possibilities of decentralized social actions and political interference. Without abandoning the traditional and still relevant claims of the socialist parties to the effect that in a society in which economic and social inequality exists, by using its power the democratic state creates equal life opportunities for all, it is also necessary to redefine the attitude of independently acting organizations within the civil society and state "restraints," decentralized social activities and the actions of the centralized state. Nonmandatory and noncentralized governmental forms of activity acquire a new significance. Changes in the forms of cooperation between the state and society and the individual and a group of individuals, on the one hand, and governmental administration, on the other, become an essential factor. The dilemma of the new strategy of democratic socialism lies in the following: on the one hand, as in the past, it must defend collective strategy as a major point of its program and draw to it the attention of the people, so that the people who hire out their labor, organized in trade unions, can extract from the productive social area an entire stratum of interests. At the same time, democratic socialism must earmark in its policies new forms of combining collective actions and opportunities for individual action and accurately express and codify this in its program, in accordance with the social status and self-awareness of individualized new middle strata. Such a policy would prevent a hopeless formulation of excessive demands of the state toward itself, a state ruled by social democrats, for this state within a society which is becoming increasingly complex, becomes increasingly unable to fulfill functions of direct and comprehensive coordination.

While the concept of a direct collective strategy has assumed a central position, in one form or another, striking in all programs of European socialist parties is the lack of combination, one could say of "coupling" of individual values with past collectivistic achievements. An interesting answer to this question is found in the fundamental program of the Austrian Socialist Party with its concept of "new federalism," which offers new forms of cooperation between the civil society and the political state. Starting with the 1980s, the Italian Socialist Party began to stand out by formulating the theme of the new individualism although, it is true, abandoning the classical theme of the labor movement—collective action. Possibly the extensive use of a successful model for employment and a social welfare state,

developed by the Swedish social democrats, is limited by the circumstance that the cultural sensitizing of the topic of the new individualism in the other European societies is perhaps not taken into consideration to the extent to which this is necessary. In the course of debates within the Social Democratic Party of Germany, for example, it is a question of the socialist principle of "subsidies," which, although not as a concept but as a question raised in the introduction to the Irseer draft new program, is found in its documents.

It is precisely this ability or inability to formulate the problems anew that makes it possible to sense the new tensions which are emerging in many countries between socialist parties and trade unions as representatives of the old labor movement. A great many people are already speaking of the "end of the labor movement," for the once relatively closed formation consisting of the trade union movement, the labor parties and the labor cultural movement, is being destroyed. It is yielding to the new social formations; socialist people's parties are being formed, which influence the work of trade unions; independent trade unions are appearing and the old labor cultural movement is disappearing, with far-reaching consequences.

Parties such as, for example, the British Labor Party, closely connected to the nucleus of industrial trade unions, are experiencing incredible difficulties in developing a reliable concept of universal well-being. Parties which try to assume such positions without coordinating this with the trade unions risk to disrupt the alliance between trade unions and social democrats, without which most of the reforms which are part of the socialist strategy cannot be implemented. This conclusion is based on the recent experience of the FRG. However, since the trade unions themselves try to involve the representatives of the new middle classes, among whom the social democratic parties recruit their voters, the coordination of the efforts of the politicians from the socialist parties and the trade unions on this matter would hardly be affected, in the final account, by basic considerations, once the new problem is seriously perceived as truly existing and fated to remain with us for a long time.

I have highlighted the basic differences in the development of programmatic concepts, based on the different experience and level of development of the individual European countries. As a whole, these differences in the individual concepts of the program for action and plans for the future, as formulated by the European socialist parties in the last decade, have substantially diminished compared with the past. Since, in my view, the understanding of many essential problems is influenced by time differences in development, in the future they will become even less important.

At the present time, as the content of the program of the Alliance of Socialist Parties of the European Community indicates, as do the discussions on the programmatic stipulations, taking place in the individual countries, a

high degree of agreement has been reached by democratic socialists on major political problems. If they succeed in applying this agreement for good and take to the **European public their ideas in a form easy to remember**, and successfully enhance their activities in individual political areas, they could formulate a common project for the future in the course of their political offensive against neoconservative-liberal forces and alternate "green" movements and parties.

This common project for the future, earmarked by the democratic socialists in Europe, would restore their ideological and political hegemony, in my view, only when it will proceed from the following guiding political ideas-slogans:

1. For a social and ecological renovation of an industrial civilization in Europe.
2. For building social welfare states in Europe as one of the important productive forces for social peace, for the sake of achieving equal opportunities for all on the social and regional levels.
3. For a socially responsible use of new industrial technologies.
4. For economic democracy under the conditions of a mixed economy, which would determine, on a European scale, the political framework for the development of markets.
5. For a new social standard of daily life as a counterbalance to the technical alienation and commercialization of leisure time standards.
6. For a policy of full employment, based on an ecologically oriented policy of economic growth and a shortening of working time on a European scale.
7. For women's equality through the just distribution of production and nonproduction labor between men and women.
8. For the individualism of solidarity, through which collective achievements contribute to the self-identification and expression of the individual.
9. For a new practical solidarity with the countries of the South, through the implementation of a new policy and opening the European markets to their products.
10. For a common European democracy, which would combine centralized coordination and decision making with decentralized and regional self-determination.

Such a new accord in views on progress already exists in its essential features. Despite these agreements related to current problems, it should be supported by broadening the dialogue among European socialists. The European socialists have covered a long historical road in developing their doctrines and new thinking. They have had to surmount differences which appeared as a result of the insufficient dialogue and in the course of the dialogue.

However, whenever such differences were based on different traditions and circumstances, their essence was made clear, everything useful they contained was extracted and made available to all. The new agreement in views on progress can be achieved as a result of looking the changed reality of our time through the lens of the great fundamental ideas of democratic socialism. We need an intensive dialogue on a European scale. The founding of a single European socialist party would be a major step in this direction. It would decisively enhance the opportunities of a future democratic socialism in Europe. No better future could be desired for Europe. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

#### Requiem for History

905B00170 Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 3, Feb 90 (signed to press 2 Feb 90) pp 122-125

[Article by V. Kuvaldin, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] The article by Francis Fukuyama "The End of History?" which was published in the American quarterly *NATIONAL INTEREST*, immediately became the focal point of attention of the Western public and political circles. Initial reactions to it also appeared in the Soviet press. An abridged translation of the article was published by the weekly *ZA RUBEZHOM* (No 51, 1989).

Obviously, a fortuitous development of circumstances created a general interest. It would be difficult to ignore such an effective heading, with which the new issue of a prestigious journal opens. Also intriguing is the personality of the author: he is affiliated with one of the most authoritative "braintrusts" as deputy director of the Political Planning Office of the U.S. Department of State. From the very first lines the reader is plunged into an atmosphere of intellectual comfort and spiritual coziness. The "cold war" has ended.... In the course of a fierce ideological struggle against absolutism, fascism and Marxism, liberalism has achieved a total and definitive victory.... The thousands of years of search by mankind for the most advanced forms of social organization have been crowned by the creation of the modern Western society and state.... Having fulfilled its purpose, history has come to its end.

Relatively short, sharp, trying to see in the kaleidoscopic events powerful tectonic shifts of universal-historical scale, the article by F. Fukuyama raised a real storm, although it also triggered a great deal of criticism. Increasingly, it is being used as an argument in debates among scientists, journalists, public figures and politicians. I believe that this is not simply a due to intellectual fashion or the desire to earn propaganda points. The author has touched upon many sensitive strings of global politics and created a strong echo in the social mind.

Despite the strict and blunt nature of its ideological structure, the article requires a serious discussion.

In the world of political experts, Fukuyama belongs to a rare untamed breed. He is a Neo-Hegelian. Indeed, it would be difficult to assume that one of the fundamental criteria of the American foreign policy department would be to trust in the decisive power of ideas in the course of historical development. Nonetheless, such is the case, and the author begins his presentation with an expanded theoretical introduction which provides a very original interpretation to the Hegelian philosophy of history. Fukuyama easily turns Hegel into the spiritual father of contemporary liberalism, prophetically predicting its complete and definitive triumph. It is not easy to find in the intellectual portrait painted by the author the real features of the philosopher who, toward the end of his life, became a defender of the Prussian monarchy. Everything seems to indicate that Fukuyama was not all that concerned with consistency with the original model. He bases his interpretation of Hegel on the works of A. Kozhev, who was born in Russia and who delivered in the 1930s in Paris a series of lectures on the "*Phenomenology of the Spirit*." Subsequently, these lectures were published in a separate book in French and English. Kozhev's audience included future famous people such as J.-P. Sartre and R. Aron. One of his admirers was Fukuyama. Such is the strange path traveled by ideas in the contemporary world, according to which the great German philosopher, as interpreted by a Russian philosopher, captured the imagination of the young American diplomat of Japanese descent. Indeed, no one can anticipate the reaction to one's words.

We cannot fail to assess properly the originality of the author's approach. In the pragmatically oriented materialistic way of life of American civilization, justifiably proud of its achievements in this area, he gives priority to ideas, to the spiritual principle. With iconoclastic enthusiasm he attacks the excessive materialism of P. Kennedy's definitive study, familiar to many Soviet readers, of the "*Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*," which was deservedly praised in academic circles and which became a best-seller (see *KOMMUNIST* No 17, 1988).

Systematically promoting his viewpoint, Fukuyama emphasizes the general prerequisites for economic growth developed in the area of culture. In arguing with scientists and journalists rallied around the *WALL STREET JOURNAL*, the rulers of the mind of business America, he tries to make the economic behavior of individuals part of the cultural matrix of the society. Thus, in highlighting the profound reasons for the upsurge in entrepreneurial activities in the Far East, the author emphasizes the importance of spiritual traditions, moral standards, work ethics, thrift, strong family ties, etc.

Fukuyama remains loyal to himself also when he writes about most important events of the past decade, such as the economic and political reforms in China and the



USSR. He views them as the conscious choice made by the national elite in favor of a new path of development, according to which the "Catholic" model of poverty and stability was preferred to the "Protestant" aspiration to take risk and accumulate wealth. One could argue with the author about the extent to which this formula, borrowed from M. Weber, represents the nature of what is taking place. It is unquestionable, however, that ideological and psychological factors play a key role in the renovation of the socialist world.

Although properly acknowledging ideological motivations, Fukuyama does not forget the real, the earthly interests. He emphasizes that political liberalism has assumed real power, combined with the "universal consumption society." Furthermore, in the eyes of the entire world it is precisely Western material abundance that has become the best argument in favor of liberal ideas. The blending of rights and freedoms of the individual with a high level of prosperity, triggered by it, has laid the foundations of the "universal homogeneous state."

The actual establishment of a liberal-democratic "universal homogeneous state" marks the end, according to Fukuyama, to world history. Faster or more slowly, one way or another, all nations are moving in that direction. The socialist countries as well, having realized the sterility of their search for alternatives, are taking the high road of liberalism. World politics, deprived of ideological passions, loses its former emotional tension and drama, gradually converting into international economic relations in the image and semblance of the European Economic Community.

Such is Fukuyama's verdict. It is true that at the end of the article the author makes a delicate intellectual pirouette, Dostoyevskiy style. As though deleting everything already said, he speaks of the possibility of turning mankind, which begins to yearn for "true" history, back to the good old times, when grandiose ideological and political battles gave life a superior meaning and particular attractiveness. However, this is merely a hypothesis. Today the vector of development follows the directly opposite direction—marching toward the end of history as a process of creation of new forms of social relations.

The publication of Fukuyama's article itself is symptomatic. Man has the inherent aspiration to look beyond the horizon. In transitional periods, when everything is shaky and unclear, this becomes a pressing need. To an international scientist and official representative of a great power, and one of the guarantors of a world order, this becomes a matter of professional honor, the ability to look at the real outlines of the future. Naturally, he sees it through the lens of the interests he is called upon to defend.

Another sign of the times is also the foreshortening under which global development is considered. The relative evaluation of power methods in international affairs (the virtually universal condemnation of the recent U.S. intervention in Canada only confirms this)

automatically enhances the significance of economic, political and ideological factors. The reassessment of values is particularly difficult for powers such as the United States and the USSR, whose leading role is largely based on their tremendous military might. Whereas P. Kennedy emphasizes the economic foundations of the status of great power, Fukuyama pays particular attention to ideological-political hegemony. Willy-nilly, he identifies liberalism with democracy, and abstract values and ideals with their real embodiment. Such a lack of separation of concepts makes a fundamental discussion difficult. All in all, the specific political hypostasis of his analysis sounds much more convincing than his general historiophilosophical considerations.

For example, Fukuyama's article includes a number of concepts with which it would be difficult to disagree. The end of the cold war has come. Relations between East and West are assuming a new aspect. The profound transformation of society in the socialist countries has become the driving motor of our time. Mankind is entering a new period in its history. Indeed, whatever may be expecting us in the future, the world will never be what it was even 1 or 2 years ago.

The one-dimensional interpretation by the author of most complex and conflicting processes which are occurring in global politics triggers some doubts. In reading Fukuyama, one gradually begins to experience the sensation that all of this is painfully familiar. All of this is what we said some 10 years ago but only turned around. Replace "the triumph of liberalism" with "the triumph of the world revolutionary process," and this article by this overseas political expert becomes indistinguishable from the flood of publications which for decades drowned our market. Today we are well aware of the worth of this output.

Although Fukuyama proclaims himself a follower of Hegel, the great dialectician, the most characteristic feature of whose elaborations is the metaphysical nature of his approach. In Fukuyama's article the liberal idea is presented as a revelation the truth of which is becoming gradually accepted by all nations. In reality, it is a question of an entire array of different ideological and political stipulations which have undergone a long and complex evolution in the course of historical development.

Thus, the author justifiably traces the origins of the Hegelian idea of freedom ("universal history is nothing other than the development of the concept of freedom") in the spiritual legacy of the American and French revolutions of the end of the 18th century. However, let us consider two fundamental documents of two great revolutions: the "Declaration of Independence of the United States of America" and the Jacobin "Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen," and we can

immediately see profound differences in the interpretation of the key problem of any social system: the relationship between the individual and society. The "Declaration of Independence" proclaims that "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." In turn, the "Declaration of Rights" opens with the following statement: "The objective of society is the common happiness." In the "natural and inalienable rights of man" priority is given to equality. Where the Americans emphasized the spontaneous activeness of the free individual, the French emphasized the social determination of human life and the need for social guarantees for its well-being.

As ever new countries and regions become part of the global capitalist economy, ever stranger combinations are appearing of liberal principles with other cultural and ideological-political traditions which are quite different from the European. It is no accident that Fukuyama himself is forced to add serious stipulations when it becomes a question of the grafting of liberalism on Japanese society by the Americans after World War II. Judging by everything he says, they will become even more serious if we take into consideration the recently established Far Eastern center of business activities, in which the family of the "four dragons" (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) are ready to include significantly larger units (Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia). The economic and political structures created in these countries are quite different from the Western models.

The liberal idea is being developed not only in terms of space but also of time. Despite all of Fukuyama's claims that the principles which were formulated at the start of the 19th century have been preserved in their pristine purity, modern liberalism is quite unlike its historical predecessor. Whereas at the time of its appearance its enthusiasm was directed against the feudal state, following the establishment of capitalist relations the internal contradictions within liberalism became increasingly apparent. The principles it had proclaimed were conflicting with each other and clashing with historical practices and, in order to survive in this fierce competitive struggle, liberalism was forced to borrow a great deal from other ideological and political trends. In particular, it paid increasing attention to the real concept of freedom of the individual and its material foundations. Incidentally, this is fully consistent with the Hegelian understanding of history as being progress in the awareness of freedom.

Despite its best efforts, over the past 200 years liberalism was unable to win even within its own fortress, the Western world. The ideological-political palette of the West carries a great variety of colors. One of the main reasons for the limited influence of liberal ideas, pointed out by Fukuyama as well, is the impersonal nature of

relations among people and the emotionally undersaturated life of the individual, as well as the clear prevalence of the sensory-materialistic principle.

The main reason, in our view, is the instinctive rejection of the ideological monopoly of social awareness. In vain does Fukuyama try to reduce everything to a single denominator. The power of the contemporary West does not lie in the notorious purity of liberal principles or the standardization of life but in the wealth and variety of ideological and political searches, the ability to remain oneself, to absorb a variety of influences and to "res-melt" outside ideas.

Occasionally, even the seemingly excessive variety of its spiritual life reflects various aspects of the way of life of the individual and of social groups. In this connection, we must point out that social democracy, the ideological and political influence of which is by no means declining, was and remains an organic component of Western life. Furthermore, the end of the cold war and of the period of fierce ideological confrontation with the socialist world thawed Western society and created favorable conditions for the appearance of a variety of trends.

Fukuyama's elaborations seem even less convincing when applied to the huge array of developing countries. The seething of passions, the strangeness of ideological formations and the instability of political institutions do not project in the least the end of history in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Remaining "within historical time," the developing countries would hardly allow the developed countries to abandon it. In an integral and interdependent world no one can avoid their difficulties and problems.

Despite the extremely broad range of contemporary problems, Fukuyama has concentrated on the socialist world. This is natural, for today in this area history "makes the weather," laying the foundations of a new world order. Fukuyama sees in the serious changes occurring in the socialist countries the most convincing proof of the triumph of liberalism. It is indicative that it is precisely this aspect of his views that has generated particularly close interest.

Naturally, everyone understands that whatever may happen there is no return to the past. Tectonic processes of tremendous power are taking place within the socialist society. We see new forms of life appearing in front of our very eyes. In the historical clock fatal minutes are ticking, and a single day may encompass more than a century. In this flood of events it is occasionally difficult to even look around, not to mention to calmly consider events.

However, common sense and intuition indicate that the tempest of changes will not bypass anyone, including the West. The forms of social life developed by the West over the centuries, however rational they may be, are not a panacea for all difficulties of today's world. It is only

the combination of existing realities with global experience that could provide the desired answer. It is only by respecting the past, the present and the future of each nation and its right to a free social choice and the search for its own truth and way that humanity could develop a normal life on a universal scale. The time has come for all nations and states to engage in historical creativity. Its only reliable guideline is the new set of coordinates in which the interests of the individual are on one of the axis while the interests of mankind, on the other.

History, as we know, is unfamiliar with the subjunctive. It can be copied but not redone. Free and free-wheeling, it is equally intolerant of violence, whether in the distant or the recent past. No one better than us knows how cruelly it can laugh at those who try to make it fit their own canons. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### Short Book Reviews

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[Text] "*Perestroyka Upravleniya Ekonomikoy: Problemy, Perspektivy*" [Perestroyka of Economic Management: Problems and Prospects]. Ekonomika, Moscow, 1989, 352 pp. Reviewed by V. Storozhenko, doctor of economic sciences.

This is an unusual book. Several dozen economic specialists, scientific workers and economic managers express in it their views on basic problems of the present reform in economic management. The book is based on roundtable debates sponsored by the journal EKONOMIKA I MATEMATICHESKIYE METODY, Izdatelstvo Ekonomika and the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council on Problems of Perfecting Planning and Management of the National Economy With the Application of Economic-Mathematical Methods and Computers. It also includes the results of a survey of 65 noted specialists.

Such a structure of the material has made it possible, to a greater and broader extent than in "ordinary" scientific or journalistic publications, to submit for judgment by the readers the entire range of problems, solutions, opinions and experience within the contemporary Soviet economy. The democratization of management and planning, commodity-monetary relations and price-setting, the balanced nature of development and departmental monopoly, inflation and financial-credit instruments, self-financing of collectives and labor wages and other topics are the focal points of attention of the authors.

The predominant viewpoint is that the present reform is taking merely its initial and frequently conflicting steps. It is short of integral approach and reciprocal coordination in terms of place and time of the measures planned for implementation, and of a unified and purposeful leadership. As has frequently been the case, the interested governmental departments are trying, to this day,

to the best of their ability to embellish the actual state of affairs and shift arising errors and "surprises" in the creation of the new economic mechanism to "everyone around them," such as science, the enterprises, the situation on the world market, etc.

In terms of the scope of the problems it considers and the variety of views and assessments presented, this book is a cross section of a significant part of our economic science as it was in the first half of 1988. Furthermore, such an overall negative factor as the long cycle in the production of a book enables, in this case, the reader to assess the accuracy of many of the then expressed views. Within the period of 18 months which it took to prepare this book for publication, many of its basic concepts and conclusions have not only not become obsolete but, conversely, have had their accuracy and substance proved through practical experience. This proves, contrary to some recent statements, that our economic science has a significant potential.

The warnings formulated by some authors relative to perestroyka illusions, and the incomplete halfway nature of a number of measures proved to be entirely accurate. The harm caused by the Law on the State Enterprise (Association) due to its "restrictive" nature, manifested in the standardization of its suggested models, was manifested most clearly. The view expressed by many authors on the need for overall shaping of an "economic environment," which would include a system of planning and allocation of resources, price setting, a financial-crediting mechanism, etc., proved, as time passed, to be right.

The main unit of the national economy—independent, self-financing and self-managing enterprises and associations—can work efficiently and effectively only if favorable external conditions have been created to this effect, i.e., if the entire national economic complex has been balanced and resources are being responsibly handled by the Gosplan, Gossnab and the sectorial ministries. Nonetheless, after the Law on the State Enterprise was passed, the view became widespread in the central economic departments that now the success of the reform will depend on the production collectives themselves which, allegedly, had been given all the necessary rights.

In this connection, it is not accidental in the least that the reforms planned in June 1987 relative to national economic planning, finances and credit, material and technical supplies, regional management and many other remain virtually unimplemented, even though officially their implementation was undertaken. That was precisely why of late the financial situation within the national economy has not only failed to stabilize but has even worsened. "Living beyond one's means" on the national economic level harms enterprise cost accounting. Enterprises are not being made fully responsible for their own economic results. Furthermore, the existing situation makes it possible for them actively to

pursue short-term group interests, thus worsening the imbalance of the fiscal system.

From my viewpoint, the main shortcoming of the concepts described in this work is the insufficiently developed nature of the problems of socialist ownership in both theory and practice. Of late, attention has been focused on the pluralism of forms of ownership, and interaction among state, cooperative and share-holding enterprises which, naturally, is relevant and necessary. However, little attention is being paid to the problem of consistency between the state federative system and the broad range of currently suggested regional forms of ownership. The extent to which the interests of the state and its territorial units are coordinated, in this case, remains unclear. If no such coordination exists, however, what and how could the resulting damage be compensated? Are some of the suggested forms of regional ownership consistent with the interests and objectives of the federation which usually unites various partners interested in each other? Lately, the relevance of such questions has become particularly clear. It will increase further with the growth of the legislative activities of Union republics and other administrative-territorial units. Today the need for an urgent answer to such questions is obvious.

Naturally, presently hardly anyone is in a condition to provide exhaustive answers to all such questions. However, the reader has the right to expect a methodology in the study of social processes occurring currently, something which is not found in the book under review.

**I. Krivoguz.** *"The Second International 1889-1914: History and Heritage."* Progress Publishers, 1989, 393 pp. [In English]. Reviewed by M. Meshcheryakov, doctor of historical sciences.

The author of this book looks at the history and legacy of the Second International 1889-1914 from positions freed from obsolete dogmas by the new political thinking. His study is based on the research done by Soviet scientists who were able essentially to surmount the Stalinist comprehensively negative assessments of this International, assessments which dominated in our country for quite some time but which were inconsistent with historical reality.

Something else is more important, however: this monograph, based on the study of a broad range of original sources and a new interpretation of Lenin's works and assessments, expresses a more objective and comprehensive approach to the activities and legacy of the Second International. It substantially adds to the evaluation of its historical merits which, as V.I. Lenin wrote, "will never be denied by any conscientious worker" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 101). He considers this international center not only as a form of free unification and voluntary contacts among quite heterogeneous labor organizations but also as the totality of their interrelated activities. This book increases our

knowledge of the way the Second International contributed to the independent formation and strengthening of the socialist parties which, having become the vanguard of the labor movement, aspired to unite but not promote uniformity among them, and which contributed to the consolidation of the forces of the trade unions which were created, with its support, by national and international associations.

The author has particularly concentrated his study on V.I. Lenin's conclusion on the predominance of Marxism within the Second International between 1889 and 1914, something which was frequently misrepresented in the past. This predominance was manifested above all in the Marxist resolutions passed at most congresses of the International, dealing with the most topical problems of the labor movement of that time. Nonetheless, the predominance of Marxism in the international labor movement did not mean its hegemony within the proletarian ranks in the individual countries and did not exclude the existence of other trends—reformist, anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist.

Naturally, this circumstance left its marks on the activities of the International. However, unlike other authors, I. Krivoguz has paid attention not only to the struggle among the different trends but also to the cooperation and interaction among them, something which was frequently ignored and even condemned in the past (particularly when it was a question of the interrelationship between revolutionary and reformist trends). Actually, all important resolutions passed at congresses of the International, other than resolutions concerning international rules for socialist tactics and colonialism, were passed by majority vote of the representatives of the main trends. That is why the author reaches the substantiated conclusion to the effect that "the Second International was not exclusively an arena for disputes and struggle among different trends—revolutionist and opportunist—but above all an example of their essentially fruitful cooperation in the joint defense of the interests of the working people, until the tragic breakup in 1914" (p 385). At that time, as we know, surrendering to chauvinistic moods triggered by the outbreak of the war, the majority of the leaders of the biggest parties within the International refused to implement the antiwar resolutions of congresses and took the side of the governments of their countries, which led to the collapse of the Second International.

As history proves, the hope of a quick replacement of capitalism with socialism for the whole of Europe, nurtured at the start of the 20th century, under the conditions of the aggravation of social contradictions and conflicts, by both wings of the labor movement, was not justified. Capitalism proved to be significantly stronger than they presumed. Taking all of this into consideration, the author has provided substantial clarifications in the assessments of the revolutionary trend which tended to absolutize even the most radical ways and means of struggle, and the reformist one, which supported the evolutionary development and gradual

changes. He reinterprets the role and place of reformist policy in the labor movement and criticizes Bernstein and his followers not because of rejecting the end objective (which was rejected by Engels himself, see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 22, p 563) but for abandoning dialectics, absolutizing evolution and becoming oriented strictly toward cooperation with the bourgeoisie (see pp 158, 159).

The facts and documents presented in this work reveal that the tactics of parliamentary activities developed by the Second International and its struggle in defense of democratic freedom and the social and economic interests of the working people and against militarism enabled it to achieve serious successes. Finally, it is an unquestionable merit of this book that it provides an objective idea of the major contribution which an entire galaxy of noted social democrats made to the labor movement of the turn of the 20th century.

I. Krivoguz justifiably notes that the lessons of the Second International are useful today as well in seeking ways for reciprocal understanding and cooperation between communists and social democratic parties. "For the second time after 1914," he writes, "the urgent need has appeared, along with the real opportunity for surmounting the historical division in the international labor movement, favored both by the renovation of the communist movement as well as the evolution of social reformism. Perhaps the lessons of the Second International will help us not to lose this opportunity, as was the case in the mid-1940s, and to find ways of unification of the workers movement, consistent with the new circumstances, a unification which will determine more than at any other time the destinies of mankind" (pp 385-386).

Naturally, the author by no means describes all opportunities for the adoption of a new approach to the history of the Second International 1889-1914. He is not always consistent. Only this could explain, for example, the fact that he repeats the old negative assessment of the resolution drafted by K. Kautsky on the political tactics adopted by the congress of the International in the year 1900 (pp 290-291). In particular, more extensive studies should be made of the position held by the International on combining class with national interests and the concept of its leaders concerning the socialist restructuring of society and the correlation between the revolutionary and reformist ways of social progress.

This interesting book was published in English. Consequently, it will be accessible only to part of our scientific public. We believe that it would be useful to publish it in Russian as well so that it could become accessible to a wide circle of Soviet readers. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

**'With a Delay of Up to 2 Months...'**

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Feb 90 (signed to press 2 Feb 90) p 128

[Report by N. Borisov]

[Text] I turn to you with a serious complaint. Starting with the second half of last year, we have begun to receive KOMMUNIST with a delay of as long as 2 months. Today, 7 January, I have still not received Nos. 16, 17 and 18 which, according to PRAVDA, came out some time ago. The post office claims that these issues have still not been received. I have been a reader of this journal for many years and I subscribed to it for 1990 as well. Now I am concerned: Will I be getting it on time? My address: 197341, Leningrad, Pr. Ispytateley, 15-1, kv. 260.

**From the editors.** We received absolutely identical letters from N. Shafranov (192071, Leningrad, Turku Street No 11, kv. 452) and Yu. Kuleshov (194291, Leningrad, Pr. Lunacharskiy, 68-1, kv. 25). We were told by the Leningrad City Communications Administration that such complaints, and not only concerning our journal, are not isolated cases. The post office workers are citing difficulties with unloading the copies received from Moscow on trucks (No 16 was shipped to Leningrad on 21 November; No 17, on 5 December and No 18 on 26 December 1989; issue No 1 for 1990 was shipped on 9 January). Since such delays have become widespread, as yet no one has undertaken to determine how serious their reasons may be. In any case, by 22 January all issues of KOMMUNIST for last year should already have been delivered to Leningrad subscribers. The first issue of the journal for 1990 has not as yet been delivered to them.... COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

**Chronicle**

905B0017R Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3,  
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[Text] A meeting between KOMMUNIST associates and the labor collective of the TsAGI was held at Zhukovskiy City, in the Moscow area. In the course of a more than 3-hour debate relevant problems of the democratization of Soviet society, the implementation of the economic reform, perestroika in the CPSU, and reasons for the critical situation on the consumer goods market were discussed. Great attention was paid to sociopolitical processes in Eastern European countries.

Achievements and difficulties in the renovation of the economic, political and spiritual life in our country, problems of developing the concept of contemporary socialism, which includes the work of KOMMUNIST, were the topics of a talk between the editors and Jean Spielmann, secretary general of the Swiss Labor Party. The head of the Swiss Labor Party highly rated the positive influence which perestroika in the USSR has had on the international situation and expressed critical remarks on views expressed in the Soviet press about so-called "Swiss socialism." COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.



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